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ONMAY 12, 1954, the Spanish S.S. Guadalupe was berthed at Pier No. 2
I. INTRODUCTION

in Hoboken, New Jersey, preparing to load a cargo of wheat. A Spanish seaman, Francisco Romero, employed as a member of the Guadalupe's crew, was engaged in "topping the boom" when something went wrong.
The wire cable employed in the operation slipped, the boom fell, and the cable
whipped around Romero's legs. His left leg was severed; his right leg sustained
multiple fractures. He was removed by ambulance to St. Mary's Hospital in
Hoboken, where he remained under treatment for eight months, ultimately
being fitted with an artificial leg.'
Twelve days after the injury Romero filed an action in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York. His amended complaint
named four defendants and set forth several grounds for recovery. The defendants, and the causes of action asserted against them, were:
(1) Compania Trasatlantica, also known as the Spanish Line, a Spanish
corporation which was owner of the Guadalupe and employer of Romero.
2
Against this defendant the plaintiff asserted claims (a) under the Jones Act,
(b) for unseaworthiness, and (c) for maintenance and cure.
(2) Garcia & Diaz, Inc., a New York corporation acting as ship's husband
t Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. The author is indebted to Mr. Bruce L.
Bromberg, of the Class of 1960, The University of Chicago Law School, for valuable assistance
in the preparation of this paper.
This study was originally undertaken as a joint project with Professor Philip B. Kurland.
More because of divergent interests than divergent opinions, we decided in the end to publish
our conclusions separately. I owe much to him as a result of the collaboration.
I Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959). Certain details
not found in the opinion are supplied by the record and briefs.
2 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952).
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under an agency agreement with the Spanish Line. On the theory that this defendant "operated and controlled and managed" the Guadalupe, the same
claims asserted against the Spanish Line were asserted against Garcia, with the
addition of a general claim for simple maritime tort.
(3) International Terminal Operating Co., Inc., a Delaware corporation
which had been engaged as stevedoring contractor to load the cargo. The claim
against International was simply for maritime tort on the theory that its
employees had contributed to the injury.
(4) Quin Lumber Co., Inc., a New York corporation whose employees were
aboard for the purpose of installing shifting boards preparatory to reception of
the cargo. Against this defendant, as against International, the claim was for
simple maritime tort.3
All four defendants moved to dismiss the actionfor lack of jurisdiction.After
a pre-trial hearing on some matters which were thought to bear on the jurisdictional question, the district court granted the motions to dismiss, 4 and the

court of appeals affirmed.5 On the face of the matter such a disposition of the
case seems surprising and anomalous. Under the Constitution the judicial power
of the United States extends "to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction" ;6 under the Judicial Code the district courts of the United States are
given "original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the states, of: (1) Any
civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases
all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." 7 This-an action for
personal injuries to a seaman, sustained on board a vessel in navigable waterswas certainly a case within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. On what
possible theory, then, could it be dismissed on the ground that the district court
had no jurisdiction?
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings." The plaintiff's
3A degree of interpretation is involved in stating the causes of action asserted. The amended complaint (Record, vol. 1, p. 223a, appears to assert the claims under the Jones Act, for
unseaworthiness, and for maintenance and cure against International; but no basis for thus
treating that defendant as owner and employer is suggested, and the point is not developed in
later stages of the litigation. The district court treated the claim for maintenance and cure as
directed solely against the Spanish Line (142 F. Supp. 570, 574 [S.D.N.Y. 1956]), and also
characterized the complaint as asserting a cause of action against all four defendants for maritime tort. The Supreme Court, more accurately, read the claim for maintenance and cure as
being asserted against both Garca and the Spanish Line (358 U.S. at 356); but the Court also
construed the complaint as asserting a claim for maritime tort against allfour defendants. Why
such a general claim should be asserted against the owner-employer is not clear. Cf. Brief for
Respondent Compania Trasatlantica, p. 6. The small discrepancies in the various statements
of the claims asserted seem unimportant.
4142 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
-244 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1957).

6U.S.

CONST. art. III,

§ 2, par. 1.

728 U.S.C. § 1333 (1952). (Emphasis supplied.)
8358 U.S. at 385.
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case was saved; the jurisdiction of the district court was vindicated. It was not
vindicated, however, in any such simple and straightforward way as would seem
to be indicated by the constitutional and statutory provisions which have been
quoted here. The opinion of the Court, written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
represents the views of only a bare majority of the justices. Twenty-two pages
of the official reports were required for that opinion's exposition of the jurisdictional question. There were two separate minority opinions. Why all this
pother over a question the answer to which seems crystal dear?
Romero's case seems certain to become a landmark decision. It deals with
questions of considerable importance, long unsettled, in the law of seamen's
injuries; it has facets which may be of significance in relation to questions of
federal jurisdiction beyond the admiralty and maritime matters directly involved; and, in addition, it decides an important question of conflict of lawsi.e., of the application of the Tones Act and the general American maritime law
to cases having foreign aspects-in a way which has significance for basic conflict-of-laws theory and method. It is the purpose of this paper to consider (1)
the phenomenon of the Court's preoccupation with the question of federal
jurisdiction over maritime cases, and (2) the conflict-of-laws question.9
II. TIM CASE IN CONTEXT
The injured seaman, like personal-injury claimants generally, places considerable store by the institution of trial by jury. Unlike most other such
claimants, however, he suffers from an embarrassment of riches in the remedies
which he may assert against his most obvious adversary, the ship-owning
employer. His effort to take full advantage of the largesse which the law bestows
upon him as a member of a favored class of workmen complicates his quest for
the verdict of his peers. Generally speaking, when a seaman is injured aboard
ship it is prudent for his counsel to file an action against the shipowner-employer
in three counts: (1) under the Jones Act, (2) under the general maritime law
for unseaworthiness, and (3) under the general maritime law for maintenance
and cure. Thus, if he can establish negligence, he may recover under the Jones
Act full indemnity, including damages for pain and suffering; or, even if he
cannot prove negligence, he can recover similarly full indemnity on the theory
of unseaworthiness if he can show that the injury resulted from any defect in
the vessel or its appurtenances rendering the thing in question unfit for its intended purpose; or, in default of any proof of either negligence or defective
equipment, he may recover maintenance and cure--i.e., his living expenses and
medical expenses during convalescence, plus unearned wages to the end of the
voyage

10

9 For discussion of the significance of the decision for federal jurisdiction generally see Kurland, The Romero Case and Somie Problems of Federal Jhirisdicion, 73 HARV. L. REv. -

(1960).

0See generally GIUmoR,

&BLAcx, THE LAw oF Amm'RTy cih. VI (1957).
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It is probably desirable from the standpoint of the interest of the public, as
well as that of the plaintiff, to have these three counts disposed of in a single
proceeding. The claim is for a single injury, arising from a single incident; the
evidence needed to establish the claim, or a defense, will be substantially the
same under all three counts. Indeed, the law forces the plaintiff to join in a
single action the counts under the Jones Act and for unseaworthiness; if one of
these is asserted separately, the judgment precludes subsequent assertion of the
other." If the action is brought in a state court pursuant to the saving-to-suitors
clause i2 all three counts may be disposed of in one proceeding, and by a jury if
the state so provides. If the plaintiff prefers a federal forum, however, difficulties arise. While the Jones Act expressly gives the seaman the right to maintain
an action "at law, with the right of trial by jury,"3 the claims for unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure rest upon the general maritime law and are
cognizable in the federal court by virtue of its admiralty jurisdiction. In the
exercise of that jurisdiction the court has traditionally proceeded without a
jury.14 Thus, unless there is to be some kind of division of the issues, or of the
function of deciding the issues, it has seemed necessary to establish that the
court has jurisdiction of the claims for unseaworthiness and maintenance and
cure independently of their maritime character. If, for example, the parties are
of diverse citizenship, and if the jurisdictional amount is in controversy, the
court has jurisdiction of each of these two claims under Section 1332 of the
Judicial Code, and the right to jury trial is taken for granted. In the absence of
diversity of citizenship, the only non-admiralty ground of jurisdiction having
general utility would be (1) Section 1331 of the Judicial Code, on the theory
that a case arising under the general maritime law is one arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or (2) "pendent" jurisdiction, on the
theory that, jurisdiction of the Jones Act claim being present because of Section
11Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316 (1927); see McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum
Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958); cf. Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437, 444
(2d Cir. 1959). The principle probably does not apply to maintenance and cure, Pacific S.S. Co.
v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 (1928); The Rolph, 299 Fed. 52, 55 (9th Cir. 1924). Although the
Peterson case involved only the acceptance of maintenance and cure rather than a prior judgment therefor, Gilmore & Black rely upon it for the statement that "By unquestionable authority a maintenance and cure claim is 'separate and independent' from both a Jones Act
claim or an unseaworthiness claim for purposes of resjwuicataor § 1441(c) or anything else."
GILmoRE & BLAcK, op. cit. supra note 10, at 301.
12
Supra note 7. The choice of forum is complicated by the fact that the typical admiralty
remedy of process in rem against the vessel to enforce a maritime lien is not available at all in
the state courts, nor in the federal courts under the Jones Act. Plamals v. Pinar del Rio, 277
U.S. 151 (1928); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 574 (1953). This aspect of the choice will
be given only incidental attention here. See, e.g., note 268 infra.
13Supra note 2.
14By virtue of a fascinating little accident of legal history, there is a statutory right to jury
trialin cases of contract or tort concerning certain Great Lakes vessels. 28 U.S.C. § 1873. Thus
in a case involving such a vessel the count for unseaworthiness may clearly be submitted to
the jury along with the Jones Act count; but it has been held that the statutory right to jury
trial does not apply to the cause of action for maintenance and cure. Miller v. Standard Oil Co.,
199 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied 345 U.S. 945, rehearingdenied 345 U.S. 971 (1953).
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1331, the two related claims may be retained and disposed of under the same
authority.,5
The courts seem simply to have drifted into the habit of treating the question
as to jury trial in jurisdictional terms, although the assumptions involved in
that treatment are by no means free from doubt. The mere fact that a case is
cognizable under Section 1331 or Section 1332 does not mean that it will be
tried to a jury; if, for example, the case is one which before the adoption of the
Rules of Civil Procedure would have been a suit in equity, the issues are tried
by the court. 6 Similarly, certain actions of a maritime character founded on acts
of Congress are cognizable by virtue of Section 1331, but are not tried by jury
because Congress has made admiralty procedures applicable. 17 Rather plainly,
there is no constitutional right to jury trial in saving-clause cases, in view of the
historic absence of that institution from admiralty proceedings. Congress, however, in saving to suitors the right to a common-law remedy, certainly intended
that the plaintiff should have the right to choose a common-law forum, and
probably intended that if he sued in the federal court (as he might if there were
diversity of citizenship) he should have the right to a jury trial."8 Even in savingclause cases, however, where the plaintiff seeks a common-law remedy which
the common law is competent to give, there is not a constitutionalright to jury
trial; Congress could repeal the saving clause and make the federal admiralty
jurisdiction exclusive, with the clear result that there would be no right to
jury trial in maritime cases.
The objective of a unified procedure for seamen's injury cases, with all three
of the counts being submitted to the jury, can be attained without resort to
jurisdictional concepts. There is no constitutional barrier to jury trial in admiralty;" certainly Congress could provide for such a mode of trial, and a simple
15Cf. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933); 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b).
165 MooR, FEDERAL PRACTICE 115 et seq. (2d ed. 1951).
17 See, e.g., the Suits in Admiralty Act, 41 Stat. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 741 et seq. (1952),
and the Death on the High Seas Act, 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761 et seq. (1952).
"8Cf. Sections 9 and 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 76, 79, providing that the trial
of all issues of fact should be by jury except in suits in equity and in "civil causes of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction." This provision, which was in § 770 of the old Judicial Code, was
omitted by the Revisers from the 1948 revision. See Reviser's Note to 28 U.S.C. § 1873. "An
action brought under the 'saving-to-suitors' clause, invoking the common law or equity jurisdiction of the district courts, would be governed by the Federal Rules [of Civil Procedure],
and hence a right of trial by jury, if demanded, would be determined in accordance with the
general principles governing civil actions generally." 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTxC 270 (2d
ed. 1951). Cf. Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437, 454 (2d Cir. 1959)
(concurring opinion.)
"9The provision for jury trial in Great Lakes cases (note 14, supra) dates from 1845, 5 Stat.
726, and its validity was sustained in The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 460 (1851).
An act of Congress providing for jury trial in cases of unseaworthiness and maintenance and
cure might revive the strange argument which was directed against the Jones Act-that it unconstitutionally curtailed the federal admiralty jurisdiction; but the authoritative rejection
of that argument in its original context should suffice to defeat it in the new. Panama R.R. v.
Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
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judicial decision authorizing it in the typical seaman's injury case without reference to jurisdictional considerations would be, in practical effect, no more than
a legitimation of what was once general practice.2 0 It is understandable that, in
the absence of Congressional action, the bar and the courts should have attempted to deal with the problem by seeking a nonadmiralty basis for the
court's jurisdiction. This search, which in recent years has centered upon the
theory that actions under the general maritime law are cognizable under Section 1331, has, however, involved such extreme concentration upon the question of "jurisdiction"--i.e., jurisdiction independent of Section 1333-that discussion by lawyers, courts, and commentators takes on a strangely conceptual
cast, as if two quite separate courts, one of law and one of admiralty, were involved, and as if a negative answer to the question of non-admiralty jurisdiction
would be fatal to the plaintiff's cause. The tendency to talk in this way is aggravated by the persistent influence of the pre-1938 separation of law and
equity. There are times when one feels impelled to protest that the excessive
attention given to the jurisdictional difference between the "law side" of the
court and the "admiralty side" is an anachronistic perpetuation of the same
kind of evil which attended the strict separation of law and equity, and is quite
inconsistent with the modem spirit in procedure 2 At the least, it may be suggested that less concern with the question whether there is jurisdiction on the
"law side" and more concern with the real questions involved would facilitate
intelligent settlement of the question as to how seamen's actions for personal
injuries shiould be tried in the federal courts.
The tendency to dichotomize the district courts is encountered in the very
first paragraph of the opinion of the Court in the Romero case, where we are
told that the seaman's three-count complaint against his employer was filed
"on the law side of the District Court for the Southern District of New York."
If, curious as to how the Court knew which of the "sides" was selected by the
plaintiff, one examines the complaint, the results are inconclusive. The caption,
which might have identified the proceeding as a civil action, or as a n action "at
law," is omitted in the printed record; but it does appear that a jury trial was
demanded. 2 The jurisdiction of the court was invoked under the general
maritime law and under the Jones Act, 23 except that as to the defendants International and Quin the diversity jurisdiction was invoked 4 Going beyond the
20 See notes 315 through 319, infra. Gilmore & Black suggest that the prevailing current
practice is to allow the maritime law counts to go to the jury along with the Jones Act count,
and even that there will be jury trial if maintenance and cure alone is involved. Op. cit. supra
note 10, at 261-62, notes 44, 45. Their analysis, however, erroneously assumes that the jury
problem in the federal courts is resolved by the saving-to-suitors clause alone. Ibid.
21Cf. 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 65 et seq. (2d ed. 1951).
22
Record, vol. 1, p. 197a, Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354
(1959).
23 Id. at 200a.
24 Id. at 201a-202a, 203a-204a.
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complaint, we find that the case was referred to a particular "part" of the
court for jury trial in accordance with the plaintiff's demand. 25 The language of
the docket entries is more suggestive of the Rules of Civil Procedure than of the
Admiralty Rules.26 In the office of the clerk of the district court, of course, we
could find unambiguous information, because in the Southern District of New
York separate dockets are maintained for civil actions and for admiralty cases.
Undoubtedly this complaint was entered on the civil docket. In many another
district, however, this fairly conclusive information would be unobtainable.
Through the courtesy of the clerks of all the district courts it has been learned
that separate admiralty dockets are maintained in only 31 districts; there are
no such dockets in the remaining 57. In half a dozen of the 57, local rules require
that admiralty cases be captioned "In Admiralty"; in others it is the practice of
the bar to caption the case so as to indicate that it is in admiralty, and in still
others the clerk, while entering the case on the civil docket, will add a notation
that it is "in admiralty." In some 36 districts admiralty cases appear to be
treated in the clerk's office simply as civil actions, without any distinction at
all. 27 In general, of course, these are the districts in which there is little or no
maritime litigation; there are separate admiralty dockets in most of the districts
which comprise areas of shipping activity. But in the Northern District of
Illinois, which handles a substantial number of maritime cases and presumably
will handle more with the improvement of the St. Lawrence Seaway, there is no
separate admiralty docket and no rule as to caption; such cases are filed with
"other civil actions."
Counsel in the Romero case would have had no doubt as to which side of the
court they were on once they appeared before Judge Sugarman for the pre-trial
hearing, for there they were confronted with the most conclusive evidence of
all: the Silver Oar, symbol of the admiralty jurisdiction, was not on the bench;
they could not very well have been on the "admiralty side." Unfortunately,
however, no other district possesses a Silver Oar.
On its face, Judge Sugarman's dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction may seem to be an instance of carrying to an extreme the tendency to ignore the court's admiralty jurisdiction when the Silver Oar is absent; in fact
the trial judge did not carry the tendency so far. Near the conclusion of the
pre-trial hearing he inquired of counsel for the plaintiff whether, in the event
the court should decide that there was no cause of action against the Spanish
Line under the Jones Act, they would desire to amend the complaint (1) so as
to proceed on the basis of diversity of citizenship against the other defendants
or (2) so as to proceed in admiralty, without a jury. The response was negaat 2a.
26Id. at A.
27 A compilation of the materials relating to docketing of admiralty cases in each of the
district courts is now on file and available for reference at the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, Supreme Court Building, Washington 25, D.C.
25Id.
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tive.2 s It was only after the opportunity to amend had been thus refused that
the court ordered dismissal, holding:
1. That since the Jones Act does not apply to injuries to alien seamen aboard
foreign ships owned by aliens, the court had no "jurisdiction" under that Act
of the claim against the Spanish Line;
2. That since Garcia was a mere husbanding agent and neither owned nor
controlled the vessel the Jones Act claim against that defendant must also be
dismissed;
3. That Section 1331 did not confer jurisdiction of the other claims because
cases predicated on the general maritime law are not cases arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States;
4. That Section 1332 did not confer jurisdiction of the claims against the
other defendants because "perfect" diversity of citizenship was lacking, the
plaintiff and the defendant Spanish Line both being aliens; and
5. That, on forum non conveniens grounds, the court would not retain jurisdiction of the claim against the Spanish Line even in admiralty.29
The court of appeals, in a brief per curiam opinion, affirmed on the basis of
the "workmanlike" opinion of Judge Sugarman, adding only a rejection of an
argument, based upon treaty, which had not been made in the district court.3"
The decision of the Supreme Court may be summarized as follows:
I. Jurisdiction
(a) Under the Jones Act. The Jones Act claims should not have been dismissed for want of jurisdiction. A substantial claim was asserted and
the court had jurisdiction to determine whether the coverage of the act
extended to a case involving such foreign elements.
(b) UnderSection 1331. The claims asserted under the general maritime law
are not claims "arising under the Constitution or laws of the United
States."
(c) Pendent jurisdiction.The claims for unseaworthiness and maintenance
and cure were, however, cognizable by virtue of the doctrine of "pendent" jurisdiction, since the court had jurisdiction of the Jones Act
claims.3
28 Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., supra note 22 at Record vol. 1, pp.
188a-190a.
29 142 F. Supp. at 574. The text is an interpretative paraphrase of the court's conclusions.
30244 F.2d at 410-411.
31"Rejection of the proposed new reading of § 1331 does not preclude consideration of
petitioner's claims under the general maritime law. These claims cannot, we have seen, be
justified under § 1331. However, the District Court may have jurisdiction of them 'pendent'
to its jurisdiction under the Jones Act." 358 U.S. at 380. Although this language is broad, it
seems quite clear that the Court was referring to the claims for unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure against the defendants alleged to be owner-employers, and not to the claims
against the other defendants. The preceding discussion was directed to the claims against the
employer; there was no need to find "pendent" jurisdiction to support the actions against the
diverse respondents; and application of the rule of "pendent" jurisdiction to claims against
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(d) Diversity of citizenship. "Since the Jones Act provides an independent
basis of jurisdiction over the non-diverse respondent... the rule of
Strawbridge v. Curtis, 3 Cranch 267, does - not require dismissal of the
32
claims against the diverse respondents.
TI. Them erits-conflict of laws and other matters
(a) The claims against the Spanish Line. In the absence of a clear Congressional directive to the contrary, neither the Jones Act nor the general
maritime law as developed in this country will be applied to a case involving the foreign elements present here.
(b) The claims against Garcia.While the district court properly found that
Garcia was not liable under the Jones Act, nor for unseaworthiness, nor
for maintenance and cure--not being the employer, nor in control of
the vessel-there should be further proceedings to determine whether a
cause of action was stated against that defendant for simple maritime
tort.
(c) The claims against Internationaland Quin. Since the complaint as to
these defendants was erroneously dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
there should be further proceedings to determine on the merits their
liability for maritime tort.
We are now in position to consider the most fascinating statement in the
majority opinion: "We are not called upon to decide whether the District Court
may submit to the jury the 'pendent' claims under the general maritime law in
the event that a cause of action be found to exist."33 If the Court did not decide
the issue as to jury trial vel non, what did it decide when it ruled that there was
additional parties, based upon different allegations as to fault, would be a more radical extension of the rule than its application to alternative counts against the same defendant.
Moreover, to hold the claims against International and Quin sustained by pendent jurisdiction
would be to produce a venue difficulty which Mr. justice Frankfurter had used as an argument
against jurisdiction under § 1331 (358 U.S. at 376-77): it is only when jurisdiction is based
"solely" on diversity of citizenship that the plaintiff may sue in the district of his residence
(28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)). If jurisdiction is sustainable also under § 1331 he may sue only in the
district of the defendant's residence, and the same is presumably true if jurisdiction is sustainable not only because of diversity but because the claim is pendent to a § 1331 claim. Surely
the Court did not mean to bring about through "pendent" jurisdiction the venue difficulty it
had sought to avoid by holding § 1331 inapplicable.
32358
33358

U.S. at 381.

U.S. at 381. In view of the Court's holding on the merits that neither the Spanish
Line nor Garcia was liable by virtue of the employment relation, or control of the vessel, the
reference to the contingency that "a cause of action be found to exist" seems to suggest that
the Court conceived of the"pendent" jurisdiction as extending to the claims for simple maritime tort as well as to those based on the employment relation. Probably the better explanation is that this choice of language was made because of the structure of the opinion: at this
point the Court had not treated the question on the merits; the contingency referred to was not
a finding by the district court on remand that a cause of action was stated against Garcia,
International, and Quin for simple maritime tort, but a finding by the Supreme Court in part
IIof its opinion that a cause of action was stated under the general maritime law against the
Spanish Line or Gareia because of the employment relation.
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pendent jurisdiction? If the Court did not decide that issue, what did it decide
when it ruled that as to the claims under general maritime law the case was not
one arising under federal law? It is safe to say that the only reason why counsel
for the plaintiff put forward the theory that the general maritime law claims
against the Spanish Line were cognizable under Section 1331, or by virtue of
being ancillary to the Jones Act claim, was that thereby they expected to secure
the right to jury trial on those claims. The conflict between the circuits, despite
the elaborate intricacy of the arguments involved, concerned a single practical
question: the propriety of jury trial on the maritime law counts. Yet we are told
that the Court, while resolving the conflict, has left open the practical question
at issue.
In as much as the claims for unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure were
to be dismissed on the merits, Mr. Justice Frankfurter could well say that it was
unnecessary to consider the effect of the jurisdictional ruling on the right to
jury trial. But in that case, why consider jurisdiction "at law" at all? Mr.
Justice Frankfurter gave this answer: "Here we merely decide that a district
judge has jurisdiction to determine whether a cause of action has been stated
if that jurisdiction has been invoked by a complaint at law rather than by a
libel in admiralty, as long as the complaint also properly alleges a claim under
the Jones Act."'34 The reference, clearly, is to the claims asserted against the
Spanish Line and Garcia under the general maritime law.
The question whether the complaint stated a cause of action as to these
claims may be subdivided thus: (1) whether, in view of the foreign aspects of
the case, the general American maritime law was applicable to impose liability
on the Spanish Line--part of the conflict-of-laws question; (2) whether Garcia
was liable for unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure as owner or employer;
and perhaps (3) whether a cause of action for simple maritime tort had been
stated against Garcia. The district court had not decided the first of these questions (unless such a decision be thought implicit in its holding that the Jones
Act was not applicable); it had held only that as a matter of discretion, on
forum non conveniens grounds, it would not retain the case for trial in admiralty.35 Had it retained the case for trial in admiralty it would presumably
have reached the question whether the general American maritime law could
be applied and, if not, whether the plaintiff could recover under Spanish law.
In answer to the second question the district court had ruled that Garcia was a
mere husbanding agent and not liable for unseaworthiness and maintenance and
cure. Neither court ruled on the third question, that being left for determination
on remand. But since there was diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff
and Garcia, and since the jurisdictional amount was in controversy between
these parties, neither Section 1331 nor the "pendent" theory was necessary to
sustain jurisdiction "at law" of the case against Garcia.
34358 U.S. at 381.
1'In so doing, did not the district court exercise its admiralty powers, though "sitting as a
court of law?"
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It follows that the sole reason for the Court's lengthy and contentious disposition of the jurisdictional question was to support the authority of the district judge to resolve the conflict-of-laws question; and, since the district court
had not passed on that question, its jurisdiction to do so was involved at best
only indirectly-perhaps in connection with its authority, on remand, to enter
a judgment on that question in conformity with the opinion of the Supreme
Court.,,
If this interpretation is correct it is matter for pause and reflection. There is
only one United States district court in each judicial district. It may have one
or more judges; in either case, each is equally competent as a judge administering the common law, a chancellor administering equity, or a doctor administering the maritime law. There are, indeed, difficulties attending the question of
what law-state or federal-applies in maritime cases; but one thing is reasonably clear: In all maritime cases the same law, state or federal, is applied
whether the action is in a state court or a federal court, and, if in a federal
court, whether on the "law side" or the "admiralty side."3 7 There are, indeed,
differences in procedure between a proceeding "at law" and a proceeding "in
admiralty." The federal courts alone exercise the admiralty jurisdiction. In
those courts that jurisdiction is exercised (1) by the judge, sitting without a
jury, and (2) pursuant to the Admiralty Rules. In a civil action the judge may
proceed with a jury-though he does not necessarily do so-and the Rules of
Civil Procedure are applicable. Here the United States district judge was sitting
without a jury. By virtue of the admiralty jurisdiction he had complete authority to pass upon the question of conflict of laws with reference to the general
maritime law;3 and it seems clear that there is nothing in the Admiralty Rules
36Cf. Mr. Justice Brennan's comment in dissent: "I must say I cannot understand a sort of
jurisdiction that allows the federal courts to make a preliminary exploration of the merits of

the case, and a binding adjudication upon them, but which may not allow them to go further."
358 U.S. at 413.
It may be that, overlooking the diversity basis for jurisdiction "at law" over the claims
against Garcia, the Court was also concerned with justifying the district judge's determination

of the factual question of Garcia's relation to the vessel. This is particularly likely in view of
the plaintiff's insistence that his right to jury trial had been infringed. The question was not
only whether the court as a law court could decide that question, but whether it could do so
wittout a jury. The latter part of the question the Court answered by treating the issue as one

appropriate for summary judgment. 358 U.S. at 357, n. 4.
37TheTungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959); United Pilot's Ass'n. v. Halecki, 358 U.S.
613 (1959); Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959); Wilburn
Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955); Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S.
406 (1953); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942); Chelentis v. Luckenbach
S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918). See GrrmoRsE & BLAcx, TM LAW or AmmRLJTy 374 et seq.

(1957).
38Note that judge Sugarman's jurisdiction to determine the conflicts question with reference to the Jones Act was not in question, the court clearly having jurisdiction "at law" so

far as that Act was concerned. It is passing strange that his authority to decide the same question with reference to the non-statutory law was doubted (and that it would apparently be
denied in the absence of the Jones Act claim), since "IThe similarity in purpose and function
of the Jones Act and the general maritime principles of compensation for personal injury,
admit of no rational differentiation of treatment for choice of law purposes." 358 U.S. at 382.
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which would have been inconsistent with his determination that there was no
genuine issue of fact as to the relationship of Garcia to the vessel.3 9 Any challenge to the district court's jurisdiction to make the determinations on the
merits which were made could have been adequately met simply by reference
to the court's admiralty jurisdiction.
Since it was not necessary to determine whether the claims under the general maritime law against the Spanish Line and Garcia based on the employment relation should be submitted to a jury-no cause of action having been
stated-the rulings as to jurisdiction under Section 1331 and pendent jurisdiction were unnecessary to the decision unless one assumes that the admiralty
and civil powers of the district court cannot be exercised in a single proceeding,
and, indeed, that the judge is impotent so far as his admiralty powers are concemed unless the Silver Oar is properly in place.40 Moreover, if the question of
the right to jury trial was not determined, we are confronted with an anomaly:
although certiorari was granted in part to resolve the conflict among the circuits, 4' and although the Court reviewed thoroughly the arguments involved in

the conflict, the real conflict is left unresolved. Oddly enough, however, the
truth seems to be that even though it was not necessary to determine the right
to jury trial, and even though the rulings as to Section 1331 and pendent jurisdiction were not necessary for any purpose, the issue as to the right of jury
trial was resolved for all practical purposes, and resolved, moreover, in a beneficial way from the standpoint of law administration. The lack of clarity as to
this point and the difficulties involved in its exposition are alike traceable to the
tendency to speak of the admiralty and civil powers of the district court as being
mutually exclusive, as if there were two separate courts. A clear recognition of
the artificiality of this concept would have simplified the problem before the
court and reduced the area of disagreement among the justices. The discussion
immediately following will trace the influence of this concept.
After construing Section 133142 in the light of its history, the Court turned
31The Admiralty Rules do not refer to judgment on the pleadings nor to summary judgment; cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c), 56. Indeed, it has been stated that "Admiralty does
not employ... the pretrial procedure, the summary judgment... as those proceedings are
set forth in the Civil Rules." 2 BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY 47-48 (6th ed. 1940). By virtue of his
admiralty jurisdiction, however, Judge Sugarman had broader authority than that conferred
by Rule 56 of the civil rules: as sole trier of factual issues, he was competent not only to determine that there was no genuine issue of fact, but to resolve genuine issues of fact. Cf. FED.
R. CIrv. P. Rule 41(b); 6 MoolE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE 2014-15 (2d ed. 1953).
40The negative implication of the passage from the majority opinion quoted in text at note
34 supra,is that a district judge has no jurisdiction to determine whether a cause of action
under the general maritime law has been stated, if jurisdiction has been invoked by a complaint
at law rather than a libel in admiralty, in the absence of a claim under the Jones Act (and in
the absence of other basis for jurisdiction "at law").
41358 U.S. at 358, 360.
42
The decision is not a construction of Article I of the Constitution and is not placed on
constitutional grounds. The authority of Congress to treat maritime cases as cases arising
under federal law is expressly recognized. 358 U.S. at 379.
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its attention to the consequences of holding that that section confers on the
district courts jurisdiction of cases under the general maritime law. In two respects the Court found that such consequences would be drastic, revolutionary,
and disruptive: (1) with respect to the procedure in admiralty and (2) with respect to the allocation of competence between the state and national governments in maritime matters.
The effect on procedure in admiralty cases is described as "a drastic innovation," "a revolutionary procedural change,1 44 a "drastic change,"4 5 and as
"far-reaching [and] dislocating." 6 In fact, the effect on procedure "in admiraity"--ifone may for the occasion employ the Court's own concept of mutually
exclusive jurisdiction-would be precisely nil. The exact effect of a holding that
maritime causes are cognizable under Section 1331 would be to permit certain
cases which are within the saving-to-suitors clause, and which may now be
brought in a state court, to be brought on the "law side" of the federal court.
Cases not within the saving clause, and cases which, though within the saving
clause, are brought "in admiralty," would not be affected. In such cases the
judge would still sit without a jury, and the Admiralty Rules would still apply.
The situation would be precisely what it now is, and has been from the beginning, with respect to cases within the saving-to-suitors clause in which there
is diversity of citizenship between the parties. A case which would otherwise be
cognizable in the federal court only in admiralty, without a jury, is made
cognizable in the same court-probably with a jury. The historic mode of trial
in admiralty has not been affected at all by the fact that the district courts
have jurisdiction of maritime causes under Section 1332, and it would not be
affected at all if the courts had jurisdiction of such causes under Section 1331.
The Court's concern over the effect on admiralty procedure seems to have
resulted from a tacit assumption which almost certainly would have been rejected if it had been made explicit: that, if cases under the general maritime
law are cases "arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States," a
right to trial by jury necessarily follows. But the right to jury trial extends only
to cases at common law.4 7 It does not extend to suits which may be, but are not,
brought at common law. There is no right to jury trial in admiralty even though
the action might have been brought at law under the saving clause. If the parties
to a libel in personam are of diverse citizenship the defendant cannot demand a
jury trial even though the jurisdictional amount is in controversy;48 and the
opinion of the Court itself refers to evidence that there are many proceedings
43358 U.S. at 369.

44 Ibid.

46 bMd.

45358 U.S. at 370.

4

See notes 16-18 supra.

generally 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAeTicE 269 el seq. (2d ed., 1951). As to the possibility of transfer to the civil docket, see notes 265, 284, 286 infra.
48 See
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in admiralty in which the case unquestionably arises under "the Constitution or
49
laws of the United States" and in which there is no right to a jury trial.
A possible.consequence of the rejected view of Section 1331-though by no
means a certain one-would be a reduction in the number of causes tried "in
admiralty" in the federal courts. Mr. justice Frankfurter makes the point in
interesting fashion:
If we are now to attribute such a result to Congress the sole remaining justification for
the federal admiralty courts which have played such a vital role in our federal judicial
system for 169 years will be to provide a federal forum for the small number of maritime claims which derive from state law, and to afford the ancient remedy of a libel
in rem in those limited instances when an in personam judgment would not suffice to
satisfy a claim.5"
Here is an excellent illustration of the seductive influence of thinking in dichotomous terms of the admiralty and civil jurisdictions. Just what are the "federal
admiralty courts" in question? Are they not the United States district courts?
And what is the grievous detriment with which they are threatened? Not that
maritime cases will be withdrawn from them, but that they will be given two
grounds instead of one for jurisdiction of maritime cases"--or three instead of
two, if the diversity jurisdiction is taken into account. Does the Court mean to
suggest that the district courts can play a vital role in the federal judicial system with respect to maritime matters only when they sit without a jury and
proceed according to the Admiralty Rules-with the Silver Oar on the bench?
The fact is that the ruling of the Court will have more of a tendency to reduce
the number of maritime cases filed in the district courts than would the rejected
interpretation of Section 1331. Leaving the Jones Act cases aside, the plaintiff
who desires a jury trial in his maritime case, and who cannot get a jury in the
district court because he cannot establish jurisdiction at law, may sue in a state
court under the saving clause and have a jury. The rejected ruling on Section
1331 would presumably have entitled him to a jury in the district court, increasing his incentive to file there. In the typical seaman's injury case, leaving aside
the effect of the Court's ruling on "pendent" jurisdiction, the plaintiff in the
absence of diversity has two choices: to sue in the state court with a jury, and to
,' See 358 U.S. at 371, n.28, referring to the Suits in Admiralty Act, 41 Stat. 525 (1920), 46
U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1952), and the Death on the High Seas Act, 41 stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C.
§§ 761-767 (1952). Proceedings under these acts-are not within the saving clause.
50 358 U.S. at 369. The paradoxical statement that claims resting on statelaw would remain
within the admiralty jurisdiction (as distinguished from the federal civil jurisdiction in the
absence of diversity) is explained by the fact that, as the Court emphasized by another
decision onthe same day, there are maritime causes in which the right of action is based on
state law. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959). The reference to libels in rem is explained, of course, by the fact that such proceedings are cognizable exclusively in admiralty
-- or, at least, in the district courts.
r 1"The provision of the Act of 1875 with which we are concerned was designed to give a
new content of jurisdiction to the federal courts, not to reaffirm one long-established, smoothly
functioning since 1789." 358 U.S. at 368.

19s9]

THE SILVER OAR AND ALL THAT.

sue in the federal court with no assurance of jury trial on all the issues. If jurisdiction were recognized under Section 1331 he would have three choices: to sue
in the federal court without a jury trial, to sue in the federal court (presumably)
with a jury, or to sue in the state court with a jury. In the case before the Court,
Romero was contending for the right to sue in the federal court with a jury.
When this right was denied him by the district court-when his choices were
limited as they were ultimately limited by the Supreme Court's decision as to
Section 1331-he did not elect to sue in the federal court without a jury. He
filed suit in the state court 5 2 Thus the denial of the right to jury trial in the
district court led this plaintiff, as it would presumably lead others similarly
situated, to take his case away from the "federal admiralty court." Does the
Court mean to suggest that, despite the "vital role" of the federal district
courts in maritime matters, it is better for maritime cases not to be tried in the
federal courts at all than for them to be tried on the "law side" of those courts,
with a jury? Furthermore, if the Court's ruling on "pendent" jurisdiction means
that the general maritime law matters may be submitted to the jury, and that
the trial may proceed under the Rules of Civil Procedure, then that ruling will
have precisely the same effect, so far as seamen's injury cases are concerned, on
the business of the "admiralty side" as would the contrary ruling on Section
1331. Thus the net effect of the rejected ruling as to Section 1331 would be that
certain actions, other than actions for seamen's injuries, which would otherwise
have been triable only in a state court or in a federal court without a jury, would
be triable in a federal court with a jury if the plaintiff should so elect and if the
jurisdictional amount were in controversy. I find this threat to the vital function of the "federal admiralty court" less than alarming.
The rejected interpretation of Section 1331 would also, according to the
Court, "have a disruptive effect on the traditional allocationof power over mari54
time affairs in our federal system."5 It would be a "disruption of principle"
and would "eviscerate the postulates of the saving clause." 55 It would "disrupt
traditional maritime policies and quite gratuitously disturb a complementary,
historic interacting federal-state relationship. 516 Specifically, the objections are
that such an interpretation would (1) detract from the role of the state courts
in maritime litigation and (2) detract from the contribution of state law to the
corpus of maritime law.
Still more specifically, the first of these objections is predicated on the
proposition that saving-clause actions filed in state courts which are not now
removable would be removable under Section 1441 of the Judicial Code (if the ju2 Brief for Respondent Quin Lumber Co.,p. 2, Romero v.International Terminal Operating
Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959). Of course, this strategy availed him little, since the nonliability of the
Spanish Line and Garcia is now res judicata.

51358 U.S. at 371 (emphasis supplied).
61358 U.S. at 372.

65Ibid.
6Id. at 375.
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risdictional amount were present). 7In the first place, this concern for the function
of state courts seems at odds with the concern previously expressed for the function
of the "federal admiralty courts." Moreover, the function of the state courts is impaired, in principle, no more by removal under Sections 1331 and 1441 than by
removal for diversity of citizenship. If the function of state courts is not impaired by the option of the plaintiff to proceed in a federal court in admiralty,
how is it impaired by the option of the defendant to remove from the state to the
federal court? The concern is not merely for "the historic option of a maritime
suitor pursuing a common-law remedy to select his forum, state or federal
...

,"

but also to prevent "considerable inroads into the traditionally exercised

concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts in admiralty matters."55s But, as
Mr. Justice Brennan pointed out in dissent, the Court had long since held that
the remedies saved to suitors by the saving clause were saved "to suitors, and
not to the state courts."59 Where jurisdiction is concurrent--i.e., where the
choice between the federal and state forums is within the control of one party or
57358 U.S. at 371-72. The assumption that such actions are not removable was made without citation of authority. A saving-clause case is, by definition, a "civil action" (as distinguished from a suit in admiralty) and one of which"the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction" (in admiralty). 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). If "noneof theparties ininterestproperly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought,"
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), why should not the case be removable to the "admiralty side"? Apossible
answer would be that Congress did not intend thus to destroy the right given the plaintiff by
§ 1333(1) to choose his forum (Hill v. United Fruit Co., 149 F. Supp. 470 (S.D. Cal. 1957)); yet
the suggested construction would do no more than qualify the right in favor of non-resident
defendants. To hold saving-clause cases removable where the requirements of diversity are
met is a qualification of exactly the same kind. Cf. Ross v. Pacific S.S. Co., 272 Fed. 538
(D. Ore. 1921). Maritime cases arising under federal statutes (e.g., the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act) have been held removable, Crispin Co. v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 134 F. Supp. 704
(S.D. Tex. 1955), though within the saving-clause. Removability on the ground of original
jurisdiction in admiralty has been sustained in Davis v. Matson Navigation Co., 143 F. Supp.
537 (N.D. Cal. 1956), and reaffirmed by way of dictum in Crawford v. East Asiatic Co., 156
F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
Mr. justice Frankfurter said: "The policy of unremovability of maritime claims brought in
the state courts was incorporated by Congress into the Jones Act. See Pate v. Standard Dredging Corp., 193 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1952)." A somewhat less cryptic statement would be that in
the Jones Act Congress incorporated the policy of unremovability of actions brought in state
courts by certain employees against their employers. See S. REP. No. 1830 (to accompany
H.R. 11102), 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3099, 3105-06 (1958). That there is a broad
policy of unremovability of maritime cases, or even of seamen's claims against their employers
other than under the Jones Act, seems doubtful.
Contrary to an intimation in the Davis case (143 F. Supp. at 538), the argument for removal on the basis of original jurisdiction in admiralty is not dependent on the 1948 revision of
the Judicial Code. A maritime action brought under the saving clause is "a suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity." If it were a suit in admiralty it could not be brought in a state
court. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 71 (1940).
58 358 U.S. at 371-2.
51U.S. at 406, quoting from The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624, 644 (1868) (emphasis
supplied). See also Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 390 (1924): "The course of legislation ... always has been to recognize the admiralty jurisdiction as open to the adjudication
of all maritime cases as a matter of course, and to permit a resort to common-law remedies
through appropriate proceedings in personam as a matter of admissible grace."
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the other, it is difficult to infer a national policy, relating to distribution of
judicial functions, against giving his adversary also a degree of control over the
choice. The weakness of the argument is most apparent when the majority
opinion appeals for support to "the deeply felt and traditional reluctance of
this Court to expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts through a broad reading of the jurisdictional statutes."60 The basis for that reluctance is stated in the
Court's quotation from Mr. Justice Stone: "Due regard for the rightful independence of state governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires
that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits
which the statute has defined."'" But here there is no possibility of improper
encroachment on state concerns. 62 All maritime causes may as a matter of
course be brought in a federal rather than a state court; and, while the states
have a contribution to make to the development of maritime law, that subject
is unquestionably one with respect to which national policy is supreme.
The argument that the rejected interpretation of Section 1331 would somehow impair the contribution of the states to the development of the corpus of
maritime law is convincingly answered by Mr. Justice Brennan.6 3 Whatever the
source of the law applied in maritime cases-whether state or federal-that law
is the same whether the action is tried in the state or the federal court.6 4 The
fact is that the only major significance of the rejected ruling as to Section 1331
so far as maritime cases are concerned would have been to allow the plaintiffs
in certain cases within the saving clause to secure jury trial in a federal court
where they now have only the choice between a state court with a jury and a
federal court without one.65 Practically speaking, the only "jurisdictional" issue
before the Court concerned the right to jury trial (though a decision of that
question was rendered unnecessary by the disposition of the issues on the merits
and by the ruling on the diversity question as regards the claims against the
American defendants). The Court has decided that issue for cases of a type not
before it--i.e., cases based purely on the general maritime law. For those cases,
if diversity is not present, Section 1331 provided the only apparent basis for a
claim to jury trial in the federal court. And, despite its disclaimer, the Court has
probably also decided that issue, in the opposite way, for the type of case that
was before it-the seaman's three-count claim against the shipowner-employer
for personal injuries.
6 358 U.S. at 379.

61Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934).
Cf.Brennan, J., dissenting, 358 U.S. at 408.
63
"[S]uch legislative competence as they possess remains to the States regardless of what
may happen to the number of maritime cases in their courts; the view that I have urged does
not detract one iota from the legislative competence of the States." 358 U.S. at 410.
64See cases cited note 37 supra.
65For the sake of emphasis this statement omits other less significant consequences: the
applicability of the Rules of Civil Procedure instead of the Admiralty Rules, and certain differences relating to appeals. See notes 80, 101, 112, 118, 137, 144, 146, and 201 infra.
62
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THE CONFLICT BETWEEN CIRcurrs

The small number of saving-clause cases tried in the state courts, cited by
Mr. Justice Brennan to minimize the effect which removability would have
upon the role of the state courts in maritime cases,66 was cited by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter to negative "the pressure of any practical consideration" for construing Section 1331 as extending to cases under the general maritime law. 7 Mr.
Justice Frankfurter also noted that the pressures which led to the Act of 1875,
investing the district courts with federal-question jurisdiction, did not suggest,
"'even remotely, the inclusion of maritime claims within the scope of that
statute. '6 8 It may be conceded that Congress, in 1875, did not enact the statute
for the purpose of conferring on the district courts jurisdiction of maritime
claims; they had had such jurisdiction since 1789. It is also true that there
would be little point in construing Section 1331 as extending to maritime cases
merely for the purpose of making them--or some of them--removable.69 It
does not follow that the support which has developed in the past decade for
such a construction was mere academic theorizing, unmotivated by the pressure
of any practical consideration. It developed in response to the need to find a
workable and just solution to the problem of how seamen's injury cases were to
be tried. This problem did not present itself until the enactment of the Jones
Act in 1920, and did not become acute until experience and precedent h ad
established that the three-count complaint was standard operating procedure.
This circumstance detracts somewhat from the persuasiveness of the Appendix
to the majority opinion, listing 66 treatises-all published in 1950 or earlierwhich contain no mention of the possibility that maritime law cases are cognizable by virtue of the "arising under" jurisdiction."
The first decision by a court of appeals on the application of Section 1331 to
cases based on the general maritime law was that of the Third Circuit in
Jordine v. Walling.7 ' That was a seaman's three-pronged action for personal
injuries brought in two counts, the Jones Act and the doctrine of unseaworthiness being invoked together in support of the damages claimed in the first
count. After a mistrial the injured seaman died and his widow was substituted
66358 U.S. at 409-410.
67358 U.S. at 372.
69Cf. note 57 supra.
68358 U.S. at 368.
70 See 358 U.S. at 370, 385.
7' 185 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1950). Just four days earlier, in what Mr. Justice Frankfurter accurately characterizes as a dictum (358 U.S. at369), the First Circuithad expressed theopinion
that cases under the general maritime law were cognizable under § 1331. Jansson v. Swedish
American Line, 185 F.2d 212, 217-18 (1st Cir. 1950). In as much as the.Jordine case had been
in litigation for many months prior to the decision of the Jansson case, it is not strictly accurate to say that until Judge Magruder's dictum "scholars and lawyers alike made the unquestioned assumption that the original maritime jurisdiction of the federal courts had, for all
practical purposes, been left unchanged since the Act of 1789." 358 U.S. at 369. The question
was left open in Pope and Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 410 n.4 (1953).
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as administratrix. The case was tried to a jury. At the close of the plaintiff's
case the judge dismissed the claim under the Jones Act, but submitted the issue
of maintenance and cure to the jury and entered judgment for the plaintiff on
the jury's verdict.
At the outset of his opinion judge Mars stated the conclusions of the court
of appeals: (1) Section 1331 did not confer on the district court jurisdiction of
the claim for maintenance and cure; and (2) the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction
did not apply to the claim for maintenance and cure even though the court had
jurisdiction of the claim under the Jones Act. The concept of mutually exclusive
jurisdictions dominates the discussion. One reads the opinion with bated
breath, wondering whether the court can really reach the result which seems
unavoidably indicated. Will the court really dismiss this actionfor lack ofjurisdiction? Will it require the plaintiff to file a new action, with all the risk, delay,
and expense thereby entailed-a new action in the very court to which he has
already resorted, and which has been held without jurisdiction? The question,
as stated by the court, was "whether the district court had jurisdiction, in the
absence of diversity of citizenship, to entertain the plaintiff's cause of action
for maintenance and cure in a civil action brought and tried under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. '7 3 The court recognized that the district court clearly
had jurisdiction of the claim under Section 1333; but "the jurisdiction thus
conferred is to be [not "is traditionally," or "should be"] exercised... by the
district judge without a jury." ' With respect to pendent jurisdiction the court
regarded maintenance and cure as a separate cause of action, but conceded
that the unseaworthiness claim, as a merely alternative ground for the claim
asserted under the Jones Act, would be within the ancillary jurisdiction. 5 Only
at the very end is the reader reassured as to the claim for maintenance and cure.
It would be "quite unjust and unnecessary" to order dismissal, since the court
unquestionably had jurisdiction "upon its admiralty side."7 The court accordingly ordered transfer of the case to the admiralty docket, thus curing the
"jurisdictional" defect.7 7 Moreover, the court recognized that a new trial was
unnecessary; the judge who had tried the case "at law" was authorized to determine the case on the evidence already presented to him. On remand Judge
Bard, who had presided at the trial, entered an order pursuant to which counsel
72From this point on the claim based on unseaworthiness drops out of consideration (except
for the court of appeals' later reference to it, obiter, in connection with pendent jurisdiction).
Presumably it was dropped on the theory that the remedy provided by the Jones Act precludes
recovery for wrongful death resulting from unseaworthiness (see Grnsoxs & BLAcx, THE
LAw oF Am.RALTy, 302-03 (1957))-a theory based on a dictum in Lindgren v. United

States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930). See Currie, Review of Gilmore & Black, The Law of Admiralty, 26
U. Cm. L. REv. 686 (1959).
73 185

F.2d at 665.

71185

F.2d at 670.

185 F.2d at 666.
76185 F.2d at 671.
Fortunately, the district to which the case was remanded-the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania-maintains a separate admiralty docket.
7
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stipulated certain facts, and an order was entered fixing the rate of maintenance
at $6 per day. Subsequently, during the summer vacation, another judge entered a consent order awarding the seaman $2,443.50 for maintenance and
78
cure.
The decision of the court of appeals meant no more than that it was error to
submit the issue to the jury; it should have been decided by the judge. Why
could not the court have treated the problem simply as one of procedure instead of talking in dangerously threatening terms of "jurisdiction"?
Since things like this had been going on in the courts for some years before
the Romero case was decided, it is hardly accurate to suggest that there was no
"pressure of any practical consideration" for asserting jurisdiction under Section 1331. 9 The conceptualism of the Jordine case must have caused serious
concern to lawyers representing injured seamen. The court's leniency in permitting retention of jurisdiction on transfer to the admiralty docket might have
been a plain, common-sense disposition which could be anticipated in other
cases, or it might have been influenced by the fact that the court of appeals had
previously held that the maintenance and cure claim could be submitted to the
jury as ancillary to the Jones Act claim 5 -in which case it might be that, after
the overruling of the earlier decision, counsel would be expected to observe
the jurisdictional compartmentalization of the district courts on pain of actual
dismissal.
The question then came before the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
which reached a contrary result in Doucette v. Vincent: actions under the general maritime law are cognizable under Section 1331.81 Again the case was a
seaman's three-pronged action for personal injuries, the first count being
"couched in such general terms that it [could] be construed as either under the
general maritime law for unseaworthiness or under the Jones Act ... for
negligence." 8 2 The second count was for maintenance and cure. At the close of
78 Letter from Gilbert W. Ludwig, Esq., Clerk of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, to Brainerd Currie, June 15, 1959.
79 See text at note 67 supra.

110
Lindquist v. Dilkes, 127 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1942). In that case the jurisdictional question
was raised although in the district court the trial was before a judge sitting without a jury. The
only reason the court considered it was that, if the case was cognizable as a civil action instead
of in admiralty, the function of the court on appeal would be "slightly different." Id. at 25.
But the question of the scope of review has nothing to do with "jurisdiction." Under the practice approved by the court of appeals in the Jordine case-whereby the civil action under the
Jones Act and the proceeding in admiralty for maintenance and cure are tried in a single
proceeding, the judge reserving to himself decision of the admiralty claim (see 185 F.2d at
671)-similar questions as to scope of review must be encountered, and must be disposed of
simply as questions of procedure.
81194 F.2d 834 (1st Cir. 1951). This was hardly surprising, in view of the court's earlier
dictum, see note 71, supra. According to Judge Magruder, that dictum had been carefully considered and had been intended for the guidance of district courts and litigants in the First
Circuit. 194 F.2d at 839-40. Resort to such a device for settling the law is suggestive of very
considerable practical difficulties.
82

194 F.2d at 836.
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the evidence counsel for the plaintiff waived any claim for negligence; the jury
found for the defendant with respect to unseaworthiness and made a special
finding with respect to the duration of the period during which maintenance and
cure was payable.83 The court of appeals raised the question of "jurisdiction" on
its own motion: "[The] case necessarily presents a question whether the district
court had jurisdiction, sitting as a court of law with a jury, not as a court of
admiralty. It is our duty to dispose of this question, though it was not raised or
argued by the parties to this appeal. '8 4 Here is another startling instance of
dichotomous thinking. It is surely true, as Judge Magruder himself recognized
in his separate opinion for the court on the "jurisdictional" question, that "[tihe
only important difference in trying the case on the law side under 28 U.S.C.
Section 1331 is that the plaintiff gets a jury trial.. . ."s5 Appellate courts do not
customarily raise on their own motion mere questions of procedure at the trial
when no error is assigned by the parties. The case cited by the court for its
"duty" to raise the question 6 concerned the division of authority between
state and federal courts, with respect to which the federal courts are properly
zealous at all stages of litigation to avoid encroachment. The Doucette case involved no such question, since a maritime claim is cognizable in the district
court irrespective of one's views as to the proper construction of Section 1331.7
The holding that cases under the general maritime law are cognizable under
Section 1331 clearly vindicated the jurisdiction of the district court with respect
to both counts, since in each the jurisdictional amount was in controversy.88
Frequently, however, the claim for maintenance and cure is modest, especially
since many injured seamen are cared for at government expense in Public
Health hospitals; 9 it seems improbable that the claim, honestly stated, will
often exceed the new jurisdictional amount of $10,000.9 How would the mode
8
3 Apparently the court, rather than the jury, determined the amount payable for mainte
nance and cure. 194 F.2d at 839.
84

194 F.2d at 836.

85194 F.2d at 846.
8
6Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
87 The ruling in Doucette thus might be characterized as dictum with as much justification
as was the statement inJansson,note 71,supra; and the court's repetition of its deliberate effort
to create an occasion for deciding the question suggests again that there must have been a real
and practical need for settling the mode of trial.
8 194 F.2d at 836. See note 333 infra. On the theory that the case was properly triable "at
law" the procedure followed in the district court may have encroached on the plaintiff's right
to jury trial. In all probability the judge's action in not submitting to the jury the question of
the amount recoverable as maintenance and cure was influenced by his belief that as to that
claim the proceeding was in admiralty. One may readily agree that the plaintiff waived his
right by not objecting to this procedure, just as the defendant waived his possible right to
have the entire case tried by the court. It is interesting, however, that the court of appeals did
not suggest that the district judge, purporting to function as a court of admiralty, improperly
decided part of the maintenance and cure issue.
89 See 2 NoRRs, THE LAW or SEAMEN § 586 et seq. (1952).
90 Act of July 25, 1958, 72 Stat. 415, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
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of trial in the First Circuit be affected if the jurisdictional amount were in controversy with respect to the major counts but not with respect to maintenance
and cure?9 judge Magruder was ready with a dictum for that situation. In a
series of earlier cases the court had approved the joinder of counts under the
Jones Act and for maintenance and cure. In one of them the amount claimed for
maintenance and cure had been less than the jurisdictional amount. The court
of appeals had not questioned jurisdiction of that count. Therefore, said Judge
Magruder in a footnote, jurisdiction must have been sustainable on the basis of
"pendent" jurisdiction- a doctrine "which has been given a liberal interpretation in this circuit."9 2 Thus the First Circuit differed with the Third with respect
to both Section 1331 and "pendent" jurisdiction. As we have seen, the Supreme
Court's decision sustains the view of the Third Circuit as to Section 1331 and
that of the First as to "pendent" jurisdiction.
One other Magruder dictum is noteworthy. Where it is necessary to rely on
a state statute in order to recover for a maritime death, the action cannot be
brought under Section 1331 because the right is created by the state statute,
such supplementation of the maritime law being "not commanded-only permitted" by the Constitution.93 The practical effect of this rather metaphysical
distinction as to the source of the right would be to deny jury trial in cases
under the general maritime law involving the deaths of longshoremen and harbor workers, passengers, and other invitees, whose administrators cannot sue,
as the administrators of seamen can, under the Jones Act. It is difficult to see
why the right to jury trial should depend upon whether the injury results in
death;94 and if the court had considered the question in proper perspective as
one of procedure, it might have been able to find a more satisfying solution than
the one to which it felt itself compelled by its jurisdictional premises. At any
rate, stating the problem in proper perspective would invite and facilitate legislative solution, whereas treating it in terms of jurisdiction, with constitutional
overtones, obscures and discourages recourse to such possibility as there may
be of congressional action.
The Second Circuit aligned itself with the Third in Padwano v. Yamashita
Kisem Kabushiki Kaisha.9 In holding that the claims based on the general
maritime law were not cognizable under Section 1331 the court not only employed the dichotomous concept of jurisdiction, but carried that concept to
its ruthless extreme: it actually affirmed a judgment of dismissal for want of
jurisdiction because the case was filed on the "civil side," although the district
court plainly had jurisdiction under Section 1333.1 6If a plaintiff files suit in the
9"See note 333 infra.
92 194 F.2d at 840, n. 5. Again the court's determination to clean up the question of mode of
trial is noteworthy.
9"194 F.2d at 843, n.7.
94BUt cf. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
-221 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1955).
96The consequences of dismissal are probably less drastic in maritime cases than in others,
since in general there is no statute of limitations and only the doctrine of laches bars the suit
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wrong district--i.e., in a district in which venue is improper-the court may
very easily transfer the action to a proper district.97 Here, because the plaintiff
sued on the wrong "side" of the District Court for the Eastern District of New
York--i.e., the side without the Silver Oar-the penalty was dismissal, though
the court had before it the decision of the Third Circuit in the Tordine case,
approving transfer to the admiralty docket. 98
For a modern student of the law it is difficult to conceive of the jurisdiction of
a district court as anything but integral, however fractional the language of the
grant. The tendency of the courts to think of the difference between the admiralty and the civil powers of the district courts as being jurisdictionally distinct,
however, has deep roots. Chief Justice Marshall, whose views on the difference
between the admiralty jurisdiction and that extending to cases arising under
federal law strongly influenced the decision in the Romero case, 99 was guilty of
the following pronouncement in The Sarah:
Although the two jurisdictions are vested in the same tribunal, they are as distinct
from each other as if they were vested in different tribunals, and can no more be
blended, than a Court of Chancery with a Court of common law.'0
for lapse of time. 3 BENEDICT, ADImALTY §§ 462, 463. While the analogy of the state statute

of limitations applicable to similar actions is an important consideration, presumably a court
would not charge against the plaintiff the time spent in litigating a substantial question of
jurisdiction on the "civil side." Cf. Lincoln v. Cunard S.S. Co., 221 Fed. 622 (2d Cir. 1915).
Nevertheless, in the generalized situation unnecessary dismissal may subject the plaintiff to
additional expense, delay, and risk-including the risk of-inability to serve process a second
time.
9728 U.S.C. § 1406a.
98There was no motion to remand for transfer to the admiralty docket. See Bartholomew
v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 203 F.2d 437, 443 (1959). After dismissal of the civil action,
Paduano filed a libel in personam in the Southern District of New York. The case was settled
at pre-trial. Letter from Kirlin, Campbell & Keating, of New York, counsel for defendants, to
Brainerd Currie, June 18, 1959. Cf. note 39 supra.
This is the only one of the five cases immediately involved in the conflict among the circuits
which was not a seaman's injury action. (Although the Supreme Court in Romero did not note
the fact, the Seventh Circuit was also involved in the conflict. See Mullen v. Fitz Simons &
Connell Dredge & Dock Co., 191 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1951), discussed in text at note 290 infra.)
The injured plaintiff was a longshoreman; hence there was no claim under the Jones Act to
sustain "pendent" jurisdiction of the claims under the general maritime law, which were for
unseaworthiness and simple negligence. Hence, also, the problem of the mode of trial characteristic of the seaman's three-count action was not presented.
The concurring opinion of Dimock, J.(221 F.2d at 619) is unique in its suggestion that the
saving clause excludes not only from the exclusiveness of the grant of admiralty jurisdiction to
the district courts but from the grant itself, so that only the state courts have jurisdiction of
saving-clause cases. Although that proposition might have helped sustain the majority in
Romero in its concern to protect the function of state courts, the Supreme Court wisely ignored
it. It is inconsistent with the long-recognized jurisdiction of saving-clause cases based on
diversity of citizenship, as well as with the premise of the PanamaRailroadcase (note 19 supra)
that the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts cannot be vested exclusively in state courts.
91See the discussion of American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828), 358 U.S. at
364.
100The Sarah, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 391, 394 (1823). For discussion of a striking instance
of the distinctive concept of the admiralty court in modern times see Currie, Review of Gilmore
& Black, The Law of Admiralty, 26 U. COr. L. Rev. 686 (1959).
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Marshall's bark, however, was worse than his bite. The Sarahwas a libel under
the revenue laws against casks of wine allegedly seized on navigable waters,
but it developed from the evidence that the seizure actually occurred on land.
On motion of the claimant the court proceeded to trial by jury, the basis for
proceeding in admiralty having failed. The jury found a verdict for the United
States, and the claimant appealed. Apparently the Court would have felt little
difficulty in disposing of the jurisdictional problem if the claimant had brought
a writ of error; then the claimant's demand for jury trial might have been
treated as a consent that the libel stand amended as an information in rem,
cognizable at law. But if the case were treated as one at law the appeal would
have to be dismissed, because a judgment at law was reviewable only by writ
of error."' The other horn of the dilemma was that if the case were treated as
one in admiralty the judgment would have to be reversed with directions to dismiss the libel, since there was no jurisdiction in admiralty. Unwilling to carry
his jurisdictional premises to their logical conclusion, Marshall reversed with
directions that amendment of the libel be allowed, and that there should be
"such farther proceedings ... as law and justice may require."'0 2 Probably this
required a new trial, but at least dismissal was avoided. Marshall did not explain how the Court had jurisdiction thus to dispose of the case on appeal when
there was no jurisdiction in admiralty, nor how the district court sitting in
admiralty without jurisdiction could enter an order allowing amendment. He
simply cut the Gordian knot with which the Court had bound itself.'
After this common-sense (though somewhat tortured and confined) solution,
the federal courts proceeded without much difficulty in shifting from admiralty
to law by the process of amendment, thereby saving prior proceedings in which
the court had acted "without jurisdiction." Thus, in a case similar to The
Sarah, where a bond had been given in a libel in admiralty in the district court
for the release of goods seized on land, the libel was amended so as to make it
an information in rem, in accordance with Marshall's ruling; thereafter the
circuit court, proceeding "according to the course of the exchequer," asserted
its jurisdiction to enforce the bond, although if the court lacked jurisdiction at
the time it was taken there was a plausible basis, at least, for contending that
the bond was void. 4
An even more relaxed attitude toward the distinction between civil and
admiralty jurisdiction emerged in 1872. An information under the revenue laws
10121 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 395.
10221 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 395-96.
102As early as 1796 Attorney General Lee assumed in argument before the Supreme Court
that a case which had been improperly tried in the district court as an admiralty case should be
remanded to the circuit court for trial by jury; but the point was not decided, because the
Court held the case properly cognizable in admiralty. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Ball.) 297, 301

(1796).

"'4United States v. Four Part Pieces of Woolen Cloth, 25 Fed. Cas. 1180 (No. 15,150)
(C.C.N.D. N.Y. 1825).
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was filed against whiskey seized on land in the Middle District of Alabama, and
the judge struck out a claim and answer which denied the material allegations
of the information. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the claimants
were entitled to jury trial.' The Court treated the question primarily as one
of procedure: "Where the seizureis made on land, the claimantis entitled to a trial
by jury. . . ."I

Jurisdiction was discussed: "[W]here the seizure is made on

navigable waters, the case belongs to the instance side of the subordinate
court, but where the seizure is made on land, the suit is one at common law,
and the claimant is entitled to a trial by jury."'10 7 But there was no concern with
whether the information had been filed on the law side or the admiralty side, 10
and none with whether the record spoke the language of admiralty. No question
was raised as to whether the case was properly before the Court on writ of error.
The only question concerned the right to jury trial, and that turned not on the
"side" of the court on which the action had been filed but on the more objectively determinable location of the property at the time of seizure. Not even an
amendment of the pleadings was required to bring the appropriate "jurisdiction" into operation.
The same attitude was exhibited in the following year. A "libel of information" had been filed under the Confiscation Act against land in the District of
Louisiana, and it was objected that the suit was on the admiralty, not on the
law, side of the district court.0 9 Mr. Justice Strong said:
No doubt in cases of seizure upon land, resort should be had to the common-law side
of the court, and such, in substance, was, we think the case here. Everything necessary
to a common-law proceeding in rem is found in the record. An information was fied
(called a libel of information, it is true, but still an information), a citation as well as
a monition was issued, a default was taken, and, after consideration of the evidence,
condemnation was adjudged. What was lacking in this to a common-law proceeding
in rem? The principal lack alleged is that there was no jury trial. But in courts of
common law no jury is called when there is no issue of fact to be tried. An inquest is
sometimes employed to assess damages; but a jury to find facts is never required where
there is no traverse of those alleged, and where a defendant has defaulted 1
This case alone might have spared Mr. Justice Frankfurter the necessity of
deciding whether the Romero case was cognizable under Section 1331.1 If a
,05
Garnharts v. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 162 (1872).
106Id. at 165.

10 7 Ibid.

10sAt the present time, at least, there is in the Middle District of Alabama no separate
admiralty docket and no rule that admiralty cases be captioned "In Admiralty" or otherwise
identified as such.
109
A separate admiralty docket is maintained at present in the Eastern District of Louisiana.
110The Confiscation Cases (Slidell's Land), 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 92, 110 (1873) (emphasis in
the original). Mr. Justice Clifford dissented as to this point. Id. at 113. No objection was made
that the case was before the Court on writ of error.
WSee text at note 34 supra.
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district judge, sitting as a court of admiralty, can decide a case properly cognizable at law where there is no question for a jury to decide, it should follow that
the same district judge, sitting as a court of law, should be able to decide a case
properly cognizable in admiralty where there is no question for a jury.
In 1918 Judge Learned Hand employed the common-sense approach so
thoroughly as to justify hope that there would be no further jurisdictional
trouble about cases filed on the wrong "side" of the court. The .Elwellcase was,
in form and language, unquestionably a libel in personam, in the Southern District of New York."' It was tried as an admiralty case, by a judge without a
jury, and review was by appeal rather than writ of error."' The court of appeals held that the district court had no jurisdiction in admiralty, the action
being one to collect the penalty prescribed by the Harter Act for refusal to give
a clean bill of lading. But the district court did have jurisdiction of an action
qui tam at common law, brought by the United States pursuant to an act of
4
Congress. Relying on The Sarah"
and Tie Confiscation Cases,"5 Judge Hand
held that the libel in admiralty could be amended, and would be treated as
amended, to bring it within the law "side's" jurisdiction; there would be no
dismissal. But the case had been tried without a jury. Judge Hand disposed of
that point by saying that the right to jury trial was "waived in the answer by
the concession of the admiralty jurisdiction of the District Court.""' The point
was a tricky one, but Hand was able to cope: "Such a concession would not, of
course, confer substantial jurisdiction upon the District Court; but where that
jurisdiction existed in any event, and where, as we have seen, the cause may be
disposed of as at common law, the admission of jurisdiction is not the sole
source of the court's power and is an effective waiver of the right to an assessment by a jury."1

7

Still the technical barriers to the common-sense approach had not been
exhausted. There was a question about excessiveness of the penalty, the district
court having assessed the maximum. The court of appeals reduced the penalty,
treating the district court's finding as an "admiralty award" rather than as a
jury verdict, and thus exercising the broad power of review characteristic of
admiralty." 8It did so because the parties had acquiesced in the treatment of the
case as one in admiralty. When a libel in admiralty, of which the court as an
12

United States ex rel. Pressprich v. James W. Elwell & Co., 250 Fed. 939 (2d Cir. 1918).

113The writ of error was not abolished until 1928. Act of January 31, 1928, 45 Stat. 54.
114The Sarah, supra note 100.

5 The Confiscation Cases, supranote 110.
Fed. at 942. The court found it unnecessary to decide whether there was a right to
jury trial, but cited cases tending to sustain the right. Compare the action of the court in
Doucette v. Vincent, supra note 84, raising the question of "jurisdiction" on its own motion
where the right to jury trial had been accorded, not withheld.
17 250 Fed. at 942.
MId. at 942.
'11 250
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admiralty court has no jurisdiction, can be amended (without actually being
amended) to make it an action at law, and tried by the court without a jury
because the parties thought it was cognizable in admiralty, and reviewed on
appeal when the review of law cases was by writ of error-and when the scope
of review is that characteristic of admiralty and not of law-then the "jurisdictional" differences between the two "sides" of the district court are destroyed.
And a good thing, too. Two procedural problems were before the court: (1)
Should there have been a jury trial? and (2) Did the appellate court have power
to modify the penalty? The court answered these questions pragmatically as
questions of procedure, relying heavily on the acquiescence of the parties. To
have attempted to answer them in jurisdictional terms would have confused
the issues and would have deprived the court of the argument based on consent,
which was decisive in reaching a satisfactory result.
Just eight months later, however, the Second Circuit fell from grace. In
Cunard S.S. Co. v. Smih 1 9 a panel including two of the judges who had decided
the Elwell case'2-but not including Judge Hand-on its own motion raised
the jurisdictional question and ordered dismissal of a longshoreman's action for
injuries sustained on board ship. There was no diversity, both of the parties
being aliens.'2 1 The fact that the court in which the action had been tried
obviously had jurisdiction of the case as an admiralty court was not directly
mentioned. No suggestion was made of any way in which dismissal could be
avoided. 2 2The court did, however, dismiss without prejudice, and held out hope
to the plaintiff that "an admiralty court of the United States," in which he
presumably was invited to start anew, might entertain his action notwithstanding the doctrine of forum non conveniens.'2l
Shortly after this lapse, Judge Learned Hand revived the procedural ap," 255 Fed. 846 (2d Cir. 1918). It should be noted that this was prior to the Jones Act
(1920) and prior to the Supreme Court's holding that longshoremen were seamen, International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926). No claim of unseaworthiness was made,
the case being tried on the theory of simple negligence.
12 0Hough and Rogers, JJ.
121No mention was made of any possibility of jurisdiction on the theory that the case was
one arising under federal law.
122At the very least, the court might have directed a transfer to the admiralty docket and
a new trial without a jury. But if the defendant's failure to challenge the admiralty jurisdiction
(see the Elwell case, supra note 112) is a waiver of his right to jury trial, is not his failure to
challenge the civil jurisdiction a waiver of his right to have a trial by the court? There is no
good reason why the judgment of the district court should not have been affirmed, unless the
court felt that there should be judgment for the defendent notwithstanding the verdict because of assumption of risk. See note 123 infra.
123255 Fed. at 848-49. Yet-having not only dismissed for want of jurisdiction but having
held out to the plaintiff some hope of recovery if he refiled on the proper "side"-the court
proceeded to hold on the merits that the plaintiff had assumed the risk. Id. at 849. But for the
fact that the dismissal was expressly without prejudice, an argument might be made that, in
view of the admiralty jurisdiction of the district court and the jurisdiction of the court of appeals on writ of error, this holding was a bar to another action.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

proach in the district court. In a libel in personam to recover prepaid freight
on the theory that the voyage had not been completed, he observed that
whether the action was for breach of the maritime contract of carriage or for
unjust enrichment" 4 might have been a material consideration if the parties had
raised the question of jurisdiction. But the decision of the court of appeals in
the Elwell case,as in which he had written the opinion, rendered the question
of jurisdiction unimportant "where there is independent jurisdiction over the
subject-matter and the parties are content to allow the cause to proceed."'' 6
Since the parties were citizens of different states and the jurisdictional amount
was in controversy, and since no objection had been raised to the use of admiralty procedures, it was not necessary to determine the basis of jurisdiction.
The same panel of circuit judges which had dismissed the action in the Sinith
case 127 for lack of jurisdiction affirmed on the merits 128
IV. THE CONCEPT OF "DIsTNcT JVIrusDCTIONs" IN GENERAL
Such was the state of affairs when the Jones Act became law in 1920. While
Marshall had stated the principle of compartmentalization in formidable terms,
neither he nor the federal judiciary after him applied the principle rigorously.
The differences between jurisdiction at law and in admiralty were treated as
merely procedural, notably in the Second Circuit; the single exception appears
to have been a temporary lapse on the part of the court which had assumed
leadership in reducing jurisdictional barriers.
The problem of the mode of trial in seaman's injury cases, as we know it
today, did not arise for some time after the passage of the Jones Act.2"' It developed slowly, while other problems concerning the distinction between the law
and admiralty jurisdictions continued to come before the courts. The procedure
here will be to examine first the general problems, and then the problems concerning trial of the several claims involved in the seaman's injury action. In
both stages the discussion will in general follow the developments chronologically circuit by circuit. This is the way in which the law developed; in the absence
24Until Archawski v. Hanioti, 350 U.S. 532 (1956), there was doubt as to whether admiralty jurisdiction extended to quasi-contractual claims arising out of maritime transactions.
See GmnmoR & BLACK, TaE LAw oF AnmnL.Tw 25, n.94 (1957).
w Supra note 112.
"2 Owens v. Breitung, 270 Fed. 190, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1920).

Supra note 119.
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128 Owens v. Breitung, 270 Fed. 190 (2d Cir. 1920) (Ward, Rogers, and Hough, JJ.).
129For an account of the gradual settlement of problems of validity and interpretation
raised by the act see Gmnoan &BLACK, ThE LAw OF ADumIALTY 282 etseq. (1957). For present
purposes it should be noted especially that the full importance of the remedy based on unseaworthiness was not appreciated until the mid-forties (Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S.
96 (1944); Gnmoan & BLAcK, op. cit., supra at 315 el seq.), and that it was not until 1949

that the seaman had substantial authority for suing both under the Jones Act and for unseaworthiness. McCarthy v. American Eastern Corp., 175 F.2d 724 (3d Cir. 1949).
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of a clear directive from the Supreme Court, the leading maritime circuits
tended to follow their own precedents, and the development was not uniform.
The Second Circuit, under the leadership of Judge Learned Hand and later
Judge Clark, continued its procedural approach to the problem of jurisdictional
differences. A libel for cargo damage included a claim for conversion which,
having occurred on land, was not within the admiralty jurisdiction. Judge
Hand, noting that the record disclosed the bases for diversity jurisdiction,
simply found on the merits that there was no conversion.' An agent engaged
by the United States to perform services in connection with a governmentowned vessel, having successfully defended an action for cargo damage in
which it had been impleaded, brought a libel against the United States under
the Suits in Admiralty Act"' for reimbursement of expenses. It was doubtful
whether such a claim was within the admiralty jurisdiction; the agent's function was apparently the procurement, rather than the performance, of maritime
services, and in any event the claim arose not directly from those services but
from subsequent litigation. Judge Swan found it unnecessary to decide the question since, if the court lacked jurisdiction in admiralty, it had jurisdiction under
132
the Tucker Act:
[W]e see no difficulty in sustaining the suit as one upon a contract with the United
States over which the District Court is given jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of
Claims by the Tucker Act. Such a suit is not tried to a jury, and the libel will serve as a
petition.... The mistake results only in formal differences. The pleading has been
called a libel instead of a petition, and contains allegations of admiralty jurisdiction,
which are surplusage. 33
A carrier brought a libel against a shipper to recover the difference between the
amount of freight billed and paid and the amount required by the filed conference tariff, relying in part on provisions of the Shipping Act which forbade
secret rate concessions. 4 In part the carrier's theory was that it had contracted
for reasonable rates, which were those set out in the tariff; on this theory the
suit was on a maritime contract. So far as the right to recover depended on the
illegality of the preferences granted, however, the cause of action was one
specially created by statute and jurisdiction in admiralty was doubted. The
court of appeals, Judge Hand writing the opinion, raised the question of jurisdiction on its own motion; but the record disclosed the bases for diversity jurisdiction. That was enough:
I' Louis-Dreyfus v. Paterson Steamships Ltd., 43 F.2d 824, 828 (2d Cir. 1930). The libel
had been dismissed by the district court.
'41 Stat. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 741 el seq.
132 Cory Bros. & Co. v. United States, 51 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1931).

at 1013.
34Prince Line v. American Paper Exports, 55 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1932).
33Id.
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When a cause of action is within the substantive jurisdiction of the District Court for
any reason, it does not mar that jurisdiction that the suitor proceeds as libelant in the
admiralty rather than as plaintiff at law."'
The only question open was whether the respondent had lost any substantial
rights by being brought into the admiralty side. The differences, said Judge
Hand, were all formal except the right to jury trial, and that was waived by
respondent, who, though he had traversed the allegations of admiralty jurisdiction, had not followed up that first step by making any further effort to secure
6

a jury.1

In another case, arising prior to the fusion of law and equity in 1938, judge
Hand applied the procedural approach with admirable ingenuity to a rather
7
complex situation involving not only admiralty and law but equity as well."1
The United States had contracted with Atlantic to operate a governmentowned vessel; Atlantic contracted with Admiral to act as husbanding agent.
The vessel was lost and the cargo owners had sued Atlantic and Admiral, who
defended successfully. Two cases were before the court, presenting three jurisdictional problems: (1) Admiral sought to recover its litigation expenses from
Atlantic, and Atlantic sought to implead the United States under the Admiralty
Rules; (2) Atlantic sought to recover its own litigation expenses from the
United States. The cases were not cognizable in admiralty, where they had been
filed."18 But the second action (Atlantic against the United States) could stand
as an action at law under the Tucker Act; the first action (Admiral against
Atlantic) could stand because of diversity of citizenship; and the effort in that
action by Atlantic to implead the United States, though it had lost its foundation in the Admiralty Rules, could stand as an original suit against the United
States under the Tucker Act. This last device was not without its difficulties.
Atlantic in the proposed third-party proceeding was seeking protection against
a liability which it had not yet incurred. That would be premature at law, but
permissible in equity. Could the United States be sued in equity under the
Tucker Act? Generally, perhaps not; but "if the bill sound in contract, and call
only for the payment of money, the relief may be granted though only a court
of equity would give it.""' Thus two libels in admiralty of which the court had
15 Id.at 1056.
136
Id. at 1056-57. The court said that the traverse might have laid the foundation for a
motion to transfer to the law side, which the court assumed would have been granted if the
case were not cognizable in admiralty. Id. at 1057. This is one of the earliest mentions of transfer between sides, or dockets, as a method of curing jurisdictional defects. It is also interesting
to note that judge Hand left open the question whether the court would have had jurisdiction
because the case was one arising under federal law. Ibid. But this does not appear to be a true
anticipation of Judge Magruder's dictum in the Janssoncase, supranote 71, since judge Hand
apparently meant no more than that the claim before him was asserted under a federal statute.
"'7
Admiral Orient Line v. United States, 86 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1936).
1"8Id. at 203; Minturn v. Maynard, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 477 (1854).
"39
86 F.2d at 204.
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no jurisdiction were retained to be tried as two actions at law and one suit in
equity.

140

The United States filed a libel in rem against a vessel, and a libel in personam against its owner, for damage to a submarine cable.' 41 This was prior to
the Amphibious Torts Act, 42 and the claim was nonmaritime. The libel in rem,
not being within the saving clause, had to be dismissed; indeed, there was no
point in pursuing a libel in rem in any court, there being no maritime lien. But
the court, Judge Augustus Hand writing the opinion, affirmed the decree in
personam against the owner, since the district court had jurisdiction under Section 41(1) of the old Tudicial Code.' 4' The only right which the respondent
might have lost by having the case treated in retrospect as one at law was the
right of jury trial; but he waived that right by not making a timely demand in
accordance with Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 144
Judge Clark, a long-time foe of the compartmentalization of law and equity,
was delighted to carry on the assault against the wall of separation between the
civil side and the admiralty side. A shipper sued a carrier for damage to wheat
which, when it could not be unloaded according to plan, remained stored aboard
at reduced demurrage rates. 45 The contention was made that, in so far as the
claim was for damage and shortage occurring during the period of storage, it
was nonmaritime. It would have been difficult to allocate the items of loss and
damage between the periods of transportation and storage. The court considered this storage, in the circumstances, an incident of the transportation, so
that the entire claim was within the admiralty jurisdiction; but if the result were
otherwise, there was still jurisdiction because of diversity of citizenship. Acceptance of the respondent's contention as to the separateness of law and admiralty would require the libellant to divide his claims for damage with the
possible result that he could not prove his case in either court:
141In Moran Towing Co. v. Navigazione Libera Triestina, S.A., 92 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir.
1937), there was jurisdiction in admiralty; but the court noted that if this were doubted there
was nevertheless jurisdiction based on diversity.
141United States v. The John R. Williams, 144 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1944).

142 62 Stat. 496 (1948), 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1952).
143 28 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1940). That section covered both suits in which the United States is a
party and cases arising under federal law. It is probable that the court had in mind the former
ground of jurisdiction, especially since the jurisdictional amount seems not to have been in
controversy. Cf. note 71 supra.
144144 F.2d at 454. A similar case decided shortly afterwards reveals another procedural
complication arising from transfer. An appeal from an order transferring the case from the
admiralty to the civil "side" was dismissed because the order was not final. An appeal from
the final judgment was filed within 71 days. The time for appeal in admiralty was 90 days;
in civil cases, 60 days. Held: The transfer was proper since the tort, committed prior to the
Amphibious Torts Act, note 142 supra, was nonmaritime; but in any event the court had
power to order transfer; upon transfer the case became a civil action, and the 60-day rule applied. United States v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 187 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1951).
I" James Richardson & Sons v. Conners Marine Co., 141 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1944).
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Such compartmentalizing of litigation, to the mystification of lay observers, and waste
in time and expense of litigants, is no longer tolerated as between jurisdiction in
equity and law, and should not be encouraged as between admiralty and law.146
The next case is of special interest because it is the first since the Second
Circuit's temporary lapse into conceptualist thinking in the Smith case147 to involve a suit brought at law but cognizable in admiralty; all the other cases in
this series involve libels not sustainable in admiralty but sustained at law or in
equity by virtue of non-admiralty jurisdiction. A longshoreman sued the owner
of a vessel for personal injuries sustained when he fell from a defective Jacob's
ladder. He charged negligence and unseaworthiness, and won a jury verdict
which the district court set aside. The basis for assuming jurisdiction at law
does not appear. There is nothing to indicate that there was diversity of citizenship. The court of appeals found no evidence of negligence, but ruled that the
owner, who was in possession under an operating contract after chartering to
the United States on a bare-boat basis, would be liable for the unseaworthy
condition if, but only if, the ladder was defective at the time the owner-demisor
gave possession to the United States under the charter.148 Thus, "upon a new
trial the plaintiff may have his damages assessed by a jury, if he can satisfy
them that the unseaworthy rung was on the ship, and in the same condition,
when the defendant delivered her to the United States."'149 Recognizing the
difficulty of such a burden of proof, the court, speaking through judge Learned
Hand, made an abortive effort to be helpful: even if the unseaworthy condition
arose after transfer to the United States, a lien attached to the vessel commensurate with the liability of the United States as owner pro lac vice, and that
lien could be foreclosed in admiralty. The plaintiff could move "to change the
action to bar into such a suit."'50 True, he would then have to arrest the ship,
and proceed before a judge; but he would avoid the difficulty of proving the
time when the unseaworthy condition came into existence. On rehearing the
court withdrew its suggestion, realizing that the Supreme Court's decision in
The Western Maid' prevented the creation of a lien against a vessel on demise
to the United States. 52 The significant fact remains that the court of appeals
had endorsed the conversion of an action at law into a suit in admiralty-and
even into a libel in rem, in which new process would have to issue. "We have
repeatedly held that, when the district court has jurisdiction over a cause of
1 6Id. at 229. The case points up another procedural difference between law and admiralty.
As Judge Clark noted, the consequence of holding the case not cognizable in admiralty would
have been first of all dismissal of the appeal, which, being from an interlocutory decree, was
permissible only in admiralty. On dismissal the action could continue at law with the commissioner, appointed in admiralty, treated as a master under FED. R. CIV. P. Rule 53(a).
147Note 119 supra.
1 8
Cannella v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 174 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1949).
W4'
Id. at 797.
50
1 Id. at 797.

1257 U.S. 419 (1922).
152 174 F.2d at 798.
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action both at law and in the admiralty, a suit upon it may be transferred from
1 3
the law side to the admiralty side, and vice versa, without starting anew."'
This statement is notable in two respects. First, it speaks of free transferability
from law to admiralty and vice versa, thus tending to dispel any possible notion
that this may be a one-way street; second, it states in a restrictive way the
principle followed by the court in its earlier decisions, perhaps modifying the
plenary character of transferability. The qualifying clause is "when the district
court has jurisdiction over a cause of action both at law and in admiralty." In
previous cases the holding had been that, even if there were no jurisdiction in
admiralty, the case would be sustained as an action at law if diversity or other
non-admiralty grounds of jurisdiction were present.
It may be that this seemingly qualifying clause was used only because the
court assumed that in the case at bar there were grounds for jurisdiction both at
law and in admiralty, and that is perhaps the most interesting feature of the
case. Why was jurisdiction at law, with the right of jury trial, assumed? 154 It
may be that there was diversity of citizenship; but where that was so in previous cases, Judge Hand and his brethren had always been careful to point out
the fact. It is not unreasonable to suggest that Judge Hand was assuming that
this action for a maritime tort, based in part upon a claim of unseaworthiness,
was one cognizable under what is now Section 1331.1"' Some support for such a
suggestion is found in the court's discussion of the question whether, in the
light of the Jensen case," 6 state law or the general maritime law should govern.
7
The court concluded that it should follow the rationale of the Sieracki case"1
and apply the federal maritime law.' In Sieracki, a similar longshoreman's
action for unseaworthiness, there was no diversity of citizenship; 59 the question
of jurisdiction was never raised. Yet the action was regarded as "a civil action,
on the law side," and was tried to a jury until, near the end of the testimony,
the damages were stipulated and the question of liability was submitted to the
judge. 6 ' After the withdrawal of the case from the jury the question whether the
district court was exercising jurisdiction at law or in admiralty became aca113Id. at 797.
54 The court did not say, as it might have said by analogy to its prior decisions concerning
law claims tried in admiralty, that the proceedings below could be treated as in admiralty, the
defendant having waived his right to trial to the court without a jury. It clearly assumed that
there were grounds for jurisdiction at law.
See note 71 supra.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
"57Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
-8 Cf. 174 F.2d 794, 798 (2d Cir. 1949).
19 We know this because of Judge Wyzanski's industrious search of the record in the case.
See Transcript of Record 12, 116, 134; McDonald v. Cape Cod Trawling Corp., 71 F. Supp.
888, 890 (D. Mass. 1947), discussed at note 215 infra.
-16 Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 57 F. Supp. 724, 725 (E.D. Pa. 1944).
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demic. It may be that the question of jurisdiction was simply overlooked; it may
be that jurisdiction was not questioned because the case was obviously cognizable in admiralty;' 61 it may also be that jurisdiction on the civil side was assumed on the ground that the case was one arising under federal law.
In the Southern District of New York, before the Paduano decision 62 ruled
the contrary, Judge Irving Kaufman 63 and Judge Weinfeld'6 1 elected to follow
the First Circuit instead of the Third, and ruled that actions on marine insurance contracts brought in state courts were removable under Section 1441 as
cases arising under federal law, the jurisdictional amount being present, irrespective of diversity. The same court surmounted jurisdictional obstacles to
achieve a sensible procedural result in two novel situations. In a Jones Act case
the defendant sought to implead the United States as a third party whose negligence caused the injury. The Government's liability could be asserted only under
the Suits in Admiralty Act,'0 but Judge Irving Kaufman said that the problem
was "plainly one of practice and pleading,"' ' and, by analogy to the practice
respecting equitable issues, held that the third-party complaint could be
amended so as to constitute a petition under Admiralty Rule 56, the issue to be
determined by the court.' In another Jones Act case the defendant pleaded a
counterclaim, not arising out of the same transaction, based on the general
maritime law. Although the Paduano case had by this time excluded the possibility of jurisdiction at law under Section 1331, the court found no difficulty in
entertaining the counterclaim by virtue of its admiralty jurisdiction, so long as
procedural differences were observed. The court reserved to itself the issues
6

under the counterclaim.1

In the Third Circuit a district court took an uncompromising view of the
distinction between jurisdiction at law and in admiralty. A number of longshoremen brought actions at law against their employer for injuries, some of which
were maritime and some not. In some cases the bases for diversity jurisdiction
161 Cf. McDonald v. Cape Cod Trawling Corp., 71 F. Supp. 888, 890 (D. Mass. 1947).
162Supra note 95.
" Compania Maritima Ador, S.A. v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 120 F. Supp. 577 (S.D.

N.Y. 1944).
164 Wunderlich v. Netherlands Ins. Co., 125 F. Supp. 877 (S.D. N.Y. 1954).
l6 See Prudential S.S. Corp. v. United States, 220 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1955). Superficially,
that case would seem to be a lapse into treating the law and admiralty jurisdictions as mutually exclusive; but a substantial difference between the Tucker Act and the Suits in Admiralty
Act is that the periods of limitation are different. Cf. Johnson v. Fleet Corp., 280 U.S. 320
(1930), discussed in text at note 219 infra.
16 Canale v. American Export Lines, 17 F.R.D. 269, 271 (S.D. N.Y. 1955).
167To the same effect is Skupski v. Western Nav. Corp., 113 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. N.Y. 1953).
168Fraser v. Astra S.S. Corp., 18 F.R.D. 240 (S.D. N.Y. 1955). Cf. United States v. Isthmian
S.S. Co., 359 U.S. 314 (1959) (counterclaim arising out of separate and unrelated transaction
not permitted in admiralty).
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were alleged. The court dismissed the cases, maritime or not, in which diversity
did not appear. 6 9 "[W]hen a suitor elects to pursue his common-law remedy, he
takes the cause out of the class, to which it might otherwise belong, of causes
maritime, and it must be treated for jurisdictional purposes as other common-law actions are treated.' 7 0 There was no mention of the possibility of
amendment or transfer.'7 '
In the Fifth Circuit a district court took a position flatly inconsistent with
the spirit of Marshall's disposition of The Sarah.7 2 The United States brought a
libel in rem against the Dixie for damage to a government-owned bridge,
under the authority of the Rivers and Harbors Act. 73 Holding that the case was
not cognizable in admiralty, the court dismissed and later denied a motion to
transfer: "In the absence of a Statute, I think this Court as a Court of Admiralty
74
is without power to transfer the Case to a Court of Law or Equity.'
In the Ninth Circuit we begin with an interesting district court decision
holding nonremovable a longshoreman's action for maritime tort in which,
though there was diversity of citizenship, the jurisdictional amount was not in
controversy. 175 Removability under the predecessor of Section 1441 on the
ground that the case was one of which the district court would have had original
jurisdiction in admiralty was not considered; but the court's remark that the
jurisdictional amount was a prerequisite "where the removal is based upon a
"I9Stamp v. Union Stevedoring Co., 11 F.2d 172 (E.D. Pa. 1925).
1 0 Id. at 174.
17'With this decision it is interesting to compare a recent case in the District of Columbia,
where there is no separate admiralty docket. The plaintiff's pleading in an action for collision
damages was called a complaint, and the case was on the civil non-jury calendar. The court
simply observed that the case was within the admiralty jurisdiction, that the complaint would
be treated as a libel in personam, and that the case was properly on the civil non-jury calendar
because that was the place for all non-jury cases. Smoot Sand & Grkvel Corp. v. Baltimore
Steam Packet Co., 148 F. Supp. 269 (D.D.C. 1957).
172Note 100 supra.
173 30 Stat. 1153 (1899), 33 U.S.C. § 412 (1958).
174The Dixie, 30 F. Supp. 215, 216 (S.D. Tex. 1939). This decision is "explained" by the
judge who rendered it in Nilsson v. American Oil Co., 118 F. Supp. 482 (S.D. Tex. 1954),
discussed in text at note 287 infra. In The Panoil, 266 U.S. 433 (1925), the Supreme Court had
affirmed dismissal of a similar libel, without discussion of amendment or transfer, although the
court clearly had jurisdiction at law since the United States was a party. In The Gansfjord,
17 F.2d 613 (E.D. La. 1927), a similar libel was sustained on the apparent ground that the
Rivers and Harbors Act, supra note 173, amounted to an extension of the admiralty jurisdiction (cf. the later Amphibious Torts Act, note 142 supra). At a later stage the same case appears as an action at law, though no mention is made of transfer, and the proceeding is treated

as sui generis: Congress has power, if it chooses to do so, to confuse law and admiralty jurisdictions and procedures. jury trial was expressly waived. The Gansfjord, 25 F.2d 736 (E.D. La.
1928). The court of appeals affirmed: "The libel did not purport to be one in admiralty, being
filed on the law side of the court, and a jury being waived by written agreement of the parties."
Aktieselskabet Dampskib Gansfjord v. United States, 32 F.2d 236, 237 (5th Cir. 1929).
1 Ross v. Pacific S.S. Co., 272 Fed. 538 (D. Ore. 1921).
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federal question as well as upon diversity of citizenship.'
seems to be an
77
anticipation of Judge Magruder's dictum in the Jansson case.
A proceeding to set aside an order of a deputy commissioner denying a claim
under the Longshoremen's and Harborworkers' Compensation Act was brought
by petition as a suit in equity. The court of appeals held on the merits that the
petition should have been dismissed. 7 It also held that jurisdiction of this
statutory proceeding was in admiralty, and that the plaintiff should have proceeded by libel on the admiralty side. Instead of affirming, therefore, it vacated
the decree below and remanded with instructions to transfer to the admiralty
docket, treat the petition as a libel, treat the motion to dismiss as an exception
to its sufficiency, and enter a decree (in admiralty) dismissing the libel. What
possible purpose might be served by all this paperwork does not appear, yet
Judge Mathews wrote a concurring opinion solely to emphasize its importance.
"The exceptions were well founded, but, as a court of equity, the District Court
was not empowered to sustain them. Attempting to do so, it erred.'17 Judge
Mathews could have used a Silver Oar-as a paddle.
In two district court cases involving maritime torts the judges elected to
follow the rule of the Jordine case, 80 and held that in the absence of diversity
of citizenship there was no jurisdiction at law. In the first 1 ' the action was
simply dismissed, with consequences which do not appear. In the second"8 ' the
case was transferred to the admiralty side with an order preserving proceedings
theretofore had under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Two cases involving the Death on the High Seas Act fairly bristle with problems, most of which are beyond the scope of this paper. In Higa,1' 8 a citizen of
the Territory of Hawaii died when the land-based plane on which he was a
passenger crashed into the Pacific Ocean. The administrator, apparently also a
citizen of Hawaii, brought the action for wrongful death in the District Court
for the District of Hawaii. The defendant was a California corporation. Although the court assumed that the bases for diversity jurisdiction were pres7
1'
Id. at 540.

177
See note 71

supra.

1 8

7 Kobilkin v. Pillsbury, 103 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1939).

179Id. at 671. To the same effect is Twin Harbor Stevedoring Co. v. Marshall, 103 F.2d
(9th Cir. 1939).
In a similar case the district court on its own motion transferred to the admiralty docket.
No harm seems to have resulted except that the lawyers suddenly found themselves proctors,
expected to proceed under the Admiralty Rules. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Pillsbury, 136
F. Supp. 846, 850 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
180 Note 71 supra.
181
Zapien v. Koninklijke Rotterdamasche Lloyd, 130 F. Supp. 453 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
182Ratto v. Pacific Transport Lines, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
183 Higa v. Transocean Airlines, 230 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1955).
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84
ent,1
it affirmed a judgment of dismissal because the Death on the High Seas
Act provides for a suit in admiralty as the exclusive remedy for cases within its
coverage. On petition for rehearing the court denied a motion to vacate the
order of dismissal and remand to the admiralty docket, although the period of
limitation had expired. 1s
The decision is brutally unjust. First, even if it be assumed that the action
was on no theory cognizable except by virtue of the admiralty jurisdiction, it
was, without any question whatever, filed in the admiralty court. The fact that
it was "brought as a common law civil suit," with a demand for jury trial, 18
is wholly immaterial. The act provides that the representative "may maintain
a suit for damages in the district courts of the United States, in admiralty.
...
"1,7 This may mean that the exclusive remedy is according to admiralty
procedures, without a jury; 8 it certainly does not mean that an action filed in

a district court is filed in the wrong court. In the majority of districts, where
there is no separate admiralty docket and no rule requiring identification of the
proceeding as a civil action or a suit in admiralty, reasoning of this sort could
make jurisdiction, and the bar of the statute of limitations, depend upon
whether the plaintiff demands a jury trial. Second, the case was within the
jurisdiction of the "law side" of the district court because it was one arising
under the laws of the United States, cognizable under Section 1331 of the
Judicial Code. Not even Romero denies that a maritime cause of action based
upon federal statute is so cognizable; 89 the ruling of that case relates to actions
under the general maritime law. True, the act of Congress provides for a proceeding in admiralty; but it creates the right of action, which did not exist under
the general maritime law, and the case presented a substantial question relating
to the construction and application of the act. 90 In 1947 Judge Learned Hand
184Since the action was brought in Hawaii the conclusion that there was jurisdiction under
§ 1332(d) is probably free from the complexities which surround the significance of National
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949), for cases involving territorial
citizenship. While a majority of the Court in that case rejected the proposition that the validity of the jurisdictional grant could be rested on Article I, their position was that "Article I
courts in the sereralstates cannot be vested, by virtue of other provisions of the Constitution,
with powers specifically denied them by the terms of Article Ill." Rutledge, J., 337 U.S. at
607 (concurring opinion) (emphasis supplied).
1" 230 F.2d at 786. Cf. Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677, 680 (2d Cir.
1957).
186
See 230 F.2d at 781.
187 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1952).
188 But see Bugden v. Trawler Cambridge, Inc., 319 Mass. 315, 65 N.E.2d 533 (1946).
189 The Jones Act itself furnishes the most obvious example.
1
90In the same way, the Jones Act created rights unknown to the general maritime law,
and provided that the action might be brought either at law, with a right to jury trial, or in
admiralty. If a seaman injured on land (cf. O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318
U.S. 36 (1943)), were to bring a libel in personam in admiralty, would the libel be dismissed or
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held-in an off-hand way, it is true, but with sure instinct-that a suit under
the Death on the High Seas Act was cognizable as a case arising under the laws
of the United States. 9' Third, though the case was not within the saving clause
and there was no right to jury trial, and though the Rules of Civil Procedure
were inapplicable, the district court had jurisdiction because of diversity.
Fourth, the court found that its disposition of the case on jurisdictional grounds
"makes unnecessary the determination whether the High Seas Act applies to
airplanes which are not in any way water navigating vessels."' 92 But if the suit
was not within the purview of the act, then the remedy provided by that act
was not the exclusive remedy, and there was no warrant whatever for dismissing for want of jurisdiction. The act provides: "The provisions of any State
statute giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall not be
affected by this chapter."' 93 If the court had jurisdiction because of diversity, or
because the plaintiff invoked an act of Congress and presented a substantial
question relating to its interpretation, surely, even though the remedy afforded
by the act be held unavailable, jurisdiction should be retained to allow the
plaintiff to assert the right to recover under state law.'9
Kunkel' 9' was an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act for a death on the
high seas. Judge Mathes dismissed the complaint because it was "at law," holding that, so far as death on the high seas is concerned, the United States has
consented to be sued only in admiralty. He refused to transfer the case to the
admiralty docket because the widow was named as plaintiff in her personal, as
well as her representative, capacity.' In substance, the criticisms directed
against Higa apply here: the action was filed in the district court; that court
had jurisdiction not only by virtue of its admiralty power but because the case
was one arising under two federal statutes; the statutory reference to admiralty
should be taken as at most a regulation of procedure, and not as designating, as
the only appropriate forum, an invisible compartment of the court having impenetrable walls. 197 judge Mathes, however, was unmoved by appeals based
on such considerations:
would it be treated simply as a waiver of the right to jury trial? The tort being nonmaritime,
at least by older standards, there would be no jurisdiction in admiralty; but there would certainly be jurisdiction under § 1331.
191 O'Neill v. Cunard White Star, 160 F.2d 446, 447 (2d Cir. 1947), discussed at note 234
infra.
112230 F.2d at 786.
19346 U.S.C. § 767.
194 Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 686 (1946) (dissenting
opinion).
195 Kunkel v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 591 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
9 The limitation period of the Death on the High Seas Act is two years. 46 U.S.C. § 763.
As to the effect of the Tort Claims Act see Moran v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 275 (D. Conn.
1951).
197 Cf. Moran v. United States, supran. 198, 102 F. Supp. at 278.
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Against the contention that the difference between the "law side" and the "admiralty side" of the court is of no material consequence, that the difference between
an action at law and a suit in admiralty is but a mere technicality, stands the rejoinder
of the venerated law professor that the distinction may be so considered "if one can
consider the difference between a boy and a girl to be a mere technicality."
There is indeed much to be said for keeping the distinction true, in order that all
may know when the maritime law is to rule decision, 198 when admiralty procedure is to
rule the course of the cause through the court....
Inescapable truth compels recognition that the inherent and fundamental difference between actions at law and suits in admiralty can never be ignored; and no legislative fiat or judicial indecision can wipe the distinction out.
The problem brings to mind timeless comments by Dean Ames on the so-called
fusion of law and equity: "The advantages of vesting a court with both legal and
equitable powers are not to be denied. But when the doctrines of equity are no longer
administered in a separate court, it is all the more important not to lose sight of the
fundamental distinction between law and equity,--a distinction as eternal as the dif99
ference between rights in ren and rights in personaw."'
In Rupert v. Todd Shipyards0 0 the court of appeals held that, upon transfer
to the admiralty docket of a proceeding to review an award under the Longshoremen's and Harborworkers' Compensation Act, the case became one in
admiralty and the ninety-day period for appeal was applicable 0°
The First Circuit has been left until last because the significant decision in
that circuit prior to the Jansson02 2 and Doucette" cases provides a bridge between the general problem of the law and admiralty jurisdictions and the
specific problem of the mode of trial in the typical seaman's injury case. The
administratrix of a seaman killed on board sued his employer under the Jones
Act and joined the builders of the lampstand which fell upon him. So far as the
builders were concerned the claim was for simple maritime tort, cognizable in
admiralty. All parties were citizens of Massachusetts. The complaint, "as [was]
indicated by its docket number and by its specific claim of a jury trial, was
11s
See note 37 supra.
199140 F. Supp. at 594-95. While we are on the subject of professorial whimsy in support of
the perpetuation of jurisdictional antiquities, it is just as well to recall Professor Hinton's
contribution: "I might say on the subject of the fusion of law and equity that it always makes
me think of the fusion of the cat and the canary. When the fusion is complete it is all cat.
Personally I think our equity canary will and does function better in his proper cage than he
does in the stomach of the cat." HINTON, IfuNois Crvmi PRAcTicc AcT 125 (1934).
No effort will be made here to exhaust the authorities on the jurisdictional questions associated with the Death on the High Seas Act. See Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp.
85 (N.D. Cal. 1954); Iafrate v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 106 F. Supp. 619
(S.D.N.Y. 1952); Bugden v. Trawler Cambridge, Inc., supra note 188.
200236 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1956).
201
The Second Circuit had applied the same principle in the converse situation. See note
144 supra.
2
202 Supra note 71.
o1
Supra note 81.
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filed at law and not in admiralty. ' 2 4 The builders moved to dismiss for want of
jurisdiction and improper joinder. Judge Wyzanski granted the motion. He was
well aware that "the vital question" 25 was not one of jurisdiction, but simply
whether, with respect to the claim against the builders, of which the court had
jurisdiction only because of its maritime character, the plaintiff was entitled to
jury trial. He held that the claim against the builders, being against a different
defendant and involving issues different from those in the Jones Act claim,
could not be considered ancillary. 2 6 He held very specifically that, if the plaintiff
meant to suggest that the claim against the builders was within the jurisdiction
conferred by Section 41(1)(a) of the old Judicial Code (now Section 1331) as a
case arising under the laws of the United States, the suggestion was "without
merit."20 7 "Her complaint presents no question of the construction or effect of
a federal statute. That... is essential if the jurisdiction of this Court is to be
sustained on the theory suggested." 23 Here, then, is a very definite anticipation
of the idea expressed in Judge Magruder's dictum in the Jansson case,20 9 although Judge Wyzanski suggested the idea only to reject it. The complaint as
to the builders was, therefore, defective. "And the defect cannot be cured because she invites a hybrid trial,-a jury trial at law so far as the corporate defendants [shipowners] are concerned; a non-jury trial in admiralty so far as the
individual defendants [builders] are concerned. 2 10 Judge Wyzanski considered
whether it would be proper to treat as correct the joinder of the law and admiralty cases, trying them simultaneously with the issues in the admiralty case
reserved to the court. Rejecting the analogy of Rule 18(a) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, dealing with the related problem of differences between law and
equity,"' he preferred to allow the plaintiff to file a new suit in admiralty, after
which she might move to consolidate the two cases for trial. This course was
preferred especially because the plaintiff might wish to refile both claims in the
state court, where she could be reasonably sure of a jury trial on both. Judge
Wyzanski did not consider amendment or transfer to the admiralty docket as
an alternative to dismissal; he did not cite The Sarah nor any of the Second
Circuit cases ameliorating the stringency of jurisdictional distinctions. Perhaps
2
this was because there was no critical problem of time limitation. u
v. Cape Cod Trawling Corp., 71 F. Supp. 888, 889 (D. Mass. 1947).
Id. at 890.
0
2 1 Id. at 892. Except for Lindquist v. Dilkes, 127 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1942) (note 274 infra),
to which Judge Wyzanski did not refer, this appears to be the first reference to "pendent"
jurisdiction in the context of seamen's personal injury claims.
20
207
s Id. at 892-93.
Id. at 892.
209 See note 71 supra. This was a strange case in which to raise the point since, as the court
indirectly recognized (id. at 890-91), the plaintiff necessarily had to rely on the Massachusetts
wrongful death statute in her action against the builders. Cf. note 93 supra.
210 71 F. Supp. at 890.
211"But I know of no basis for such a hybrid combination of admiralty and law." Id. at 892.
212 See note 96 supra.
204 McDonald

2
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V. TaEE CONCEPT OF "DISTINCT JURISDICTIONS"
IN SEAMN'S INJURY CASES
The story of the problem concerning the mode of trial of seamen's injury

cases, prior to the Ronero decision, begins and ends with Judge Wyzanski 13
In 1947, in the McDonald case, 14 he undertook a soul-searching review of the
practice of the district courts in the First Circuit, providing the first comprehensive discussion of the problem. Ten years later, in Jenkins v. Roderick,21 he
made a much less helpful contribution to the discussion--one which may have
been partly responsible for the distressingly incomplete fashion in which the
Supreme Court dealt with the problem in Rolmero. Let us consider this aspect of
McDonald first and, after reviewing developments concerning the mode of trial
circuit by circuit, come back to Jenkins v. Roderick.
Judge Wyzanski noted that it was common practice for a seaman to join in
one action counts for negligence under the Jones Act and for maintenance and
cure.1 6 The first of these was properly brought as an action at law, with the
right to jury trial; the second was, in the absence of diversity, cognizable only
by virtue of the admiralty jurisdiction. The district courts had "often" tried
these two causes of action together in one lawsuit, submitting them together
to the jury. The result, as a practical matter, had been satisfactory. The procedure avoided two lengthy trials; it avoided (or minimized) the risk of overlapping recoveries, since a single trier of facts would be unlikely to duplicate
items, such as medical expenses, recoverable under either count. Complete
separation of the claims was impracticable in any event, since a negligent failure
to provide medical care could itself be made the basis of a Jones Act claim; submitting both claims to the jury as a matter of course avoided the confusion
which such a Jones Act claim would have injected into the effort to keep them
separate. Yet it seemed to Judge Wyzanski that he and his brother judges had
probably been acting erroneously. They could not honestly avoid their error by
saying that they had treated the jury verdict with respect to maintenance and
cure as advisory only. The truth was that they simply had not sufficiently considered the legal basis for their practice. The maintenance and cure claim was
not cognizable at law in the absence of diversity. It was not cognizable as a
case arising under federal law; it was not cognizable at law at all--"unless perchance there is some as yet unexpressed theory of pendent jurisdiction such as
,23
A certain literary license is involved in this statement, since just prior to the Romero
decision the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rendered a significant decision in Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1959), discussed in text at note 269
infra. But we are discussing the Romero case, and Bartholomew was decided too late (January
9, 1959) to be cited in Romero (argued March 13, reargued October 22-23, 1958; decided
February 24, 1959).
214 Supra note 204.
215156 F. Supp. 299 (D. Mass. 1957), discussed infra at note 301.
216 71 F. Supp. at 891. Note that at this date the third claim, based on unseaworthiness,
seems not to have been common.
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is applied in copyright and trademark cases.... That is, there may be some
notion that where the facts supporting the count for maintenance and cure and
one for negligence are substantially the same then, to save time, expense and
double litigation, the law side of the federal court has jurisdiction over both
217
counts."
The impact which this review of the situation would have upon Judge
Wyzanski's future practice in trying typical seamen's injury cases is not made
clear by the opinion. He did say that he was "quite unprepared to proceed" on
the basis of earlier court of appeals decisions impliedly approving the practice;
but he held only that the theory of pendent jurisdiction, which alone could
justify the practice, would not in any event extend to the plaintiff's claim
against the builders in the case before him. Except that there is no reference to
the possibility of trying the two claims simultaneously with the issues under
the maintenance and cure claim being reserved to the court, this opinion contains all the ingredients which have gone into discussion of the problem.
A most unfortunate decision by the Supreme Court in 1930 provided an unwholesome context for the development of the law regarding jurisdictional distinctions in seamen's injury cases. A seaman injured aboard a merchant vessel
owned by the United States brought an action "at law" alleging (1) negligent
failure to provide a safe place to work and (2) negligent failure to provide medical treatment. The trial court dismissed the first count and submitted the
second to a jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.2 18 The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the libel in personam specified by the Suits in Admiralty Act was the exclusive remedy-and ordered dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.219 Quite apart from
the fact that the case arguably arose under any one of three acts of Congressthe Jones Act, the Tucker Act, and the Suits in Admiralty Act-the important
consideration is that the action was filed in a United States district court,
which is a court of admiralty, and which unquestionably had jurisdiction as
such. If the court meant that the issue should not have been tried by a jury, it
should at most have reversed and remanded for a new trial under proper conditions. It should not have ordered dismissal for lack of jurisdiction."'
As early as 1933 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit approved joinder
of the count for maintenance and cure with the Jones Act count where the
21

71 F. Supp. at 891.

211Lustgarten v. Fleet Corp., 28 F.2d 1014 (2d Cir. 1928) (memorandum opinion).
219 Johnson v. Fleet Corp., 280 U.S. 320 (1930).
220 The Court observed in Fleet Corp. v. Rosenberg Bros., 276 U.S. 202, 213 (1928), that
the Suits in Admiralty Act furnishes a complete system of administration "by which uniformity is established as to venue, service of process, rules of decision and procedure, rate of interest,
and periods of limitation.... ." All of these special provisions can be held applicable to suits
within the coverage of the act, and any deviation from them can be corrected, simply on the
basis of a holding that the act provides the exclusive remedy, without dismissing an action for
no other reason than that it was filed on the wrong "side" of the court.
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action under the Jones Act was brought at law, and assumed without discussion that it was proper to submit the maintenance and cure count to the
jury.22' In Nolan v. GeneralSeafoods Corp.,22 2 the court went farther. The seaman
sued (1) for negligence under the Jones Act and (2) for maintenance and cure.2nI
The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant on the first count and the
jury found for the plaintiff on the second. The court of appeals reversed as to
the first count and affirmed as to the second. Thus the submission of the maintenance and cure count to the jury was specifically approved although, after the
directed verdict on the Jones Act count, none of the practical reasons for that
procedure remained. But perhaps the most interesting aspect of the opinion is
the following passage:
No question was raised in this case as to the right of the plaintiff under the general
maritime law to recover indemnity for injuries resulting from failure of the shipowner
to furnish a seaworthy ship, including safe and suitable appliances.... Whether such
a suit can be maintained on the law side of a federal district court in the absence of
diversity of citizenship, instead of by libel in admiralty, need not be determined.
224
Compare 28 U.S.C. §41(1)(a) ....
Section 41(1)(a) of the old Judicial Code invested the district courts with jurisdiction of cases "aris[ing] under the Constitution or laws of the United States.
.." Thus we have here, ten years before judge Magruder's dictum in the
Jansson case,12 a positive anticipation of the suggestion that actions under the
226
general maritime law might be cognizable as cases arising under federal law.
Again in 1946 the First Circuit approved joinder of the maintenance and cure
count with a Jones Act action at law. While not discussing the rationale of
jury trial on the maritime law count, it affirmed the verdict of the jury on both
counts.2 2 7 After the Court of Appeals decided Doucelle v. VincenP2 8 in 1952 the
221 Stevens v. R. O'Brien & Co., 62 F.2d 632, 634 (1st Cir. 1933). In Calmar S.S. Corp. v.
Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938), an appeal from the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court tacitly
approved joinder where the Jones Act claim was in admiralty. It may be that at that time, in
that circuit, it was believed that a single trial could be had only if the plaintiff elected to
proceed in admiralty.
222 112 F.2d 515 (1st Cir. 1940).
222There was no claim for unseaworthiness under the general maritime law. The plaintiff
had "elected" to sue under the Jones Act. Id. at 517.
2 4 Id. at 516-17.
25 See note 71 supra.
22There can be no doubt that the question left open was the same one that the Magruder
dictum answered in the affirmative. In addition to § 41(1)(a) of the Judicial Code the court
cited Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 160 (1920), which contains this language:
"The Constitution itself adopted and established, as part of the laws of the United States,
approved rules of the general maritime law .. ." It cited Philadelphia & Reading R.R. v.
Berg, 274 Fed. 534, 538-39 (3d Cir. 1921), and Stamp v. Union Stevedoring Corp., supra
note 169, as implying a negative answer (maritime cause maintainable at law only where jurisdictional requisites of citizenship and amount are present).
227
1Bay State Dredging & Contracting Co. v. Porter, 153 F.2d 827 (1st Cir. 1946).
8
- Note 81 supra.
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District Court for Massachusetts entertained an action at law for maintenance
and cure alone, the jurisdictional amount apparently being in controversy 29
The seaman's injury had been caused by the automobile of a third party while
he was returning from shore leave. He had settled his claim against the third
party. The claim for maintenance and cure was submitted to the jury although
the practical reasons for that procedure, cited by Judge Wyzanski,2 0 were not
present (of course the decision in Doucette supplied the rationale). The amount
due for maintenance and cure to the time of trial was stipulated; all the jury had
to do was deduct from the stipulated figure items already recovered from the
third party, and add an amount for future maintenance and cure. The jury
botched this assignment, necessitating a new trial. The case strongly suggests
(1) that it is difficult for one trier of fact to determine the claim for maintenance
and cure when the claim for indemnity has been otherwise determined, and (2)
that where such a determination must be made, as in the case before the court,
it would be better made by the court than by the jury. Indeed, there is further
evidence that the Doucette decision injected difficulties into a procedure which
had theretofore been operating satisfactorily. In a seaman's action for unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure the judge, contrary to the earlier practice
described by Judge Wyzanski, withheld the maintenance and cure count from
the jury because the amount claimed therein was less than $3,000.31 The jury's
verdict was for little more than the plaintiff was clearly entitled to for lost
wages, although there was evidence of pain and suffering. There was evidence
of contributory negligence, and the jury had been instructed to scale down the
damages in proportion; this they had presumably done not only with respect to
the item for pain and suffering but also with respect to lost wages. This was
probably correct procedure on the jury's part; but under the count for maintenance and cure the seaman was entitled to recover wages without deduction for
contributory negligence. Judge Aldrich knew, then, that the jury had awarded
the plaintiff some of his wages, but did not know how much. He awarded a sum
for medical bills and for maintenance, but nothing for wages, which means
that he cast upon the plaintiff the unsustainable burden of showing the amount
which the jury had awarded for wages. 32 If both counts had been submitted to
the jury with proper instructions, it seems less likely that the plaintiff would
229Gomes v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, 127 F. Supp. 435 (D. Mass. 1954), inotion for
summaryjudgment denied, 132 F. Supp. 29 (D. Mass. 1955).
2
11 Supra note 215.
231
Stendze v. The Boat Neptune, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 801, n. 1. (D. Mass. 1955). In so doing
he overlooked the dictum in Doucette concerning "pendent" jurisdiction (note 92 supra)which is hardly surprising in view of the principal rationale of that case. The district courts
probably concluded that one basis of jurisdiction at law over claims arising under the general
maritime law was enough. And cf. note 333 infra.
22
1 In terms, the burden was cast upon the defendant of showing what portion of the
wages had been paid by inclusion in the jury's verdict; but this is contradicted by the omission of any award for wages.
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have been deprived of part of the modest protection afforded him by the principle of maintenance and cure.
The Second Circuit adhered in the seamen's injury cases to its procedural approach to "jurisdictional" questions, though in the first case to be discussed it
did so in a confused and unsatisfactory context. The administratrix of a British
seaman, domiciled in the United States, sued his employer for his death on a
British vessel at sea. The district court dismissed for lack of diversity, but gave
leave to move for transfer to the admiralty. 3 3 The motion to transfer was
denied on forum non conveniens grounds.23 4 The plaintiff then filed a libel in
personam in admiralty, invoking the Jones Act and the Death on the High
Seas Act. This proceeding, so far as the Jones Act was concerned, was barred by
the statute of limitations unless the plaintiff could somehow rely on having filed
the action at law in time. This question the district court did not resolve, deciding that, in any event, jurisdiction in admiralty should be declined on forum
non conveniens grounds. The appeal was not from this dismissal of the libel but
from the order of the district court refusing to transfer the original action at law
to the admiralty docket. Judge Learned Hand held that the refusal to transfer
was erroneous: "We held long ago that any ground of substantive jurisdiction
will serve to support an action, regardless of the formal amendments which
may be necessary to make it triable on one side or the other of the Court." 35
Since the claim was based on the Jones Act and the Death on the High Seas
Act it was a case arising under federal law 23 6 CunardS.S. Co. v. Smith, 37 the one
instance in which the court had dismissed a maritime claim because there was
no jurisdiction at law, was "distinguished." There, said Judge Hand, the plaintiff stevedore had "no right of action" under the predecessor of the Jones Act;238
233
O'Neill v. Cunard White Star, 69 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). It does not appear what
law was invoked by the original complaint. In the court of appeals, O'Neill v. Cunard White
Star, 160 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1947), Judge Hand assumed that the complaint was based upon the
Jones Act and the Death on the High Seas Act, but he was thinking of the later libel in admiralty. His statement of the procedure below is inaccurate. Cf. the opinion of the district
court, supra. The likeliest possibility seems to be that the complaint was inartistically drawn
and did not make clear the legal basis for the claim.
234 69 F. Supp. at 944.

23160 F.2d at 447. Actually, this point was not necessary to the decision. The district
court had refused transfer not because diversity was lacking but because of its discretionary
power to decline jurisdiction of an action between aliens for a foreign tort.
21 See note 233 supra. If the original complaint was based on the Jones Act the circum-

stance that it was therefore a case arising under federal law was a reason for retaining jurisdic-

tion, not for transfer; the reason for transfer-lack of jurisdiction at law-would in that event
disappear.
237 255 Fed. 846 (2d Cir. 1918), discussed at note 119 supra.
238 160 F.2d at 447, citing § 20 of the Seamen's Act of 1915, 38 Stat. 1185, and Chelentis v.

Luchenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918). No mention was made of the act in the Smith case.
The act referred to seamen, not to stevedores; not until 1926 did the Supreme Court hold that
stevedores were seamen for purposes of the Jones Act. International Stevedoring Co. v.
Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926). If Smith's action be viewed in retrospect as one brought under
the Jones Act's predecessor on the theory that stevedores were seamen, surely it was then a
case arising under federal statute, and should not have been dismissed.
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it followed that "there was nothing we could do but dismiss the complaint, as
soon as it appeared that the necessary diversity did not exist." 23 9 This is no

distinction at all; it is merely destructive of the position which Judge Hand had
labored for years to establish. He seems to be saying that there must be some
non-admiralty basis for jurisdiction, such as diversity or federal question, before
a maritime case filed on the law side can be transferred to admiralty. That is
not what he had said before, and it is not what he had said earlier in the same
paragraph. If there is a non-admiralty ground for jurisdiction the typical occasion for transfer, as an alternative to dismissal, does not exist. It is regrettable
that Judge Hand did not simply disapprove the Smith case as one in which the
admiralty jurisdiction of the court should have prevented dismissal although
240
there was no jurisdiction "at law."
The court then proceeded to hold that the case was not one for discretionary
dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds, but that, on the merits, the Jones
Act should not be applied to a case having such foreign aspects 24'
In the following year the Second Circuit affirmed a judgment based on a
jury verdict in an action under the Jones Act and for maintenance and cure,
but without discussing the propriety of submitting the latter claim to the
jury. 42 In 1950 it aligned itself with the Third Circuit in holding that no election was required between the Jones Act and the claim of unseaworthiness under the general maritime law, approving, without discussion, the submission of
both counts to the jury 2 43 In 1951, reviewing the judgment in a three-pronged
action in which all the issues had been submitted to the jury, Judge Clark observed in a footnote that the practice of submitting the maintenance and cure
count to the jury, followed in the Southern District of New York, had been held
"invalid" in the Third Circuit, 24 but was vigorously supported by Professor

Moore.2 45 The court did not commit itself on the matter-presumably because
the verdict as to maintenance and cure was not involved in the appeal, although
substantially the same problem existed with reference to the claim for unseaworthiness.
219 160 F.2d at 447.
210 Perhaps the case can be read as tacitly disapproving the Smith case since it does not
appear that the original complaint at law invoked any federal statute. Yet Judge Hand, with
the subsequent libel in mind, assumed that it did.
21
1 The district court had held that the Death on the High Seas Act gave no more comfort to
the plaintiff than the Jones Act, and that recovery under the British wrongful death statute
was barred by the British statute of limitations. The court of appeals did not discuss these
matters further than to say that the case was one for application of the law of the flag.
242
McAllister v. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co., 169 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1948), rev'd on other
grounds, 337 U.S. 783 (1949).
24
3 Balado v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 179 F.2d 943 (2d Cir. 1950).
24
1 Id. at 480 n.1.
21 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTicE 281-85 (2d ed. 1951). Professor Moore's support for the prac-

tice is based largely on pragmatic and non-technical grounds, but leans toward the theory of
"pendent" jurisdiction.
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At this stage Judge Irving Kaufman in the Southern District of New York,
prompted by Judge Wyzanski's opinion in McDonald,46 undertook some soulsearching of his own. The case before him was that of a British seaman against
a British shipowner under the Jones Act and for maintenance and cure. Because
of the foreign aspects the court held that there was "no jurisdiction" under the
Jones Act (meaning, of course, that there was no cause of action on the merits);
as to the count for maintenance and cure, that might be dismissed for want of
'247
jurisdiction on the law side, but such a disposition would be "superficial.
"In denying civil jurisdiction, it ignores the admiralty jurisdiction of the court.
It also evades a nascent jurisdictional problem in this circuit already grown
more robust elsewhere."2 4 In the absence of diversity the count for maintenance and cure, deprived of whatever support it might have enjoyed by virtue
of joinder with the dismissed claim under the Jones Act, was not within the
jurisdiction of the court sitting at law:
We thus avoid a problem which may yet churn the placid waters of Jones Act litigation in this circuit. Perhaps too casually, we have allowed causes for maintenance
and cure and causes under the Jones Act to be tried jointly at law without sufficient
probe into the court's jurisdiction of the separate causes. Now elsewhere, this practice
has been sharply challenged. The propriety of combining the actions, at law, where no
diversity exists has been denied in several nearby circuits. The rationale of pendent
jurisdiction justifying merger of the actions has been expressly rejected.... One district judge bravely confesses error and intimates that his brethren are partners in the
error.... If he is correct, I cannot say that others of us have not erred. If the case at
bar involved two New York residents the normal procedure in this court certainly
would be to try both causes before a jury.... Yet in the Third Circuit this is error.
Possibly in the First Circuit it also is. For the moment, we must tread on unsure
249
ground.
Judge Kaufman did not commit the error of dismissing because there was no
jurisdiction at law; he recognized the propriety of transfer to admiralty, and
denied that relief only because it would be futile: as an admiralty judge, he
would decline jurisdiction on forum non conveniens grounds.
Two years later the Court of Appeals again approved, without discussion,
submission of the maintenance and cure count to the jury along with the Jones
0
Act count.25
In 1954 it reaffirmed its policy of "free interchange between admiralty and law" in an unusual situation.251 An action for the death of a seaman,
begun as a civil action under the Jones Act, was on motion of the plaintiff, and
over the objection of the defendant, transferred to the admiralty docket and a
'24 Supra note 204.
247
Catherall v. Cunard S.S. Co., 101 F. Supp. 230, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
2Iaid.
24
9Id. at 233-34.
2

10Rosenquist v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 205 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1953).

2

11Civil v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 217 F.2d 94,97 (2d Cir. 1954).
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count under the Death on the High Seas Act was added 52 After an award to the
plaintiff the defendant objected that the election to proceed at law under the
Jones Act was irrevocable. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the
substantial question was whether there should be jury trial or not, and that the
choice was given to the plaintiff.
Not until 1956 did the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit address its
attention to the mode of trial, and then it did so in a devious and inconclusive
fashion. The case was a typical three-pronged seaman's action, in which the
Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims were submitted to the jury "in accordance with the customary practice in this Circuit." 2 3 The maintenance and cure
claim was decided by the judge 54 The propriety of this customary practice was
mooted by the court on its own motion because the question was "jurisdictional," although "the only significance it has is with respect to the mode of
trial, since there is always jurisdiction in admiralty over an unseaworthiness
claim." 25 5 Judge Learned Hand, had he been sitting, would probably have said
simply that the defendant's failure to object to jury trial of the unseaworthiness
count was a waiver of his right, if any, to have it tried by the court. This
gratuitous raising of the "jurisdictional" issue is all the more strange since the
court construed the charge to the jury as directing a verdict for the defendant on
the claim for unseaworthiness.25 1 Moreover, the court recognized that "a suit
begun 'at law' may, under some circumstances, be deemed to have been
brought in admiralty, and vice versa."2517 Perhaps a second reason given by the
court offers a better explanation of the excursus: recent decisions in the Second
and other circuits had focused attention on the jurisdictional bases for jury
trial of maritime claims, 25 8 and the problem was one that ought to be clarified.
If that was the purpose, it was not achieved. The court's disposition of the case
contributed nothing that was not already clear. Paduanohad established that
the claim for unseaworthiness was not cognizable as one arising under federal
law. The theory of "pendent" jurisdiction was discussed noncommittally. Submission of the unseaworthiness claim to the jury was approved because a
search of the record disclosed that the plaintiff "lived" in New York, that the
defendant was an Indiana corporation, and that the jurisdictional amount was
reasons for the plaintiff's unusual motion are interesting but not material here.
Troupe v. Chicago, D. & G. B. Transit Co., 234 F.2d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 1956).
234
- Although this is the first mention in the Second Circuit of this Third-Circuit treatment
of maintenance and cure, the court did not comment on the practice, presumably because the
maintenance and cure count was not involved in the appeal.
= 234 F.2d at 257.
256
Id. at 256. The question was not entirely irrelevant since the court ultimately held on the
merits that the plaintiff was entitled to a new trial on both claims, so that the mode of procedure on remand was clarified. That hardly seems a reason, however, for the court's raising
the question sua sponte as one of jurisdiction.
218 Id. at 257.
5 Id. at 257 n.5.
2 The
253
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in controversy.26 9 The court also thought it "probable" that jury trial was
justified by the Great Lakes Act, 260 although the detailed facts needed to bring
that act into operation were apparently not alleged. Thus, having strained to
raise the question, the court strained to avoid answering it. That a jury trial
was proper for saving-clause cases where jurisdiction could be predicated on
diversity had been known, or assumed, all along. The decision contributed
nothing to solution of the problem concerning the mode of trial of saving-clause
cases in the absence of diversity.
In Weiss v. Central R.R. of New Jerse26' the court affirmed a judgment in a
case in which the Jones Act claim had been submitted to the jury and the
maintenance and cure claim had been adjudicated by the judge. Thus there was
explicit confirmation of the practice borrowed from the Third Circuit; still,
however, the legal basis for the practice is not discussed. Judge Clark observed
in a footnote 2 2 that the procedure below differed from the prevailing practice
in the Second Circuit of submitting both issues to the jury. He did not criticize
the lower court's departure from local custom in favor of the Third Circuit's.
Instead he observed that "obviously" the simultaneous trial of the two claimsone to the judge sitting in admiralty and the other to the jury-was convenient
and proper. Apparently this was a warning to the district courts that they
should abandon their older practice. It is indeed obvious that a single trial
with two triers of fact is better than two separate actions; but on the basis of
experience, particularly in the First Circuit, it is far from obvious that dividing
the function of decision is more convenient than submitting the entire case to
263
the jury.
In McAfoos v. Canadian Pacific Steamships, Ltd.,2 4 the plaintiff, a magician's assistant employed aboard a passenger vessel and arguably a "seaman,"
began by filing a libel in rem and in personam in the district court, alleging
negligence, unseaworthiness, and the right to maintenance and cure. This unusual procedure was followed, apparently, because of doubts as to whether the
plaintiff could qualify as a seaman, or otherwise as one entitled to the distinctive benefits of the causes of action asserted. By suing in admiralty she assured
herself at least of a trial by the court on a claim for simple maritime tort. A
month later she filed a substantially identical action at law, with a demand for
jury trial, specifically invoking the Jones Act. This action the district court dismissed as vexatious and because the plaintiff was deemed to have made an irrevocable election to proceed in admiralty. The court of appeals, speaking
through Judge Clark, reversed, treating the fundamental question as one concerning the right to jury trial. The right was not waived by the "election" to sue
29

1 Id. at 258.

28 U.S.C. § 1873. See 234 F.2d at 258 n.7. Cf. note 14 supra.
211See note 316 infra.
22Id. at 310 n.1.
- 243 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1957).
21

2-1235 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1956).
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under the Jones Act in admiralty; the time for demanding jury trial should be
regulated by Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Transfer to the
civil docket might have been better than filing a new action:
The in rem claims and any in personam theories not cognizable at law would not be lost

by such a transfer, of course, but would be preserved
in admiralty; and both sets of
265
claims could be pressed simultaneously at the trial.
When the civil aspects of a libel in admiralty can be transferred to the civil side
while preserving the maritime aspects in admiralty, and when the whole case
can then be tried as one, the jurisdictional barriers are reduced to a minimum.
Moreover, Judge Clark reiterated the policy of free interchange between the
two jurisdictions in a way which should dispel any lingering influence of the old
Smith2 decision:

A long line of decisions has established the propriety of treating cases begun by libels
as actions "at law"--or presently "civil actions"--where there is federal jurisdiction
to sustain the suit on the civil side.... And we have similarly treated an action begun
by a civil complaint as a suit in admiralty.... This power to shift a case from one
"side" of the court to another is not limited to situations where one side has jurisdiction and the other has not... ; nor does the district court have unlimited discretion
to deny transfer between sides .... 217
The question of the mode of trial upon remand was even more complex than

usual on account of the plaintiff's ambiguous status; but the plaintiff spoiled
any hope the court may have entertained for an opportunity to settle that
problem. She indicated that she would amend her complaint to allege diversity
of citizenship. judge Clark had to content himself with a seemingly less significant procedural achievement:
We point out only the obvious convenience of a consolidation of the admiralty and civil
actions, so that the in personamclaims may be tried to a jury at the same time that the
68
in rein claims are tried to the court.
Finally, in 1959, the Second Circuit attacked the problem of the mode of tr'al
in a forthright and practical, though limited, way. In a typical three-count
21 Id. at

272.
mNote 119 supra.
267 243 F.2d at 272.
F.2d at 274. Such a procedure would seem to involve complications of its own,
despite Judge Clark's somewhat obscure optimism: "Of course the final rationale for a judgment is for the court, so that there need never be an 'election' between legal theories ...
The court, in arriving at its ultimate judgment, will make the choice, dictated naturally only
by the principles of substantive law which govern the relief sought." Diversity of citizenship
(assuming that the jurisdictional amount is present) would mean that all the in personam
claims could be submitted to the jury. But all the claims except that under the Jones Act were
assertible, and asserted, in rem. Does the court mean that only the Jones Act claim is to be submitted to the jury, despite diversity, or that all the claims will be so submitted? If the latter,
what is the function of the judge, sitting as an admiralty court, other than to enter a decree
in rem on the basis of the jury's vegdict respecting the claims not based on the Jones Act?
It is conceivable that this dictum may be the harbinger of a new era, in which the seaman
will not only be able to try all three of his claims before a jury in a single action but will have
the benefit of a decree in rem as well to the extent that he can establish maritime liens. Cf.
Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437, 458 (2d Cir. 1959) (concurring
opinion).
268243
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action, the judge submitted both the claim under the Jones Act and the claim
for unseaworthiness to the jury, reserving to himself the decision as to maintenance and cure. In Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc.," 9 the court of
appeals affirmed. Judge Medina's opinion for the majority justified the submission of the unseaworthiness count to the jury by "pendent" jurisdiction, but
made it clear that this was only a peg on which to hang a result dictated by
procedural convenience:
We wish to make plain, however, what undue emphasis on the Hurn v. Oursler test
may obscure, namely, that the fundamental desideratum is that all litigation should
be decided in the manner most conducive to the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the business of the courts untrammelled by unnecessary technicalities and
possible dilatory maneuvers.270
Judge Lumbard, concurring, objected to framing the issue in jurisdictional
terms, and argued that the same result could be reached by construction of the
Jones Act 27' or by permitting the district court in its discretion to submit both
claims to the jury although the unseaworthiness claim is cognizable solely by
virtue of the admiralty jurisdiction.Y2 Unfortunately, reservation of the maintenance and cure count was impliedly approved although in substance the arguments (with the exception of Judge Lumbard's argument as to the construction
of the Jones Act) would justify submission of that issue to the jury also.
In the Third Circuit the earliest case in this period merely sustained the
right of a seaman to sue at law for maritime tort under the saving clause where
diversity was present.2 73 In 1942, in Lindquist v. Dilkes, the court of appeals
approved joinder of a claim for maintenance and cure with a claim under the
Jones Act and became, so far as is known, the first court to rely on the "pendent" theory to justify jurisdiction "at law" of a maritime claim. The right to
jury trial was not involved, the defendant having raised the jurisdictional question in a strictly captious spirit.27 4 In 1949 the McCarthy case 75 was decided.
The seaman brought two actions, one at law for unseaworthiness and under the
Jones Act, and a separate libel in admiralty for maintenance and cure. The
defendant urged that the Jones Act required an election between the remedy
created by the act and the old maritime remedy based on unseaworthiness.
The court, which had previously rejected this contention, 27 did so again, and
affirmed the jury verdict for the plaintiff. The practical difficulties of separating
the maintenance and cure claim for trial by the court are suggested in mild
269 263
70

F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1959).

271

d. at 449.

2I
Id. at 446.
21 d. at 454.
273 Philadelphia & Reading R. R. v. Berg, 274 Fed. 534 (3d Cir. 1921), cert. denied 257 U. S.
638 (1921).
274127 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1942). This decision was, of course, overruled in Jordine (supra
note 70). The Romero decision vindicates this pioneering abstraction in a suitably abstract
way.
27 McCarthy v. American E. Corp., 175 F.2d 724; id. at 727 (3d Cir. 1949).
2" German v. Camegie-1l. Steel Corp., 156 F.2d 977 (3d Cir. 1946).
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form by the appeal from the decree in the maintenance and cure case. In the
lawsuit the plaintiff had proved as an item of damages his lost earnings, past
and future, and the value of the board and lodging he would have received had
he been able to remain aboard ship. No medical expenses were claimed. The
court approved the district court's ruling that the plaintiff had been fully compensated by the damage verdict for all that he was entitled to under maintenance and cure, board and lodging aboard ship being the equivalent of maintenance ashore. Probably substantial justice was thus achieved; but a similarly
satisfactory result is not to be anticipated in cases in which the amounts presumably awarded by the jury for wages, medical expenses, and board and lodging are not congruent with what would be recoverable as maintenance and cure;
and the court was fortunate in having before it a case in which it did not have
to contend with the possibility that the jury had scaled down the recovery for
2 77
such items because of contributory negligence.
After the decision in Jordine v. Walling expressly approved the practice of
reserving the maintenance and cure issues for the court, the difficulties of that
procedure were again suggested by Lipscomb v. Groves. 27 In McCarthy279 it had
been considered important not to mention to the jury the liability for maintenance and cure. In Lipscomb that liability came to the jury's attention in two
ways: (1) in a charge which the court held erroneous, the jury was told that the
seaman had a duty to disclose aspects of his medical history material to the risk
of absolute liability for maintenance and cure which the shipowner assumed; (2)
one of the grounds of negligence alleged was that the defendant had failed to furnish proper medical care. There was also some difficulty concerning recovery of
wages.25 0
In Yates v. Dann,281 the jury returned an unconscionably small verdict,
awarding only lost wages although the injury was severe. 212 The judge granted
a motion for new trial limited to the issue of damages. Then, on motion of the
plaintiff, he transferred the case to admiralty, wherein he assessed substantial
damages, though allowing for contributory negligence, and made an award for
maintenance and cure. The court of appeals reversed, holding that this procedure deprived the defendants of the right to jury trial. The plaintiff, having
277

175 F.2d at 728, n.1. Cf. note 231 suitra.

278

187 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1951).

279

Supra note 275, 175 F.2d at 728.

280 187 F.2d at 42. Although the verdict of the jury was for the defendant, the judge on rehearing eliminated wages from the maintenance and cure award. This award, which was
affirmed, necessarily had an effect upon the trial of the other claims on remand. Cf. note 282

infra.
In McLeod v. Union Barge Line Co., 189 F.2d 610 (3d Cir. 1951), the court affirmed submission to the jury of both the Jones Act claim and the claim for unseaworthiness.
281223 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1955), reversing Yates v. Dann, 124 F. Supp. 125 (D. Del. 1954).
282Yates v. Dann, 11 F.R.D. 386, 388 (D. Del. 1951).
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elected to sue at law with a jury, could not after verdict withdraw that election.
At the very least, the plaintiff was not entitled to a jury trial on the issue of
liability and a bench trial on the issues of contributory negligence and damages.
Since the award for maintenance and cure had been framed in the light of items
covered in the damage award, it could not be affirmed but had to be vacated
and remanded so that it could be properly related to the ultimate jury verdict28
In the Fourth Circuit a district court adopted the Second Circuit's principle
of free transferability. After filing a libel in admiralty in Baltimore, a seaman
filed his action at law in New York and moved to dismiss the Baltimore libel so
that the New York action could proceed. Treating the motion to dismiss as the
equivalent of a motion to transfer to the New York district, the court denied it,
but allowed a motion to transfer to the civil docket although more than ten
days had elapsed since the joinder of issue. s 4In other words, while the plaintiff's
original election to proceed in admiralty was not held to preclude jury trial, it
did preclude jury trial in New York, where juries were thought to be more
generous.
The Fifth Circuit at a relatively early date approved without discussion the
practice of submitting the maintenance and cure claim to the jury along with
the Jones Act claimP2 The court of appeals reversed on the Jones Act claim,
remanding for a new trial, but affirmed the judgment as to maintenance and
cure. The case suggests that even the procedure of submitting all claims to the
jury is not free from complexities pertaining to possible duplication or neglect of
items of recovery. The prior adjudication of the maintenance and cure claim
must affect to some degree the instructions to the jury concerning damages recoverable on the new trial.
A district court in the Fifth Circuit wrote an opinion which may at first appear to be an enthusiastic espousal of the free transferability principle of the
Second Circuit, but which actually imposes a highly conceptualistic limitation
upon that principle. A seaman, having filed a libel in admiralty under the Jones
Act and for maintenance and cure, moved for transfer to the civil docket. The
motion was apparently timely and was unopposed. Diversity was alleged and
the amount in controversy in each count exceeded the jurisdictional amount.
Judge Kennerley allowed the transfer "[s]ince this Court has jurisdiction of this
case in admiralty and would have jurisdiction thereof if it be transferred to the
civil action docket. 288 He distinguished his earlier holding in The Dixi s7 on
the ground that there the court had no jurisdiction in admiralty, and so could
280 supra.
211Jackson v. Ore Navigation Corp., 159 F. Supp. 935 (D.Md. 1958). Cf. the McAfoos case,
supranote 264.
28
Lykes Bros. S.S. Co. v. Grubaugh, 128 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1942), modified on rehearing,
130 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1942).
28 Nilsson v. American Oil Co., 118 F. Supp. 482 (S.D. Tex. 1954).
217Note 174 supra.
283Cf. note
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not transfer to law. Such a limitation on the principle of free transferability is
most unfortunate and would destroy the prime utility of the principle s It
should not be material whether the court has jurisdiction on the "side" on
which the action is filed; it should be sufficient if there is jurisdiction on the side
to which transfer is sought. More directly, a case should not be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction if it is sustainable on any basis.
Although the fact was not noted in Romero, the Seventh Circuit was involved
in the conflict as to jurisdiction of maritime claims under Section 1331. In 1948
it approved the joinder of a count under the Jones Act with one for maintenance and cure, and impliedly, at least, approved the submission of both to the
jury1 On a subsequent appeal in the same case the court adhered to the intervening holding of the Third Circuit in Jordine, and held that it was error to
submit the maintenance and cure count to the jury.290 Like the Third Circuit,
however, the Seventh concluded that a new trial was unnecessary; upon remand, the claim for maintenance and cure could be transferred to the admiralty
docket and the same judge who had presided at the trial could enter findings of
fact and conclusions of law.291Thereafter the practice in this circuit appears to
have been to submit the claims for negligence under the Jones Act and for unseaworthiness to the jury, reserving the claim for maintenance and cure for
2
determination by the court.

2

In the Ninth Circuit a district court held at an early date that a claim for
maintenance and cure was properly joined with an action at law under the
8
2 Such a limitation, however, is exactly what is suggested by Judge Learned Hand's illadvised attempt to distinguish the Smitl case. See note 236 supra.
2 9
s Mullen v. Fitz Simons & Connell Dredge and Dock Co., 172 F.2d 601, 604 (7th Cir.
1948). It may be noted in passing that it was assumed that the plaintiff was required to elect
between a claim for negligence under the Jones Act and a claim for unseaworthiness, and that
in so far as unseaworthiness figured in the case after the election to proceed under the Jones
Act it was only failure to use due care to provide a seaworthy vessel that was thought to be
involved.
29 Mullen v. Fitz Simons & Connell Dredge & Dock Co., 191 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1951).

291Despite the fact that there is no separate admiralty docket in the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, this procedure was followed in substance on remand. Judge
Sullivan, who had presided at the trial, entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. Letter
from Judge Edwin A. Robson to Professor Philip B. Kurland, June 26, 1959.
The Great Lakes Act (note 14 supra)was not considered in this litigation. It was not until
the following year that the court held that a claim for maintenance and cure was not a matter
of "contract or tort" within the provisions of that act. Miller v. Standard Oil Co., 199 F.2d
457 (7th Cir. 1952). Presumably the court intended to embrace the Third Circuit's holding
that claims under the general maritime law are not cognizable under § 1331, though the specific
holding seems to be only that the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction does not apply to the claim
for maintenance and cure. The claim for unseaworthiness was not involved, having been
abandoned by the plaintiff's "election" to proceed under the Jones AcL 191 F.2d at 84.
29 See McDonald v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 1955 A.M.C. 1415 (N.D. Ill. 1955). This memorandum opinion reveals no reliance on the Great Lakes Act and no rationale for submission of the
unseaworthiness count to the jury. Presumably the Third Circuit's view of "pendent" jurisdiction of the unseaworthiness claim was being accepted.
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In 1942 the court of appeals affirmed a judgment dismissing a
claim under the Jones Act on the merits and transferring the appended claim for
maintenance and cure to the admiralty docket.29 4 A district court consolidated
for trial an action at law under the Jones Act and a libel for maintenance and
cure, with no indication whether the latter claim would be submitted to the
jury.295 In 1956 the Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment in a three-pronged
action in which, without objection from plaintiff's counsel, the court reserved
to itself decision on both the unseaworthiness and the maintenance and cure
1
claims.296
Thus the question of jurisdiction of the maritime law claims under
Section 1331, or by virtue of their being ancillary to the Jones Act claim, was
not reached; 297 yet the court indicated a strong disposition to hold that those
claims were not cognizable "at law" on either ground.298 In 1957 a district
court held positively that neither the claim for unseaworthiness nor that for
maintenance and cure was cognizable at law; Section 1331 did not apply, and
neither claim was cognizable by virtue of being ancillary to a Jones Act claim.299
While the court denied a motion to dismiss the maritime law claims for lack of
jurisdiction, it did transfer them to the admiralty docket, and indicated an intention of proceeding with two separate trials because the Rules of Civil Procedure are inapplicable to suits in admiralty!3"'
We return, now, to Judge Wyzanski's opinion in Jenkins v. Roderick.30' The
3 2
decision has special importance because of its citation in the Romero case.
This was a seaman's three-count action in which, according to Judge Wyzanski,
the question presented concerned the propriety of allowing jury trial not only
on the Jones Act claim but also on the claims for unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure, where the amount involved in the maintenance and cure claim
was less than $3,000. Judge Wyzanski answered the question by allowing jury
trial on all three counts. A basis for doing so had been provided by Doucette v.
2

13Kongs v. Oceanic & Oriental Nav. Co., 47 F.2d 650 (N.D. Cal. 1931).

294

Modin v. Matson Nay. Co., 128 F.2d 194 (9th Cir. 1942). There was no diversity of
citizenship and the claim was for less than the jurisdictional amount There was no discussion
either of § 1331 or of pendent jurisdiction.
206Moss v. Joshua Hendy Corp., 1955 A.M.C. 360 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
66Jesonis v. Oliver J. Olsen & Co., 238 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1956).
9
2 7Cf. 238 F.2d at 309, n.3.
29

8Id. at 308.

29

1Melleck v. Oliver J. Olsen & Co., 149 F. Supp. 481 (S.D. Cal. 1957).

300Ibid. It is interesting to note (1) that the court allowed the plaintiff to proceed in the
admiralty cases without prepayment of costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1916 (referring to seamen's
suits for "the enforcement of laws enacted for their health or safety"), and (2) that the plaintiff
was required to "serve and file" an amended complaint, stating only the Jones Act claim, and
a libel in admiralty stating the claims under the general maritime law. Id. at 484.
301
156 F. Supp. 299 (D. Mass. 1957). See note 215 supra.
302358 U.S. at 360, 378 (1959).
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Vincent:
the claims under the general maritime law were cognizable under
Section 1331, and, though the jurisdictional amount was not in controversy as
to maintenance and cure, that count was covered by "pendent" jurisdiction.
Judge Wyzanski, instead of relying on the authority of Doucette, undertook to
analyze the problem afresh. Reviewing the theories upon which an unseaworthiness count joined with a Jones Act count had been submitted to the jury, he
rejected the theory that this must be done to avoid trouble from the doctrine of
res judicata. His view that the rule of Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips"4 operates
in one direction only is supported by no citation of authority, but only by an
unpersuasive argument; that, however, need not detain us here.311 The theory
that the count for unseaworthiness should be entertained as pendent to the
Jones Act claim he favored because of its practical advantages. As to the theory
that the claim was cognizable under Section 1331, while he conceded that the
words of the jurisdictional grant "fit like a glove,"310 he was troubled by the
facts, later to be emphasized by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, that there was no
reason why Congress in 1875 should have been interested in conferring on the
district courts jurisdiction, which they already had, over maritime causes, and
that Section 1331 had not been so construed until Doucette was decided in
1951. He did not, however, specifically charge the court of appeals with error on
this score. Instead he maintained that, in assuming that a right to jury trial
was a consequence of holding the claim cognizable under Section 1331, Judge
30 7
IMagruder had indulged in an "erroneous assumption."
In the entire history of the effort by the courts to deal with the problem of
the mode of trial in seamen's injury cases, no more confusing and unsettling
suggestion has been made. It is ironical that it should have been made by the
judge who in other respects has dealt more thoughtfully and constructively
with the problem than has any other.
By way of preliminary, let it be acknowledged that it is unfortunate that
the mode of trial has historically been considered in jurisdictional terms."0 8
Let it be added that, even if cases under the general maritime law are cognizable
under Section 1331, a constitutional right to jury trial does not necessarily follow. It may even be conceded that there is room for disagreement as to whether
there is a statutory right to jury trial in the federal courts in saving-clause
cases, though the plaintiff seeks only a common-law remedy which the common
law is competent to give. 0 9 The fact remains that this belated suggestion, that
303

Note 80 supra.
U.S. 316 (1927). See note 11 supra.

304 274

305The question is settled by McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 224-25
(1958); but cf. Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437, 444 (2d Cir. 1959).
36 156 F. Supp. at 301.
307 156 F. Supp. at 303.
308 See text at note 20 supra.
309 See notes 16 through 18 supra, and related text.
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the problem as to mode of trial is not settled by a finding that there is a nonadmiralty basis for jurisdiction, is disruptive. The suggestion would equally
mean (though this was not noted by judge Wyzanski) that, contrary to the
assumption of many years' standing, there is no right to jury trial in savingclause cases where there is diversity of citizenship and the jurisdictional amount
is in controversy. The suggestion is based upon a clear misconception of the saving clause. "In an unseaworthiness count plaintiff does not seek a common
law remedy; he seeks a federal maritime remedy."31 0 The fact that federal maritime law provides the basis for a claim does not exclude the action from the
saving clause; the typical saving-clause case is one which is founded on federal
maritime law, but in which the plaintiff seeks some common-law remedy, such
as a simple money judgment, as distinguished from the distinctively admiralty
remedy of a decree in rem.3" The argument proves too much. If an action for
unseaworthiness is not one in which the common law is competent to provide a
remedy,"' then it follows not only that there is no right to jury trial but that
the case is not within the saving clause at all; the federal courts, sitting in
admiralty, have exclusive jurisdiction. This much should have been made clear
by the very case relied on by Judge Wyzanski-Pope & Talbot v. Hawn.313 The
holding of that case, that federal maritime law rather than state common law
was controlling in an action for unseaworthiness based upon diversity of citizenship, was not coupled with any suggestion that the case was cognizable only in
admiralty, or that there was no right to jury trial. On the contrary, the Court
affirmed the judgment which had been rendered upon a jury verdict.
By way of climax-or anticlimax-for this dissertation, judge Wyzanski held
that, while the plaintiff was not entitled to jury trial by virtue of Section 1331,
be was entitled to jury trial by virtue of the fact that his unseaworthiness claim
was "pendent" to the Jones Act claim.314 No explanation was offered. We are
left to wonder why jury trial, though not a consequence of jurisdiction at law
under Section 1331, is a consequence of jurisdiction at law by virtue of "pendent" jurisdiction.
Turning to the count for maintenance and cure, with respect to which the
jurisdictional amount was not in controversy, judge Wyzanski found himself on
firmer ground. He relied to some extent on Judge Magruder's "considered
dictum" in Doucette3 5 to the effect that this claim might be considered pend310156 F. Supp. at 303.

3 The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1867); The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
555 (1867); Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924); C. J. Hendry Co. v.
Moore, 318 U.S. 133 (1943); GmmoxE & BLAcK, ThE LAW oF AnDinuTY 33-36 (1957).
312Cf. 156 F. Supp. at 303.
313346 U.S. 406 (1953). See also Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437,
453 n.15 (2d Cir. 1959) (concurring opinion).
314156 F. Supp. at 304.
315Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834, 840 n.5 (1st Cir. 1951).

TBE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 27

ent to the claim under the Jones Act; primarily, however, he supported his
decision to submit all three counts to the jury by a careful exposition of the
practical difficulties involved in the procedure whereby the judge attempts to
reserve to himself the issues on maintenance and cure while submitting the
other two counts to the jury. There is no point in repeating his detailed analysis
here. It is sufficient to note that this careful examination of the problem316 by an
experienced and thoughtful district judge leaves no doubt that the fairest and
most efficient procedure is not to reserve the maintenance and cure count but
to submit it to the jury along with the major counts for damages.
VI. SUMHATION

A completely intellectual attitude toward law should lead one to welcome
any critical examination of the rational bases for judicial behavior. I must confess, however, to a feeling almost of regret that judge Wyzanski did not let
sleeping dogs lie in 1947. Prior to his opinion in McDonald,317 when a seaman
sued his employer for personal injuries under the Jones Act the entire case, including claims based on the general maritime law, was submitted to the jury.
This was the practice at least in the First,318 Second, 319 Third, 32 Fifth, 321 and
Seventh3 2 circuits. As a practical matter the procedure was satisfactory. 323
Now, thanks to the Supreme Court's decision in Romero, the federal courts will
probably return to that procedure. In the meantime, Judge Wyzanski's intellectual curiosity has provided us with a decade of uncertainty and conflict as to
the mode of trial in seaman's injury cases; questions have been raised as to
federal jurisdiction which have implications transcending the question of seamen's injuries, or even of maritime cases in general; and the Supreme Court has
dealt with the issues involved in a way which should be, but is not, definitive.
Without a trace of either apology or facetiousness one may regret that, in
raising the question as to the propriety of the mode of trial in seamen's injury
cases, Judge Wyzanski did so in jurisdictional terms. There has never, at any
time, been any room for doubt that a United States district court, by virtue of
its admiralty powers, has jurisdiction of a seaman's claim, based upon the gen316See 156 F. Supp. at 304-06.
31 Supra note

204.
318McDonald v. Cape Cod Trawling Corp., 71 F. Supp. 888 (D. Mass. 1947). See notes
216, 221, 222 & 227 supra.
319
Balado v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 179 F.2d 943 (2d Cir. 1950). See notes 242, 244, 246,
250, &253 supra.
120Lindquist v. Dilkes, 127 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1942). See note 274 supra.
32
1Lykes Bros. S.S. Co. v. Grubaugh, 128 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1942), mnodified on rehearing,
130 F.2d 25 (1942). See note 285 supra.
322 Mullen v. Fitz Simons & Connell Dredge & Dock Co., 172 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1948).
See note 286 supra.
321 McDonald v. Cape Cod Trawling Corp., 71 F. Supp. 888, 891 (D. Mass. 1947).
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eral maritime law, for personal injuries. The question has been one of procedure:
whether joinder of the several claims is proper, whether there is a right to jury
trial, whether jury trial on all the issues is more convenient and just than
separating some of them for trial by the court, and how to handle certain differences between admiralty and civil rules at trial and on appeal. These questions
could easily be resolved by a simple bit of congressional legislation. In the absence of such legislation they could be resolved by the courts simply and directly
as procedural problems. Resolving them in this way would be no more an intrusion on the legislative function than the effort to resolve them in jurisdictional terms, and would be far more satisfactory. Dealing with them in jurisdictional terms is a makeshift technique which creates new problems while inadequately treating the one to which it is addressed, and which encourages the
kind of thinking which led to the indefensible result of the giga case,324 among
others.
No one has ever suggested that a claim under the general maritime law is
cognizable by virtue of Section 1331, or that the doctrine of "pendent" jurisdiction applies to maritime claims, except in the context of the problem of procedure in seamen's injury cases.32 A solution of that problem on the basis that
cases predicated upon the general maritime law are cases arising under federal
law within Section 1331, as contended by Mr. Justice Brennan in Romero,32
would have been certainly too broad and perhaps too narrow. That solution, or
at least the version of its rationale embraced by Mr. Justice Brennan, would
have implied that any claim based upon federal decisional law is cognizable by
virtue of Section 1331.27 With the soundness or unsoundness of such a result I
am not here concerned.2 The point is that there was no occasion for the Court
324Supra note 183.
3

2 The sole possible exception relates to § 1331 and consists of an obscure intimation of the
idea by a district court in a removal case. Ross v. Pacific S.S. Co., 272 Fed. 538 (D. Ore. 1921).
See note 175 supra.After the First Circuit had held, in the context of the jury problem, that
§ 1331 applied to maritime cases, other courts held that removability followed. See notes 163,
164 supra. See also note 80 supra.
31 358 U.S. at 389 (1959).
327 According to one view, judge Magruder's ruling was based on the position that maritime cases were cases arising under the Constitution, because the Constitution itself adopted
the maritime law, whereas Mr. justice Brennan's position was that federal common law was
embraced within the "arising under" jurisdiction equally with statutes. See Kurland, The
Romero Case and Sonm Qzestions of Federal urisdiction, 73 HA.v. L. R:v. 000 (1960); cf.
Paduano v. Yamashita, 221 F.2d 615, 617 (2d Cir. 1955). According to that view, the ruling
would have implications for nonmaritime cases only if the Brennan rationale, rather than that
of Magruder, were the official one. I am not persuaded that the apparent difference between
Magruder and Brennan is significant. It seems possible to read the two opinions as making the
same point in somewhat different language. Judge Magruder's reference to the Constitution
was a rhetorical device which facilitated his argument by analogy to cases reviewable by the
Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3), the relevant portionof which does not use the term
"laws" but speaks of "the Constitution, treaties or statutes of... the United States."

3

28See

Kurland, supra note 327.
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to make so consequential a decision in the Romero case. Historically and practically, the problems which have given rise to the contention for jurisdiction
under Section 1331 related solely to the trial of seamen's injury cases; there was
no apparent pressure to resolve the question whether cases based on federal
decisional law in general were cognizable under that section. At the very least,
the result urged by Mr. justice Brennan would have implied that any case arising under federal maritime law (with the exception of cases brought under
statutes providing for admiralty procedures) could, given the jurisdictional
amount, be brought as a civil action and tried under the Rules of Civil Procedure, presumably with a jury. There is no indication whatever of any practical
pressure for such a result. By and large, people seem content to bring their
actions concerning marine insurance, salvage, charter parties, general average,
and collision damages as suits in admiralty, without a jury, or occasionally to
bring them in state courts.12 9 Mr. Justice Brennan's solution of the problem
might also have resulted in the removability of saving-clause cases not now
removable. 3 0 Again the question is not as to the soundness or unsoundness of
such a result, nor even as to its significance. The point is that the Court would
have been well advised to leave that question unresolved until it should be
presented in a removal case. Certainly there was no practical pressure for a
ruling which would make saving-clause cases removable. 3 '
In addition to having extensive collateral consequences, Mr. justice Brennan's position would have provided a poor solution for the real problem. While
advocating jurisdiction under Section 1331, he apparently rejected the idea of
pendent jurisdiction.332 In view of the strange conceptions which have plagued
the treatment of this subject, there is room to doubt that this would have provided a solution for the case of a maintenance and cure claim, in less than the
jurisdictional amount, joined with a claim under the Jones Act; this was the
case which presented the problem in its most troublesome form. 333 A broader
3'9 The evidence in maritime collision cases is of such a character that one cannot contemplate with equanimity the trial of such cases before a common-law jury. See Moscow, COLLISION COURSE (1959). The fact that few collision cases are brought in state courts suggests
that the prudence of shipowners would deter them from demanding jury trial in such cases
even if it were available in the federal courts.
330Cf. note 57, supra.
13 The Brennan solution would also have entailed the venue complication pointed out by
Mr. justice Frankfurter. See note 31 sutpra.
112

358 U.S. at 412-13.

333 The rule that a single plaintiff, suing a single defendant, may aggregate his claims to
make up the jurisdictional amount, Pearson v. National Soc. of Public Accountants, 200 F.2d
897 (5th Cir. 1953), has never played any part in the disposition of these cases. Clearly, if
the claim for maintenance and cure is one arising under federal law within § 1331, this rule
would solve the "jurisdictional" problem by allowing the plaintiff to add the amount claimed
under the Jones Act to that claimed for maintenance and cure to satisfy the amount requirement. Yet judge Magruder, though holding that the claim arose under § 1331, clearly assumed that if the jurisdictional amount were not claimed in the maintenance and cure count
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objection is that there appears to be no reason whatever why the right to jury
334
trial should depend upon the amount in controversy.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's solution-assuming that it is a solution at allseems a neater and less troublesome one, if the solution must be in jurisdictional terms.335 It is true that this employment of the concept of pendent jurisdiction is somewhat anomalous. That concept, troublesome even in its original
setting, was devised to expand the jurisdiction of federal courts at the expense
itself the theory of pendent jurisdiction was necessary. Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834, 840
n.5 (1st Cir. 1951). In the same circuit, after the Doucette decision, Judge Aldrich withheld the
maintenance and cure claim from the jury because it did not involve the jurisdictional amount
(note 231 supra)-overlooking not only the propriety of cumulating the amounts claimed in
the two counts but also the theory of pendent jurisdiction. As late as 1957 Judge Wyzanski
was still concerned over the specific problem of what to do with a seaman's action in which the
claim for maintenance and cure itself did not involve the requisite amount, and ended by relying on the theory of pendent jurisdiction without mentioning the possibility of aggregating the
claims. Jenkins v. Roderick, sufpra note 298. Even where the parties were taken to be of
diverse citizenship the Second Circuit assumed the propriety of withholding the maintenance
and cure claim from the jury, not noticing the possibility of aggregation. Troupe v. Chicago,
D. & G. B. Transit Co., supra note 253.
The failure of the courts to utilize the aggregation principle is no doubt attributable to the
fact that what they were seeking was jurisdiction "at law," and merely satisfying the amount
requirement does not seem to make a maritime case cognizable "at law." But suppose that a
plaintiff has two nonmaritime claims against a single defendant, neither involving the jurisdictional amount. Although both claims may arise under federal law, and although there may be
diversity of citizenship, the court has jurisdiction of neither. If the claims are joined and the
amounts aggregated, the court acquires jurisdiction. If a plaintiff has a claim under the Jones
Act for more than the jurisdictional amount and a claim for maintenance and cure for less,
the district court has jurisdiction of each-of the Jones Act claim by virtue of § 1331, and of
the maintenance and cure claim by virtue of its admiralty power. If the amount in controversy
is important, why not allow aggregation where the court has jurisdiction of both claims as
well as where it has jurisdiction of neither? One answer to this question might well be that such
a solution does not go to the merits of the question whether there should be jury trial; but
neither do any of the other jurisdictional solutions.
334This observation seems valid notwithstanding the fact that the Seventh Amendment
itself guarantees the right to jury trial only "where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars." That limitation served to exclude trivial cases from the guarantee. The function of the amount requirement in the jurisdictional statutes is to reduce the caseload of the
federal courts; the amount has been fixed with that function in mind (see 2 U.S. CoDE CONG. &
AD.NEWS 3099 elseq. (1958)) and has no relevance to whether there should be jury trial in a
case which is within the admiralty jurisdiction irrespective of the amount involved.
There is no reason, either, why the right to jury trial should depend upon whether the
parties are of diverse citizenship. And certainly the right should not turn on the fortuitous
factors which bring the Great Lakes Act (supra note 14) into operation. That Act, and most
of the conditions in it, are the result of Congress's mistaken belief that it could extend the
jurisdiction of the federal courts to the Great Lakes only by virtue of its powers over commerce. It is also incongruous that the right to jury trial should depend upon whether a maritime injury results in death. Cf. 358 U.S. at 401 with The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588,
597 (1959). Such considerations rather strongly suggest the desirability of legislative attention
to the question of jury trial in maritime personal injury and death cases.
3a This is ironical, since both Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Black, in dissent, recognized as the majority did not that the basic problem was one of judicial administration and of
relatively limited scope.
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of state jurisdiction; in its new context it serves merely to enlarge the jurisdiction of the "law side" of the court at the expense of the "admiralty side." It is
possible that this use of the concept may give rise to difficulties in cases involving the respectiv. powers of state and federal courts."' It seems much less likely
to be productive of collateral complications, however, than the rejected solution
employing Section 1331. It may have limited significance for removal jurisdiction in seamen's injury cases; but, if so, it would seem to strengthen the existing
view that such cases are not removable.3 7 If it is limited to claims of which the
court has jurisdiction independently of the "pendent" theory-such as maritime claims-it is difficult to see how it can do a great deal of harm. Indeed, if it
is limited, as it may well be, to the generalized features of the case before the
Court, it will serve simply as a solution to the problem of procedure in the
typical seaman's injury case, without collateral consequences.
The question remains whether the Romero case can be regarded as providing
any solution for the real problem-the right to jury trial on all the issues in the
typical seaman's injury action against his employer. The Court expressly left
the question open. 338 Since the principal claims which could be pendent to the
Jones Act claims were dismissed on the merits, there was no occasion for the
Court to decide the question as to jury trial. But then, there was no real occasion for the Court to decide the question whether the district court had
jurisdiction under Section 1331, or on the pendent theory, at all. It did so, in
terms, only to sustain the jurisdiction of the district judge to determine whether
a cause of action was stated. The admiralty jurisdiction of the court was ample
to sustain that determination. Yet the Court undertook a plenary consideration
of the question of jurisdiction at law, using the terms and concepts which the
lower courts had employed to attack the jury problem. It would be strange and
unfortunate if this labor should turn out to have been a mere academic exercise.
At the very least, the Court has struck down one of the principal supports for
the practice of submitting the maritime claims to the jury: jurisdiction under
Section 1331.111 To that extent the question as to the right to jury trial has been
answered in the negative. At the same time, the Court has adopted the theory of
"pendent" jurisdiction, which, in its maritime version, was invented and employed almost exclusively for the purpose of justifying the submission of mari336 For example, the Court's holding that the claim for maintenance and cure is pendent to
the Jones Act claim, without discussion of the considerations which led the Third Circuit in
Jordine to hold the contrary, may berelied on as relaxing the requirement concerning similarity of issues.
3-1See Pate v. Standard Dredging Corp., 193 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1952); GIL-M!oRE & BLACK,

TnE LAW Or ADmIRALTY 300-01 (1957).
"' 358 U.S. at 381. it seems possible that the Court's care to limit its holding may have
been motivated in part by doubts suggested by Judge Wyzanski as to the logical relation between jurisdiction at law and jury trial. See note 307 supra.
331 See Aho v. Jacobsen, 359 U.S. 25 (1959).
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time claims to the jury. 340 It is difficult to believe that the affirmative implications of this holding for the jury question can be without significance.
It must be remembered that even the Third Circuit, in its pioneering Jordine
decision,34' did not deny the right to jury trial on the unseaworthiness claim,
but justified the submission of that claim on the "pendent" theory. 42 Only by a
district court in the Ninth Circuit has that claim been withheld from the jury
on jurisdictional grounds. 343 Whenever submission of the maintenance and cure
count to the jury has been justified it has been on the basis of pendent jurisdiction. The jury question ought not to be decided in jurisdictional terms; but
when the Court injects itself into the unfortunate business of trying to find a
basis for jurisdiction "at law" of maritime claims, and when it adopts a concept
which the lower courts have developed and employed primarily for the purpose
of rationalizing jury trial, its action should have some significance for the jury
question, especially since the Court had undertaken to resolve a conflict between the circuits which was primarily a conflict over that question.
When a Jones Act clim is submitted to the jury, the appended claims for
unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure ought also to be submitted. This
solution could be achieved simply as a matter of construction of the Jones Act.
The superimposition of that statutory remedy on the maritime law raised questions which had to be resolved by the judicial process: whether the plaintiff must
elect between the new remedy and the old; whether the several claims could be
joined in one action; whether a judgment on one of the claims was res judicata
in an action on another; and whether the claims under the maritime law could
be tried to the jury. The first three of these four questions were disposed of
simply as questions of statutory construction and common law, without
jurisdictional theorizing; the fourth could be disposed of in the same way,
simply as a matter of determining what is the reasonable, convenient, and just
mode of procedure in the light of the Congressional policy embodied in the
Jones Act. It is perfectly clear that this could be done to the extent of holding
that the claim for unseaworthiness should go to the jury along with the Jones
Act claim. Judicial decision has established that the plaintiff need not elect between these remedies, that they may be joined in a single complaint, and that
they are so closely interrelated that a state may not impose a limitation period
on the unseaworthiness claim shorter than the limitation period of the Jones
Act. 344 The Court, "with an eye to the practicalities of admiralty personal
injury litigation,' 34 has recognized that "full utilization of [the seaman's]
remedies for personal injury"'346 can be "accomplished only in a single proceeding. ' 3 47 A state could not impair the opportunity of full utilization of remedies
34 Cf.

notes 206 and 274 supra.
342 See note 75 supra.
71 supra.
33 See note 299 and cf. note 298 supra.
344 McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958).
345357 U.S. at 224.
346
357 U.S. at 225.
347Ibid.
3MNote
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in a single proceeding by imposing a shorter limitation period upon the unseaworthiness claim. It is but a step from that holding to a holding that the claim
for unseaworthiness may also be submitted to the jury; and the propriety of
also submitting the maintenance and cure count, in the interest of convenience
and efficiency as well as of securing to the seaman the full utilization of his
remedies in a single proceeding, would follow unobstructed but for the Third
Circuit's conceptualism regarding causes of action.

48

The Supreme Court's adoption of the "pendent" jurisdiction theory in
Romero should at least put to rest that conceptualism. The theory was applied
to both unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure without distinction as to the
nature of the causes of action. If such distinctions do not obstruct "jurisdiction" for the purpose of determining whether a cause of action has been stated,
they should not be an obstacle to "jurisdiction" for purposes of jury trial. With
that obstacle out of the way, there is no reason why all three counts should not
be submitted to the jury, irrespective of the amount involved in the maintenance and cure count itself. That result can be reached with or without the
"pendent" jurisdiction theory of the Romero case. It would be better if it were
reached without resort to jurisdictional conceptions, but the paramount consideration is that it be reached. It is to be hoped that the disposition of the
3 49
problem foreshadowed by the Romero case will in time materialize.
The fact remains that it is unfortunate thatthe Court dealt with the problem
in jurisdictional terms. That approach lends dangerous encouragement to the
assumptions of mutually exclusive jurisdiction which lead to dismissal of civil
actions simply because the Silver Oar is on the bench and of suits in admiralty
because it is not. It is reasonable to hope that the Supreme Court would not,
today, be guilty of any such extreme application of the jurisdictional concepts
which color the majority opinion. In fact, immediately after Romero was de348 Jordine v. Walling, 185 F.2d 662, 670-71 (3rd Cir. 1950). Cf. American Fire & Cas. Co.
v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951). See also Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437,
446, 454 (2d Cir. 1959).
349 The coreproblem concerns only submission of the maritimelaw counts to the jury along
with the Jones Act count in the typical seaman's action. The pendent jurisdiction theory
neatly solves the problem in this form. But the problem has larger proportions. What is to be
done with the maritime law counts when the Jones Act claim is for some reason not submitted
to the jury? The Romero case itself, by invoking the theory of pendent jurisdiction in a situation in which convenience and economy did not demand unitary procedure, suggests that
jurisdiction at law may entail the right to jury trial although the practical arguments for
unitary procedure are absent. A better solution might take into account the stage of the trial at
which the Jones Act claim is eliminated from consideration. Thus, if it is dismissed at the outset, there is no compelling reason for empanelling a jury at all; on the other hand, if a jury has
attended to the evidence in a long trial, the fact that the judge at the conclusion of the evidence decides to direct a verdict on the Jones Act count should not necessarily result in the
jury's discharge. The Romero solution would not cover the case in which the seaman joins a
claim under the general maritime law against a defendant other than his employer. Nor would
it lend encouragement to any desire which there may be for jury trial in maritime personal
injury cases other than those involving seamen. Such very broad aspects of the problem are
probably best left to Congress.
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cided, the Court had occasion to review a maritime tort case from the First
Circuit which had been tried to a jury apparently on that circuit's theory of
Section 1331 jurisdiction.350 The Court of Appeals had erred in determining the
standard of care owed by the shipowner to visitors on board,"' and for this
reason the Court reversed. At the same time it cited Romero, presumably to
indicate that the action was not cognizable at law; but, instead of dismissing,
it remanded for "retrial on the admiralty side." There is comfort to be drawn
from the fact that the action was not dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, but a
degree of jurisdictional thinking is still suggested. The Court's order transferring the case to the admiralty side amounts to a holding, sua sponte, that
there was no jurisdiction "at law." Yet no more was involved than the fact that
the case had been tried to a jury. Why did not the Court leave it to the defendant upon remand to move for transfer to the admiralty docket if he should be
so advised? A conceivable answer might be that it is the policy of the Court to
stamp out jury trials in the federal courts where there is no right to have them,
even though one party may negligently or collusively fail effectively to oppose
the other's demand. But a likelier explanation in view of the history of this subject is that the Court acted on its own motion because it conceived of the
matter as jurisdictional.
The Silver Oar which the Southern District of New York is fortunate to have
had restored to it is a beautiful piece of craftsmanship and a relic of rare historical interest; the antiquarian spirit is not to be begrudged its delight in such
an artifact. A different kind of antiquarian spirit should not be permitted, however, to perpetuate the separatism of which the Silver Oar is a symbol, thereby
dividing a single district court into two separate courts. Appreciation of such a
treasure should be limited to artistic and historical grounds; its symbolism
should never interfere with the unitary character of the district court, nor with
the just, convenient, and efficient conduct of judicial business, nor, indeed,
with the long overdue unification of all heads of federal jurisdiction under a
single set of rules of procedure.352
VII. EPraoGuE: CONFLICT OF LAWS
The only appropriate way to begin discussion of the conflict-of-laws aspect of
the Romero case is with a word of fervent thanksgiving for the Court's adherence to the basic methodology of Lauritzen v. Larsen.53 As in Lauritzen, there
is no mechanical approach to the question of the applicability of American
law. There is no preclusive "characterization" of the case as one of contract or of
tort; there is no slavish submission to the law of the place of contracting, nor
of the place of injury, nor of the flag. There is no territorialist dogma. In
10 Aho v. Jacobsen, 359 U.S. 25 (1959), vacating judgment in 249 F.2d 809 (1st Cir. 1957).
51Ibid.; see also Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transaflantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
52See 5 MooREu,

FFDERAI PRAcTIcm 65 et seq. (2d ed. 1951).

-3345 U.S. 571 (1953).
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Lauritzen there was only a construction of the Jones Act, made necessary by
the "literal catholicity of its terminology"35 -- a characteristic which the Jones
Act shares with most legislation.355 The Act was construed in a spirit of "reconciling our own with foreign interests and... accommodating the reach of our
own laws to those of other maritime nations."356 Romero extended this approach
to the nonstatutory maritime law.357 A prime advantage of this approach over

traditional conflict-of-laws methodology is that, while inquiring specifically into
the governmental policies and interests involved, it explicitly recognizes the
power of the legislative branch to determine what domestic policy is and when
domestic interests require the application of that policy, so that legislative
rectification of any interpretation which does not serve the public interest is
positively invited. 355 The traditional method not only obscures, or treats as unimportant, governmental policies and interests, but tends to discourage legislative modification of judicial precedent by its pretense that the results which it
produces are, in the nature of things, limitations on sovereign power.
The method employed by the Court in these two cases was thus admirably
constructive. In Lauritzen it produced a result to which no exception can be
taken; there appears to be no reason whatever why this country had any interest, in that case, in applying its law to compensate the injured seaman. In
Romero, however, it may be respectfully suggested that legitimately applicable
American policy was given insufficient consideration.
In Lauritzen the injury occurred in Havana, Cuba; in Romero it occurred in
Hoboken, New Jersey. According to the majority of the Court, "This difference
does not call for a difference in result."359 The place of injury was regarded as a
"wholly fortuitous circumstance"36 (which it sometimes is), "I and the desirability of allowing a foreign vessel to operate under a single law, with a uniformity of liability unmarred by such fortuities, was treated as the paramount
consideration. The imposition of liability under American law would disrupt
international commerce "without basis in the expressed policies of this country.

3 62

So far as the claims for indemnity are concerned this is a commendable position. Providing compensation for the injured seaman and regulating the
31 345

U.S. at 576.

See Currie, Married Women's Contracts:A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. Cm.
L. REv. 227, 230-31 (1958); Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 CoLutM. L.
Rxv. 959, 961 (1952).
3

345 U.S. at 577.

157358

U.S. at 382.
3" 358 U.S. at 383.
' 8 Cf. 358 U.S. at 382-83; 345 U.S. at 578.
380 358 U.S. at 384.
361Cf. Currie, The Constitutionand the "Transitory" Cause of Action, 73 HAv. L. REv. 36
(1959); Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication versits Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10

STAN. L. REv. 205 (1958).
62358 U.S. at 384.
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liability of the shipowner are the concern of the state of their common nationality, and this country has no interest in intruding its own policies into that relationship. The point was persuasively made by the briefs filed by the United
Kingdom, Denmark, the Norwegian Shipping Federation, and the Swedish
Shipowner's Association as amid curiae. Thus Denmark, pointing out that
standards of income and compensation differ greatly, said:
What might seem a relatively minor extra burden to the United States could be a
major disaster to Danish shipping and hence to Denmark's entire economy. A decision
which would have the effect of imposing American law and American standards of
compensation on Danish shipowners for injuries received by Danish seamen on Danish
ships could be gravely deleterious to the economic health ... of Denmark. 3
The British brief emphasized the inequalities among foreign seamen if those
who happened to be injured in American ports were compensated according to
liberal American standards:
The verdict of a New York City jury assessing the damages of an injured Japanese
seaman might well exceed the award of a Japanese court by 10 to 1. Obviously, the
interests of justice would not be served if one Japanese seaman who had been injured
on a vessel of his country's flag while fortuitously in an American port were given this
great advantage over a fellow Japanese seaman performing the same services who had
64
been injured in Osaka.
In short, a typical jury verdict under the Jones Act would have imposed a
severe burden on the Spanish Line, enabling Romero to live in ducal splendor in
his home country. The United States had no interest in producing such a result.
But the record in Rornero shows that the injured seaman had incurred in this
country heavy medical and related expenses which remained unpaid. The unpaid bill of the hospital was $3,750.60; that of the supplier of the artificial leg
was $195; that for burial of the severed leg was $25.165 The bare possibility that
local suppliers of medical services may not be reimbursed by an indigent victim
has been held by the Supreme Court to justify a state's application of its own
law, even though that law may permit recovery of more than enough to pay any
such creditors.G6e In dealing with the problem in that context, however, the
Court is bound, within limits, by the state court's determination of state policy
and of the circumstances which justify the application of that policy; even if the
state court has not made those matters explicit, the Court may, in deference to
state authority, uphold the application of the law of the forum on the ground
that the state's interest might reasonably be so interpreted. In dealing with
federal rather than state law the Court has no such authoritative determination
1'-Brief of the Government of Denmark, Amicus Curiae, p. 4.
," Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom, Amicus Curiae, p. 5.
'
Record, vol. 1, pp. 107a, 116a.
' Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955). Cf. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc.
Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939). See Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law, 26 U. Cm. L.
Rv. 9, 23 (1958).
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before it, and no reason for assuming that the purpose of Congress is to press a
policy to the outermost limits of reasonableness; it has to determine for itself
what the national policy is and where the national interest lies.
The case affords an excellent opportunity for consideration of the judicial
function in conflict-of-laws cases in the light of the governmental-interest
analysis. A court's first task is to ascertain and declare the governmental policy
as it has been expressed in statutes and judicial decisions, and as it may be
interpreted in the light of all the relevant considerations accessible to the court.
The process is one of construction and interpretation, and is essentially the same
as that employed in a purely domestic case; as in a domestic case, the process
may be dynamic and creative. What is clear is that the court cannot of its own
mere wish and motion determine governmental policy. There must be some
existing culture which, however dormant, can be stimulated into growth and
nurtured and developed by the numerous arts of the judicial process. Principles
found in past decisions and statutes can be projected and adapted; past errors
can be rectified; changed social conditions can be taken into account, and the
competing interests of individuals and groups within the state can be appraised.
The powerfully creative instrument of analogy is always at hand. By these and
kindred methods new policies can be brought into being. In some such way it
came to be national policy that seamen should be indemnified by their employers for injuries caused by unseaworthiness even in the absence of negligence. 6 7 On the other hand, when counsel in Lauritzen v.Larsen made a "candid and brash appeal" for the application of the Jones Act to the case before
the Court for the purpose of helping seamen generally and in order to enhance
the cost of foreign ship operation for the benefit of our competing industry, the
Court administered a deserved rebuke. "The argument is misaddressed. It
would be within the proprieties if addressed to Congress. Counsel familiar with
the traditional attitude of the Court in maritime matters could not have intended it for us."368 In substance the argument proposed that the Court manufacture a policy tending to bring the cost of foreign shipping to the level of our
own. Such a policy was so collateral to the obvious policy of the Jones Act-to
provide indemnity for seamen injured by the negligence of their employersand so predatory that no grounds existed for inferring it, even if the Court had
been so inclined. 69
67
'
Cf. GI .moI & BLACK, Tim LAW or ADIRALTY 315 et seq. (1957).
368345 U.S. at 593. In a note (id. at 593, n.29) the Court added the following quotation from
The Peterhof, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 28, 57 (1866): "In cases such as that now in judgment, we
administer the public law of nations, and are not at liberty to inquire what is for the particular
advantage or disadvantage of our own or another country."
169Though a clearly expressed Congressional policy may be predatory and collateral to the
principal reasons adduced in its support it will be respected by the courts within constitutional
limits. Cf. 38 Stat. 1164, 1165 (1915), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 597 (1944); Strathearn S.S. Co.
v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 348 (1920); ZEis, AammIcAxu SHIPPIG PoLicy 70 (1938). But there seems
no reason why the restraint imposed by due process upon a state's application of its policy
to matters not within its legitimate sphere of concern should not apply also to the national
government. Cf. Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law, 26 U. Cm. L. Rtv. 9 (1958).
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The second task of the court is to determine in what circumstances there is a
reasonable basis for the application of the governmental policy: i.e., whether
there is a domestic interest in the application of our law. In Lauritzen there was
no question about the general policy embodied in the Jones Act of providing
indemnity for negligently injured seamen; the question related to the interest
in applying that policy; and the Court found no basis, in the light of all the circumstances of the case, for an interest on the part of the United States.
At this point there is involved an aspect of the process of construction which
is peculiar to the conflict-of-laws situation. In a purely domestic case the court
may have to decide whether a determined policy applies to a peripheral state
of facts: as, for example, whether the policy allowing limitation of the liability
of the owner of a vessel applies to a marginal maritime structure. 3 ° The problem of determining whether a given policy applies to a case having foreign
aspects is essentially similar, but presents a consideration not presented by a
purely domestic case: another state may have a different policy and an interest
in its application. It is altogether fitting and proper that the existence of such a
foreign interest should be a factor in the court's determination of whether a conflicting American interest exists. Such conflicts ought not to be created lightly
and unnecessarily, and I take it that this is what Mr. Justice Jackson meant
when he spoke of "reconciling our own with foreign interests and... accommodating the reach of our laws to those of other maritime nations. 3 7' Even if
our lack of responsibility to the injured Danish seaman in Lauritzenhad been less
clear than it was, the conflict with Danish interests which would have resulted
from an application of the Jones Act on the facts of that case would have been
a material consideration which might have led the Court to define American
interests with moderation and restraint.
In Romero the Court was required to concern itself first of all with the policy
of the act. The fact that the injury had occurred in an American port could not,
indeed, alter the fact that, in so far as the policy is concerned with the welfare
of the seaman, it has no application to alien seamen employed on foreign
vessels. But the occurrence of the injury in this country entailed consequences
not only to the alien seaman but to American citizens. Such consequences can
be predicted in the generalized case, and it actually happened that Americans
who went to the aid of the victim were left unpaid. These circumstances
properly presented to the Court a question which it did not discuss directly: Can
the Jones Act be interpreted as expressing a policy, not only for the protection
of an injured seaman, but also for the protection of those who come to his
assistance? With some reason, the Court might have answered this question in
the affirmative. In the domestic situation the seaman's recovery from the
wrongdoer provides a fund from which the claims of such creditors may be
satisfied. When an injury such as Romero's occurs in an American port, Ameri370
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can life-saving machinery goes into action as a matter of course, but not without
cost. In addition to medical services, the victim is in need of legal services.
Even if his only recourse is to apply to the Spanish consul for compensation,
he needs that legal advice; and the alien seaman, injured though he is, has problems with the immigration authorities.3 72 To protect the stranger within our
gates to the extent of encouraging our residents to furnish these necessary
services, as well as to secure their reimbursement from the wrongdoer, would
be a reasonable national policy,373 and one which might with some effort be
attributed to the Jones Act.
The trouble is that the Jones Act and the remedy for unseaworthiness are
not even roughly proportioned to such a policy. They allow recovery not only
for medical (and legal) expenses but also for loss of earning power and pain and
suffering, and these major elements of recovery have nothing immediately to
do with legitimate American concerns. Even so, it might conceivably be the
policy of Congress to give the injured seaman, who is in a better position than
his creditors to prove his case, an incentive to prosecute the action and thereby
produce a fund from which they can be repaid. To this end the policy might be
to provide for recovery sufficient not only to cover the claims of American
creditors but to give substantial compensation to the seaman as well.
There is little basis for attributing any such policy to Congress. In the domestic situation, on which legislative attention is typically focused, there is no
need to particularize the policies involved; a provision that the victim may recover plenary damages will incidentally protect his domestic creditors; the
question whether, if we have no interest in compensating the seaman himself,
we are nevertheless interested in protecting him for the benefit of his local
creditors, is not likely to be considered. All we can say is that Congress might
reasonably have formulated such a policy if it had directed its attention to the
possibility that a case like Romero's might arise.
Here, in the determination of what the governmental policy is, as in the determination of whether there is governmental interest in the application of that
policy, the Court must reckon with the fact that an immoderate and provincial
determination may lead to serious conflict with the policies and interests of a
foreign state. To have allowed Romero to recover full indemnity would have
imposed a heavy burden on a Spanish enterprise, contrary to the policy formulated by Spain in reconciling the interests of its seamen and shipowners, for the
purpose of incidentally securing reimbursement of relatively minor expenses
incurred by American citizens. The international implications of such a policy
are sufficiently serious to warrant the Court's reluctance to attribute it to
Congress on the basis of mere speculation.
The Court left no doubt, however, that such a policy, if declared by Congress,
would be respected and enforced. There would be no room for "weighing" the
372 8 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq.
Cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1283, imposing directly on the vessel liability for treatment of alien seamen afflicted with certain diseases and disabilities.
373
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respective policies and interests of the United States and Spain. There would be
no room for a judgment that the interests of American creditors, and of the
United States in protecting them, are less significant than the interests of Spanish shipowners, and of Spain in protecting them. There would be no room for
talk about facilitating international commerce by so arranging matters that
vessels may operate throughout the world under a uniform law. There would be
no room, certainly, for a doctrinaire pronouncement that such matters are
governed by the law of the flag, or the law of the place of contracting, or the law
of the place with the greatest number of "contacts" with the transaction. And
the same would be true if the Court were, without explicit clarification from
Congress, to reach the conclusion that the Jones Act expresses a policy for the
protection of the creditors of the victim. The national policy being clear, it is
the duty of the courts to apply it, not to subordinate it to considerations which
may seem to the courts more important. If congressional policy unwisely creates international complications, that is a matter for rectification by Congress,
not by the courts.
Assuming that such a policy for the protection of American creditors had
been found, in what situations would there be a reasonable basis for-a domestic interest in-its application? In view of its more moderate interpretation
of national policy, the Court did not reach this question, which is of the same
type as that decided by the Court in Lauritzen. Clearly the policy would be
applicable where, as in Romero, the victim is indigent, services are actually
rendered by Americans, and no payment has been made. Perhaps, in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary from Congress, the hypothetical
policy should be applied only under these conditions; the Court might be influenced so to hold by the unnecessary conflict with Spanish interests entailed
by an unnecessarily broad application. On the other hand, as we have observed,
a state may constitutionally employ for the effectuation of policy a tool which
cuts a wider swath than is absolutely necessary to accomplish the stated purpose, if there are reasonable grounds for so doing; 74 so may Congress, and the
federal courts may infer such a congressional design. Hence it might reasonably
be determined that the mere occurrence of the injury here warrants application
of our law, in view of the probability that the injury will entail consequences
of concern to us.
37
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If Romero had died of his injuries-as he nearly did-his American creditors would not

be aided even by the interpretation of the Jones Act discussed in the text. Logically, we should
be concerned as much to protect the American creditors when the victim dies as when he
survives. The reasonable basis for the application of such a protective policy is there; but the
policy is not. The death and survival provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
incorporated in the Jones Act, are construed like Lord Campbell's Act: the proceeds belong
to the statutory beneficiaries, and are not subject to the claims of creditors. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51,
59; In re Scheller's Estate, 87 N.Y.S. 2d 550 (1949); cf. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry., 237 U.S. 648,
656 (1915); Hogan v. New York Cent. R.R., 223 Fed. 890 (2d Cir. 1915). The absence of a
policy for the protection of creditors where death ensues may be an argument for not inferring

such a policy where the victim survives. And cf. note 364 supra.
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The difficult problem here is not one of "conflict of laws." The duty of a
judge when he knows that the law (the policy and interest) of his own country
is in conflict with that of another seems perfectly clear. The problem arises from
the imprecision of our laws relating to personal injury. These may express
various policies: compensation for the victim or his dependents, protection of
local creditors, deterrence of wrongful conduct, and so on. Not only are the
precise policies seldom made explicit, but the amounts recoverable are not
nicely adjusted to various policies which might otherwise be attributed to the
legislature. The real problem is not what to do when there is a "conflict of laws"
but whether domestic policies and governmental interests give rise to such a
conflict.
It is not indispensable, of course, that domestic law be applied in order to
protect local creditors. If the foreign law provides for sufficient recovery, a
judgment under that law will no doubt serve the purpose. But this requires a
judgment in our courts; and the courts did not award recovery to Romero
under Spanish law. On the basis of the doctrine of forum non conveniens the
district court declined to adjudicate the claim against the Spanish Line even
in admiralty; and, while the plaintiff may have invited or even acquiesced in
this disposition, preferring to proceed otherwise, there are often obstacles to the
application of foreign law, or reasons why that law would inadequately protect
domestic interests317 Moreover, the application of foreign law to effectuate our
own policies is anomalous; its application to protect the interests of American
creditors, if we have no domestic policy for their protection, is even more so. If
it is domestic policy to protect American creditors, American law should be
applied.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter said: "[Tihe similarity in purpose and function of
the Jones Act and the general maritime principles of compensation for personal
injury, admit of no rational differentiation of treatment for choice of law purposes." 3 77 To the extent that this means that the methodology of the Lauritzen
case is equally appropriate when the general maritime law, as distinguished
316
See notes 27 and 28 supra.In O'Neill v. Cunard White Star, 160 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1947)
(note 234 supra), the action was for the death at sea of a British seaman employed on a British
vessel. The deceased, although a British subject, had resided here for some twenty years and
had declared his intention of becoming a citizen; his widow, who had resided here for almost
as long, had also declared her intention to be naturalized; their four children were native-born
citizens. The Jones Act clearly declares a policy of compensating the dependents of seamen
killed through the negligence of their employers; there was no reason to suppose that Congress
did not wish to assert its obvious interest in protecting its own domiciliaries and citizens. On the
very ground that the widow and children were domiciled here, the court refused to dismiss on
forum non conveniens grounds. Yet, in a singularly unperceptive opinion, JudgeLearned Hand
held the Jones Act inapplicable. The British law was not applied because Lord Campbell's Act
contains its own one-year limitation period. See s.c. below, 69 F. Supp. 943, 946 (S.D.N.Y.
1946). The court should have held American law applicable (cf. Ganbera v. Bergoty, 132
F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1942)); at the very least it might have respected the American policy of
allowing a longer time to sue.
37 358 U.S. at 382.
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from acts of Congress, is under consideration, this is an unexceptionable statement. The statement overlooks, however, a possible solution which would have
given some protection to American interests while not entailing the serious
international consequences which would have followed an application of the
Jones Act or the remedy for unseaworthiness. Might not the Court, by a discriminating analysis of the right to maintenance and cure, have held that
modest remedy available? Under it the seaman would recover only medical expenses during convalescence, wages to the end of the voyage, and board and
lodging. It is reasonable to assume that the foreign interests on whose behalf
amicus briefs were filed would not have objected to such a recovery; their concern was with a judgment for full indemnity, which would be a gratuitous interference with the standards of compensation to which they were accustomed.
They could hardly object with good reason to a judgment which would do little,
if anything, more than compensate American citizens for the cost of caring for
the alien seamen injured here in the service of the foreign ship.""
That national policy as interpreted in the Romero case poorly serves private
American interests in connection with domestic injuries to foreign seamen is
underscored by the fact that, while the claims against the Spanish Line were
dismissed, those against the three American defendants were remanded for possible trial-presumably before a jury, there being diversity of citizenship.
These claims for simple maritime tort might well result in full indemnity to the
same extent as if the employer had been liable under the Jones Act. The factual
basis for the claims was slender: against the American stevedoring contractor,
for example, the charge was, essentially, that its employees looked on in a
hostile manner as the crew prepared the ship's tackle for taking on the cargo,
the longshoremen believing that this was work within their jurisdiction; their
attitude made everybody nervous, and so contributed to the injury. But a New
York jury could be quite generous to a seaman in such circumstances, the more
logical defendant-the shipowner-being no longer in the case.
Conflict-of-laws theory has here produced an incredible jumbling of values.
American policy calls on the injured seaman's employer to pay his medical expenses even if the employer is free from fault. Yet, because of "our self-regarding respect for the relevant interests of foreign nations,"3 ' the foreign employer is allowed to escape any responsibility whatever for those expenses,
while American enterprises which supplied materials and services are left to
bear the cost of their humanity. If an American tortfeasor can be found, however, they may be relieved of that burden-and, moreover, the foreign seaman
may get the handsome recovery which was denied him under the Jones Act on
the ground that it would disproportionately enrich him and unduly burden
378
Indeed, there is indication that under Spanish law the plaintiff was entitled to the
equivalent of maintenance and cure in addition to a pension. Brief of Respondent Compania
Trasatlantica on the Merits 18.
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358 U.S. at 383.
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foreign shipping enterprise. Presumably we prefer burdening the American
economy with generous verdicts for foreign seamen to imposing the burden of
such verdicts on foreign enterprise.
Obviously, what we need is a national policy intelligently related to private
American interests. I do not suggest that we should, as we might selfishly do,
restrict the liability of American tortfeasors so that it does not benefit foreigners injured here. We have a selfish interest in providing some protection for the
victim in such circumstances; moreover, we can probably afford the luxury of
not discriminating against aliens when they sue domestic defendants for wrongful conduct here. I do suggest that we need a policy which takes account of the
burden imposed on the community when a foreign seaman is injured here, and
which, if it generously gives a seaman a handsome verdict against an American
which it denies him against a foreigner, is at least deliberately generous. It is by
no means clear to me that it is American policy, or intelligent American policy,
to provide a ducal standard of living for Romero in his home country at the expense of American, but not Spanish, business enterprise.
If Congress and the federal courts do not improve this situation, a state like
New Jersey or New York may be tempted to intervene. 8 0 Such a state might
reasonably be concerned about unpaid local creditors, and about the plight of
the domesfic tortfeasor who is held liable for full indemnity while the foreign
employer goes free. It seems perfectly clear, however, that the rule of the Romero
case on the inapplicability of American maritime law would be binding on the
state courts if the seaman's action were brought there under the saving clause.
For this proposition there is no need to seek an authority establishing the converse of the ruling in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co." 5' The Supreme Court

has made it perfectly clear that its ruling in Romero is an interpretation of national policy having important implications for international relations. Indeed,
so far as the Jones Act is concerned, the ruling is not simply a "choice-of-law"
rule, concerning which there might be some disputation as to the freedom of the
state to go its own way, but a construction of the Act itself in the light of the
presumed intention of Congress. So far as the general maritime law is concerned,
the ruling is equally an adjudication of its scope and meaning. The conclusion
380The United States does not even alleviate the situation to the extent of making freely
available the facilities of the Public Health Hospitals, which are open without charge to seamen on American vessels. When "suitable accommodations" are available seamen of foreignflag vessels may be treated "on application of the master, owner, or agent of the vessel," in
azcordance with regulations. The vessel may not be granted clearance until the expenses are
paid or guaranteed. 62 Stat. 1017 (1948), 42 U.S.C. § 249. In the Romero case the trial judge
asked: "And he never went to the Public Health Service?" Counsel for the plaintiff replied:
"No, they wouldn't accept him unless the company would guarantee it, in the case of a foreign
country." Record, vol. 1, p. 89a, Romero v. International Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
This may mean either that no application was made by the master or agent, or that the application was refused. The latter interpretation seems unlikely in view of the power to deny
clearance to the vessel until payment is secured.
381313 U.S. 487 (1941).

THE MACE OF TE VIcE-AD zALTY COURT
OF THE PROViNCE OF NEW YopK

This mace, in the form of a silver oar, symbolized the royal authority in the ViceAdmiralty Court of the Province of New York and is now employed as a symbol of
the admirality jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York. See Appendix, page 75 infra.
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is inescapable that if the federal courts cannot apply federal law to such a situation, neither can the state courts. And unless the Jensen33 2 line of cases is to be
overruled it is equally clear that the state cannot fashion laws of its own to cover
injuries to seamen."' 3 We thus find ourselves in the unhappy predicament that
while Congress, and the courts in their application of conflict-of-laws theory,
are careless of American interests, the states are powerless to protect them.

APPENDIX*
GIFT
of
SILVER OAR
to
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
for the
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
CouRT IN BANC, Room 506
February 14, 1941, 10:30 A.M.
JuDGE KNOX: The Court takes pleasure in recognizing Mr. Burlingham.
MR. BtRLiNrnAm: May it please the Court: We are here today to present to the
Court the Silver Oar, well known to the admiralty bar but rarely seen. I doubt whether
there is anyone in this room who has seen it until this year, unless perhaps Mr. Gilchrist if, as I hope, he is here.
The Silver Oar was the mace of the Vice-Admiralty Court of the Province of New
York until the court was dissolved in 1775 by the Revolution. The marshal of the court
at that time was Thomas Ludlow, Jr., who took the oar into his own possession, doubtless for safekeeping, which, as we know, is eleven points of the law. Gradually his de332Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). See GmmopE & BLACK, THE LAW

or ArmuzALTY 333 et seq. (1957).
s On the trial of the Romero case there was mention of liens claimed by medical creditors.
Record, vol. 1, p. 116a, Romero v. International Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959). Statutes
in both New York and New Jersey provide for such liens; see, e.g., for hospital liens, N.Y.
LmN LAW § 189; 2A N.J. STAT. ANNs. ch. 2A §§ 44-35 el seq. (1952). The New York statute by
its terms appears to be inapplicable, since it applies to hospitals "in the state" and to actions
"in any court of this state." The New Jersey statute purportedly applies to "any and all"
rights of action which the injured patient may have against a negligent tortfeasor. There remains room for some doubt whether New Jersey law would be permitted to interferewith the
rights of a seaman asserted in the United States District Court in New York; at all events, the
lien is useless if the court denies liability under federal law.
* This Appendix, consisting of Document 259, February, 1941, from the court's records,
was made available through the courtesy of Herbert A. Charlson, Esq., Clerk of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Mr. Charlson's letter of March
10, 1959, states that the original silver oar is, pursuant to order of the judges of the court, on
loan to the Museum of the City of New York for public exhibition; the oar in use by the court
is a replica of the original and is made of brass, silver plated.
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scendants came to regard the oar as their private property; but about two years ago
one of the latest Ludlows put the oar up as collateral for a loan from a National Bank
of this District and it was sold last October to a silversmith whose public spirit and
artistic sensibility led him to sell it to us without profit to himself.
Many efforts had been made to persuade the Ludlow family to give the oar to this
court, but in vain. Mr. Gilchrist informs me that about fifty years ago it was exhibited
to judge Addison Brown, then the sole judge of this court. Those who knew him and
remember his battered old beaver hat know that he was not a man likely to encourage
unnecessary expenditure for the purchase of a small oar, only twenty-two inches long
and weighing only twelve ounces and seventeen pennyweight.
Later, about thirty years ago, an artificer suggested to the court that he could make
a copy of the oar, and a copy was made. When I learned this from Mr. Gilchrist, I
hurried up to court to see the object, fearing that it was a replica and that, as I had
already begun to try to get the original, I might find my labors vain; but the copy
proved to be made of lead weighing forty ounces. So I contentedly continued my
efforts.
You may be interested to know how we came to obtain the oar. Professor Julius
Goebel, Jr., of the Columbia School of Law, a distinguished student of the history of
thelaw, wrote me that the oar was for sale at Mr. Robert Ensko's, a well known silversmith of New York. I conferred with my dear friend, judge Thacher, and we concluded
that we must have that oar. Unfortunately, there was another bidder, judge Thacher's
alma mater. Yale University, which has the finest collection of silver in this country,
given it by Francis P. Garvan, was eager to get the oar because it was made by Charles
LeRoux, one of the best and most famous of American silversmiths. He was the official
silversmith of the City Council, and he made the gold box which contained the seal
attached to the certificate of the freedom of the city granted to Andrew Hamilton of
Philadelphia, who defended John Peter Zenger in the famous trial here in New York
which determined the freedom of the press. I secured an option on the oar, and the
money flowed in from our friends who are here today. I appealed to the admiralty
lawyers first, and other members of the bar of this court joined us; I should say also
that The Maritime Law Association of the United States contributed generously.
If the Court please, I present in behalf of the Bar this small but beautiful and rare
piece of artistry. Inscribed on it are the Royal coat-of-arms, the title of the ViceAdmiralty Court and the anchor and the crown on the obverse. There are also inscribed the initials CLR, Charles LeRoux. We have no hallmarks in America. American silver of this quality is very rare. I present it to the Court in full confidence that
they will preserve and cherish it.
JUDGE KNOX: Mr. Burlingham, on behalf of my colleagues and myself, I wish to express our deep appreciation of this generous act upon the part of the Bar. It seems appropriate to me upon this occasion that the response to the gracious words of Mr.
Burlingham should be made by our brother, Judge Woolsey, who came to us from the
Admiralty Bar.
JuDGE WooLsEy: Judge Knox, Mr. Burlingham, Gentlemen of the Committee of
Donors and Gentlemen of the Bar:
This gracious gift, involving as it does the recapture of the ancient mace of our
predecessor Court, is an occasion which cannot be passed by the Court in silentia.
It deserves comment, and you, Judge Knox, have been good enough-because of
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my association for years with the Admiralty Bar of this Court-to ask me to accept
this oar in behalf of the Court, and to embroider my acceptance with what I might regard as appropriate comments. You little knew, sir, I fancy, that you were in effect
mounting me on one of my hobbies-a dangerous indulgence to give to an antiquarian,
who has, when his means would permit, allowed himself to venture into the alluring
field of the collection of old silver. But I promise to ride my hobby on a curb, and after
a very short canter to rein him back on his haunches, and bring him to a sudden stop.
I have the following remarks to make which I hope may prove of interest.
A silver oar was, throughout the British Empire from the early part of the eighteenth
century, the mace of the Vice-Admiralty Courts, of which there was one in each of the
principal ports of that Empire. The size and design of the maces were identic.
The Vice-Admiralty Courts were commissioned under the Great Seal of the High
Court of Admiralty in England and dealt with questions not only of Forfeiture for
Customs Violations, but also with Prize causes, an important jurisdiction, because, until the last World War, the proceeds of the sales of captured vessels and cargoes found
their way to a large extent into the pockets of their captors.
Although there were many Vice-Admiralty Courts in this hemisphere, we find still
extant, so far as I can discover, the maces of only three; that of Bermuda, mentioned
by Judge Hough, the greatest student of our Court history, in the preface to his invaluable book on "Cases in Vice-Admiralty and Admiralty, New York 1715 to 1788";
that of Boston, discovered, I think, since Judge Hough's book was written; and that
of New York, which is being given to us today. We have known about the latter for
many years and this Court has had a replica of it in base metal since the latter days of
Judge Addison Brown, who was the only Judge of this Court from 1881 to 1901,
when-before its merger with the old Circuit Court in 1911-it was predominantly
an Admiralty Court.
There has been a Court with Admiralty jurisdiction in New York City almost continuously since October 5, 1678, when Sir Edmund Ambrose, the then Governor
General, appointed Stephen Van Cortlandt, then Mayor of New York, to be Judge
of the Court of Admiralty of the Province of New York.
The Colonial Court of Vice-Admiralty came to an end on December 19, 1775. Its
last official act was, I understand, the taxation of a bill of costs!
This Vice-Admiralty Court was in due course succeeded by the Admiralty Court of
the State of New York, which lasted until after the adoption of the United States
Constitution. Then in 1789-the first Court to be formed under the United States
Constitution, as Mr. Thacher told us on the occasion of our One Hundred and Fiftieth
Anniversary last year-came our present District Court as a Court of Admiralty.
The silver oar of the Vice-Admiralty Court was the outward and visible sign of the
authority which the Court derived from the Crown to arrest persons and vessels, and
it was carried, inserted in the top of a staff, before the Judge when he went into Court
and was laid on the Bench in front of the Judge whilst he was sitting.
The two silver oars still
extant in the United States were made circa 1725. We cannot be more precise as to the date, because the marks of American silversmiths do not
contain date letters.
The Boston oar was made by Jacob Hurd, one of the most celebrated colonial
silversmiths of that city and is now owned by the Massachusetts Historical Society.
The Boston oar and the oar which is being given to us today are of about the same

78

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

size and weight. Both of them are engraved in the style of lettering used in the first
quarter of the eighteenth century. The New York oar has the inscription "Court of
Vice-Admiralty New York" with the British Coat of Arms on one side and the Crowned
Anchor, which was the seal of the Admiralty Court of Great Britain, on the other.
This oar which is being given to us today was made by Charles LeRoux, who was
bornin 1689,and who died in 1745.Itbears his mark"C.L.R."LeRoux was a notedcolonial silversmith, and for a long period he served as the official silversmith of New York
City. As such he was employed to make many gold and silver boxes to contain the seals
attached to certificates granting the freedom of the City to illustrious visitors and citizens, and he engraved the plates for bills of credit issued at various times between 1715
and 1737. He was commissioned by the Common Council on one occasion to prepare
a gold box to enclose the Seal of the City of New York to be presented to George
Clinton on September 28, 1743.
Charles LeRoux himself received the Freedom of the City of New York on February 16, 1724, and the same year he was appointed Deacon of the New York School,
whatever that may mean, and inter alia, he held the office of Assistant Alderman of
the East Ward from 1735 to 1738.
The gift which is being made to the Court today, therefore, has not only the greatest
associati6n value by reason of the fact that it was the mace of a Court which was, so
to speak, our direct juridical ancestor, but also very great intrinsic value because it is
an exquisite example-more than 200 years old-of early colonial craftsmanship.
Mr. Burlingham and Gentlemen of the Donor Committee, this Court with the
deepest appreciation accepts as its mace the oar which you are now tendering to it.
As this oar has again found its proper venue after one hundred and sixty-six years,
the Court hopes that it will be preserved under the Court's control in safety through
the years to come in such manner as may be deemed advisable.
JUDGE KNOX: Once again, gentlemen, the Court expresses its thanks and appreciation and gives the assurance that we shall treasure and preserve this historic relic, and
draw inspiration from its symbolism. I am sure that those who follow us nill do no less.

